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Abstract. 
This thesis investigates the origins of statutory producer control that 
emerged out of the Board of Trade (Wool Industry) Regulations 1921, The Meat 
Export Control Act, 1921-22 and The Dairy Produce Export Control Act, 1923. 
Most histories have traced the formation of statutory producer organisations 
to the economic conditions that prevailed during the British Government' s 
1915-1921 bulk purchase agreement with New Zealand known as the 
'Imperial Commandeer' and the commodity price slump that marked the 
Commandeer' s conclusion . Analysis of agricultural income series and output 
data suggest that the popular view of a 'boom' and 'slump' cycle is over-
played. This thesis argues that net real farm incomes remained relatively 
static during the Commandeer while output contracted. The slump cycle 
beginning in 1920121 was particularly severe given the interaction of key 
demand and supply variables . The contemporary argument for statutory 
intervention may have been based on misconceptions in some cases , yet 
when the economic arguments are evaluated a strong case emerges. The 
central role played by W.F . Massey and his Reform Party Government is also 
important to an understanding of how this legislation came about . 
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Introduction 
Statutory producer control organisations known as 'producer boards' 
have provided the basis for the sale and marketing of New Zealand's 
agricultural commodities for almost seventy years. While producer boards 
have evolved during the intervening period, the legislation under which 
they were established provided the basis for the institutional and marketing 
structures under which the boards presently operate. During the 1980s 
changes in the political and economic environment have led to re-evaluation 
of the government's role in the economy and the role of statutory producer 
boards . Debate during the 1980s failed fully to develop an historical 
perspective, important since an understanding of the 1920s approach to 
issues tied to the boards may help to explain the structures and problems 
producer boards presently face. 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the origins of statutory 
producer control legislation under the Board of Trade (Wool Industry) 
Regulations, 1920, The Meat Export Control Act, 1921-22 and th~ Dairy Produce 
Export Control Act , 1923. Four principal themes will be developed . First, an 
evaluation of the hypothesis that boards emerged out of the economic 
conditions that prevailed during the First World War and post-war periods. 
Second, an examination of the role of the Reform Party Government and the 
Prime Minister, W.F. Massey in the board movement. Third, a consideration of 
the economic justifications for statutory intervention in agricultural 
marketing. Fourth, an evaluation of organisational issues tied to the producer 
board structure . 
Primary source material has been drawn from papers in the New 
Zealand National Archives and the Alexander Turnball Library . Other sources 
have been New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (principally from the House 
of Representatives ) and the Appendix to the Journal of the House of 
Representatives. Department of Statistics data has provided the basis for 
estimates of New Zealand Agricultural Income, 1914/15 to 1924/25. 
Thi s thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter examines the 
British Go ve rnment 's war-time commodity purchase agreement with New 
Zealand known as the 'Imperial Commandeer' . The first part of the chapter 
will consider the operation of the Commandeer as it related to the requisition 
of frozen meat dairy products and wool between 1915 and 1921. The second 
part of the chapter examines some of the difficulties surrounding the end of 
the Commandeer, specifically to stock-piles of goods, shipping shortages and 
adjustments to marketing in an uncontrolled environment. 
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The second chapter evaluates the impact of the Commandeer on 
production and income variables in New Zealand Agriculture during the First 
World War and post-war periods. The chapter examines the proposition that 
Boards were formed to reproduce the benefits of income security and price 
stability with which the Commandeer had been associated before the 1920/21 
slump. 
The third chapter reviews events leading up to the formation of 
statutory producer control organisations between 1921 and 1923. The role of 
the Reform Party Government and Massey as the central protagonist in the 
movement toward these organisations will be considered. A brief review will 
also be made of the statutory powers and functions of the Boards. 
The fourth chapter evaluates those aspects of primary product 
marketing that may have required government intervention from an 
economic perspective . Three broad justifications for statutory intervention 
are developed . First, 'optimum tariff' and economic rent arguments. Second, 
transactions cost minimising strategies. Third, technological economies of 
scale . 
The fifth chapter considers the apparent failure of the boards' 
architects to consider the wide range of issues contained in 'one package'. It 
focuses on the issues that emerged out of a wider debate during the 1980s 
over the State's role in the economy and perceptions of structural 
weaknesses in some government and quasi-government organisations. 
There are two appendices. The first appendix is a data series that 
includes incomes estimates for New Zealand agriculture between 1914/15 and 
1924/25 . Data is based on earlier series constructed by Philpott et al and 
extended back by this thesis from 1921/22 to 1914/15. This appendix 
represents the body of empirical research and forms the basis of key 
findings in chapter 2 and the conclusion. The second appendix includes the 
legislation and regulations that empowered each of the Wool Committee, the 
Meat Producers ' Board and the Dairy-Produce Control Board . 
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1. The Imperial Commandeer, 1915-1921. 
1.1 Introduction 
General histories have traced the formation of these boards to the 
circumstances and economic conditions that prevailed during the First World 
War and the two years of post-war prosperity. For most producers the period 
was associated with the British Government's war-time purchase contracts 
known as the 'Imperial Commandeer'. The Commandeer in turn was widely 
credited with positive consequences for marketing, prices and farmers' 
incomes emanating from these contractual arrangements. Woods(1988) has 
argued that; 
... the war period bulk purchase arrangements had been associated 
with a strong upward trend in prices paid to farmers, assured outlets, 
and prompt and guaranteed settlements. These arrangements had 
given the farming industry at least short term price stability and 
income security .1 
This chapter will consider events in New Zealand agriculture up to the 
point at which the Boards were established. The primary focus is the 
Commandeer which had important implications for the later development of 
the Control Boards. The first half of this chapter will consider the operation 
of the Commandeer as it applied to the requisition of meat, dairy produce and 
wool. The second half of this chapter will look at problems surrounding the 
end of the Commandeer such as commodity stockpiles, shipping shortages 
and adjustments to de-controlled marketing. Having thus surveyed New 
Zealand agriculture during the First World War and post-war periods, the 
second chapter will evaluate the impact of the Commandeer on levels of farm 
income and output. 
1.2 Overview: The Imperial Commandeer 
The aims of the Imperial Government in requisitioning New Zealand's 
pastoral production from 1915 on transcended the desire to clothe and feed 
British troops . While the need to supply military forces during the First 
World War may account for the early requisition, later requirements by the 
civilian population ensured that contracts were extended beyond the war's 
end. The Imperial Government was also aware of the potential for 
commodities to be sold outside the Empire particularly to neutrals that in turn 
1 Woods (1988), p 9. 
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could sell them to Germany or her allies. It was recognised that despite the 
shortage of shipping the British Government had a responsibility to ensure 
that production levels were maintained, not only for political expediency in 
its dealings with New Zealand but also as a means of satisfying its own 
requirements . This was despite the fact that during the war considerable 
quantities of produce were held in storage in New Zealand which had been 
purchased by the British but not yet consumed. 
If New Zealand was to contribute to the war effort it required a source 
of export income. As an ally New Zealand had some reason to expect the 
Imperial Government to promote the economy's well being. Indeed, had 
producers not been convinced that their dealings would be on an equitable 
basis some refusal to comply with British embargoes and restrictions (as had 
been threatened in Australia) may have been a consequence. Producers were 
in a stronger position than they had been prior to the war, since 
requirements for commodities to satisfy wartime military and civilian uses 
placed a constraint on the British. Given their pre-occupation with the 
planning and operation of a wartime economy, the British were unable to 
negotiate term s that reflected their normal bargaining power as U.K. 
purchasers. 
While the Imperial Government acted as a single buyer, the strength 
of the nearly unanimous New Zealand farming lobby and its representation 
in the Government secured a cartel of interests. Had the British acted to 
exploit their power as the sole purchaser of New Zealand commodities (ie: 
monopsonist power), profits would have been made at the expense of 
producers . However by acting as an industry cartel producers secured 
reasonable prices and conditions , albeit at a level below the prevailing 
market price. New Zealand producers recognised their bargaining power and 
were prepared to exercise it-for instance in wool negotiations . The British 
were concerned to finali se purchase for the 1916-17 wool clip to secure raw 
material for production and to check speculation and profiteering. Aware of 
this situation Massey cabled the Acting Prime Minister, Ward : 
With reference to requisition of wool, [I) am of the opinion that price 
quoted below market values . On the other hand, proposal means 
solution of shipping difficulty, as Imperial Government take full 
responsibility, and by prompt cash wool grower would be safe . Advise 
full consideration and not to accept hurriedly .2 
Central to the relationship between New Zealand and the Imperial 
Government were the constraints imposed on both parties by the 
2 Ibid ., p 2. 
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international situation . New Zealand had few genuine alternative markets 
and certainly no means of supplying them without the cooperation of British 
shipping. Yet for all Britain's monopsony power, New Zealand still had 
significant input in the policy and decision making process. Producers were 
prepared to challenge and not to play the part of dependent nation on the 
periphery of the British Empire. By the same token the Imperial Government 
never consented to more than was demanded (and usually gave less) and 
secured an exclusive source of supply. For producers the Commandeer 
ensured price stability and removed uncertainty and risk in marketing, 
despite disputes over the distribution of wool profits and the government's 
handling of surplus wool stocks. The lessons of the Commandeer may be 
found in the transactions cost savings, the economies of scale from selling 
through a single desk operation and the benefits of monopoly bargaining 
power. It is in the Commandeer that the origins of the producer boards may 
be found, particularly in conjunction with the 1920-21 transition from 
control to the free market. 
In order to deal with the requisition of frozen meat on behalf of the 
Imperial Government from March 1915, the Imperial Meat Supply 
Department, afterwards known as the Department of Imperial Government 
Supplies, was established . Its initial functions were simply defined as taking 
charge of the business details relating to the requisition and purchase of the 
entire output of frozen lamb, mutton and beef available for export. 
As the First World War progressed, the requirements of the Imperial 
Government encompassed most of the commodities exported by New Zealand 
to the United Kingdom . Cheese followed the requisition of meat in October 
1915 while an Order in Council prohibiting the export of wool in November 
1916 was followed by requisition in December 1916. Butter was another major 
commodity required by the Imperial Government after November 1917. Other 
commodities such as condensed milk, milk powder, sheepskins and hides were 
all required from time to time during the war. 
The duties of the Department saw further expansion when an Order in 
Council of October 1916 established a butter equalisation fund administered 
by the Department to keep the local price of butter below the export price. 
The Department , in co-operation with the Dairy Division of the Department of 
Agriculture also purchased cheese and butter for supply to New Zealand 
military camps . 
Having commenced operations in March 1915 the Department 
continued to undertake work on behalf of the New Zealand and Imperial 
Governments. The last contract (for butter) terminated on March 31, 1921 
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with a final report made to the House of Representatives in 1922. This 
followed the shipment of outstanding stocks carried over from the Imperial 
purchases and detailed disbursements from the butter equalisation fund. 
During the period from March 3, 1915 to June 30, 1922 disbursements totalled 
£160,585,5073. The Department's operations may be put into perspective when 
it is realised that the total value of New Zealand exports in 1917 and 1918 was 
only £30 .58 million and £28.47 million respectively 4. Administration costs 
were low in proportion to turnover, reflecting economies of scale in 
administration. Total operating expenses to March 31, 1921 were £85,044 
which amounted to 12.75d per £100 of business or 0.0536% of the total 
disbursement. Operating expenses however varied between commodities . 
Wool had the highest administration cost at 24d per £100 (0.10%) followed by 
butter at 12d per £100 (0.05%), cheese at 8.67d per £100 (0.036%) and frozen 
meat at 4.5d per £100 (0.019%)5. 
The system of Imperial Commandeer was administered using a system 
of purchase by requisition through proclamation. The general method of 
negotiation was to arrange a conference between government, producer and 
trading interests in a given industry. Wool provides a useful example of the 
negotiation process arising from the British request to purchase the 1916-17 
season's wool clip. A series of conferences were held over an extended period 
between the Minister of Agriculture , William MacDonald, and the growers, 
brokers, buyers , freezing companies and other participants in the wool 
industry . The original offer of the Imperial Government was to purchase the 
whole clip at 1913-14 prices plus 45%. This offer was rejected and a counter 
offer made based on wool values at January 1916. A final offer acceptable to 
all parties was made at a 55% premium on 1913-14 prices to wool producers. 
The method of negotiation highlights two implications for the later 
development of control boards. In the first instance despite Britain's control 
of export shipping during the war period and the economic ties that bound 
New Zealand to Britain , 'agreement and unanimity were not secured as a 
matter of course·6. Furthermore as the war progressed and contractual 
negotiation s widened, industry interests became accustomed to this 
marketing arrangement. This may be attributed to the improved contractual 
condition s and the chronic shortage of shipping. In either case producers 
could be sure of a ready market for their exportable surplus at fixed prices. 
3 AJHR 1922, H-38 , p 5. 
4 NZOYB , 1919, p 351. 
5 AJHR 1921-22, H-38 , p 10. 
6 Smith (1936) , p 18. 
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In the second instance the conferences brought together diverse 
industry interests to negotiate their future development. Although this 
process was of less significance in the vertically integrated and largely co-
operative dairy industry, for the meat and wool sector's negotiations laid the 
basis for later initiatives to establish producer boards. 
1.3 Frozen Meat 
In the pre-war system of purchase and distribution meat was killed on 
the farmer's behalf and sold by means of 'consignment' (where produce was 
consigned to an agent to sell for the farmer). Often meat was bought from the 
farmers and processed by the freezing companies. Freezing companies then 
consigned the meat to an English braking company representing New 
Zealand exporters or sold it through domestic stock and station agents. In 
each case meat was sold either C.I .F 7 , ex-ship or "in store" at the port of final 
destination , typically to the Smithfield market in London . While London and 
the British market were not the only points of export, Smithfield wholesale 
remained the focus of New Zealand's frozen meat trade both before and after 
the war. 
The requisition of frozen meat commenced March 3, 1915. Setting a 
precedent for subsequent negotiations , a conference was convened by the 
Prime Minister with representation from freezing companies, shipping 
companie s, the Board of Agriculture and other industry interests. 
An original schedule of prices was adhered to until an upward 
revi sion of rates by the Imperial Board of Trade. Rates were then maintained 
from October 1916 until the final termination of contract on June 30, 1920. 
The prices represented a significant increase from the earlier contractS with 
the condition that they should operate at least three months after the war 
had ended. 
In contrast to the pre-war marketing system, the Imperial 
Government accepted ownership of all meat at the point it entered storage 
which meant that the Crown had responsibility for insurance, storage, 
delivery and importantl y risk. 
The agreement ensured the New Zealand domestic market was supplied 
before requisition of the exportable surplus . Payment was initially made 
when the meat was placed f.o.b (free on board) for export. However after 
7 The exporter is required pay for and arrange transportation and insurance to the port 
of destination (in other words for the cost, insurance and freight). 
8 Refer to price schedule AJ H R, 1921-22, H-38, p 24. 
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industry representation it was decided in 1918 to provide an advance 
representing 75 percent of the value of the meat that had remained in store 
for six weeks or more. For freezing companies and producers this 
arrangement was a method of prompt settlement between buyer and seller at 
minimal risk for both parties and under a regime of fixed prices. F.o.b. under 
normal circumstances meant that ownership and risk did not pass to the 
buyer until the meat had been placed 'free' on board the ship. While prices 
were typically quoted f.o.b. the requisition meant that ownership was 
accepted "ex factory"9; 
While the Imperial Government accepted both the risk and ownership 
of meat as it entered the freezing chambers, in practice payment was delayed 
and obligations for storage and insurance were with meat companies. For 
freezing companies there was an obligation to pay storage charges for a 
maximum period of three months (later reduced to one month) before they 
were "entitled" to payment of 0.09375d per pound per month from the 
Imperial Government. Companies were required to provide insurance for a 
maximum period of four months at their own cost. The 75 percent "advance" 
to freezing companies seems rather arbitrary in purchasing meat that 
should have been paid for in full as ownership and risk had been accepted by 
the purchaser. Clearly under these circumstances price quotation 'f.o.b.' is 
misleading, but a method that served the Imperial Government's purposes. 
Why were New Zealand producers prepared to accept an agreement 
that appeared to be exploitative? Some explanation may be found in the 
discussion of bargaining power; the relative strengths of the Dominion and 
Imperial positions , and the nature of the uncharacteristic market 
circumstances during war. The Imperial Government certainly appeared to 
be the senior party in the arrangement, but its actions need to be viewed in 
light of the relationship that existed between Britain and one of her 'White 
Dominions' 
The relationship was undoubtedly based on good faith between the two 
parties , but each had an eye to ensuring that its own interests were first 
protected. The articles of 'good faith' that characterised the relationship also 
defined its bounds . In practical terms this meant that when requisition 
contracts appeared inherently unfair to either party, flexibility and common 
sense prevailed to negotiate and resolve these difficulties. Evidence may be 
drawn from the re-negotiation of contracts for meat which saw increases in 
the price schedule and changes in conditions after market prices had 
increased. Final agreements were a compromise between the position of New 
9 AJHR , 1919, H-38, p 2. 
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Zealand producers in desiring payment 'up front' at the best possible prices 
and that of the Imperial Government which wanted exclusive rights of access 
to the exportable surplus with payment made at consumption. It is 
conceivable that payment was not effected in full as a means of protecting 
the buyer's interests. So long as payment was outstanding and the freezing 
companies were responsible for storage, some guarantee over the quality of 
the meat could be ensured. Similarly part payment was necessary for 
continuity of production and encouraged farmers to send their stock to the 
works even if the meat was not exported or consumed until some later date. 
Another aspect was the impact of the chronic shortage of refrigerated 
shipping. From December 1916 the quantity of meat in storage grew rapidly 
from 451,361 carcasses to 3,483,324 six months later in June 1917. During the 
Commandeer space remained critical and stored volumes peaked in June 1919 
at 7,934,921 carcasses 10. This accumulation was finally cleared two years later 
in 1921, one year after the last carcass had been requisitioned by the 
Imperial Government in June 1920. 
The growing level of meat in storage was paralleled by the growth of 
storage capacity . When the Imperial Government began purchase storage 
capacities at freezing works totalled 2,200,000 carcasses with 31 works in 
operation . By June 1917 eight new works had been established in the North 
Island and two in the South Island. Meanwhile storage capacity had doubled 
to 4,400,000 carcasses increasing to 7,405,272 by March 1919 with space for 
4,896,561 carcasses in the North Island and 2,508, 711 in the South Island 11. By 
the conclusion of the war New Zealand had storage capacity in excess of a 
normal season 's export production . Surplus capacity when normal market 
conditions were restored resulted in works closures and an under utilised 
capital stock. 
Meat provided the largest item of expenditure for the Imperial 
Government with total payments of over £53 million for the beef, mutton and 
lamb to New Zealand producers . Payments to producers in total varied from 
season to season due to changes in production levels and the availability of 
shipping . Prices however remained fixed and provided a basis upon which 
producers could calculate their returns from one season to the next. In the 
disposal of surplus pre-war marketing channels were retained between 
exporters and agents for meat that was surplus to military requirements. 
Exporters 'tagged' carcasses which were then passed to nominated agents for 
distribution and sale. 
10 AJHR, 1921-22, H-38, p 3. 
11AJHR , 1919, H-38. 
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Concern was raised over the method of sale for this surplus in a 1916 
report to the House relating to Meat Purchased by the Imperial Meat Supply 
Department 12 (predecessor to the Department of Imperial Government 
Supplies). While beef and mutton were utilised largely for military purposes, 
lamb was sold for consumption by the civilian population. Taking account of 
charges incurred by the Imperial Government on the f.o.b price paid for 
New Zealand lamb, it was calculated that at the prevailing market price in 
July, 1916 of 9 .5d per pound, a profit of 1.375d was being made at producers 
expense. Profits of this sort were not unusual while shortages continued 
until the control of trade and prices by the British Ministry of Food. 
Domestically the activities of private trade interests were a focus of 
industry attention . The system of disposal was claimed to facilitate the 
operations of "meat trusts" . This observation was of some importance when 
placed in the context of later demands for control legislation. Speculation was 
also regarded as a problem, particularly after the sale of meat on behalf of 
the home government and before it was passed on to retailers . Government-
controlled New Zealand meat was sold at a discount to Argentine mutton and 
lamb on the United Kingdom wholesale market. However on the retail market 
New Zealand meat was sold at equally high prices leading producers to 
question where the difference had gone. 
In brief it may be argued that the Imperial Commandeer provided a 
firm basis for the meat industry during the First World War. Nevertheless the 
combination of rising prices and government purchases did not appear to 
have facilitated significant increases in meat production or stock numbers. 
Sheep numbers declined from 24,798,763 in 1914 to 23,919,970 in 1920 though 
beef cattle rose from 1,649,560 in 1916 to 2,208,491 in 192013. Similarly no 
distinct increase may be seen in the number of livestock slaughtered, which 
declined for sheep and lambs from 1914 to the war's end and then increased 
after 1918 to 1923 . 
Causes for the limited quantity response of the meat industry may be 
found in the relative price differentials between meat and wool and also 
between meat and dairy products during the Commandeer. Prices for wool 
and dairy products increased more rapidly than meat which may have led 
farmers to concentrate on wool production or to switch to dairying (if this 
· was a viable option). Further explanation may be found in the rising costs of 
farm inputs and a deteriorating farming terms of trade. War-time demands 
meant shortages of labour and limited storage capacity constrained freezing 
12 AJHR , 1916, H-28. 
13 NZOYB 1926, 1927. 
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works' production. In the post-war environment frozen meat did not 
increase in price at the same rate as commodities such as butter and cheese. 
It did however enjoy a greater volume of exports particularly as refrigerated 
shipping was released for civilian purposes and contracts were extended. 
1.4 Dairy Produce 
Cheese was the first dairy commodity to be requisitioned when, during 
the 1915-16 season, the Imperial Government purchased one-third of the 
first- grade cheese produced at a price of 7.25d per pound14 (f.o.b). 
Requisition expanded in the 1916-17 season to encompass the entire 
exportable production of first and second-grade cheese. Prices reflected an 
upward tendency in the free market and increased by grade to 9.5d and 9.25d 
per pound f.o.b. respectively. The initial price increases were followed by 
significant increases for the 1917-18 and the 1918-19 seasons. Before the 
1917-18 season only first and second grade factory cheese had been accepted 
by the Imperial Government. After this time third grade factory and first and 
second grade dairy cheese were accepted, although at a significant discount 
to the quality grades. First grade factory cheese peaked during the 1918-19 
season at 10. 75d per pound while at the same time second grade dairy 
received only 8.75d per pound15. 
The system of payment was more favourable than that for frozen meat; 
'advances' were introduced in the 1916-17 season with a forward payment of 
90 percent on the prices established for that season. The advance applied to 
all cheese held in grading stores for at least twenty eight days while payment 
in full was made when the cheese had been shipped within twenty eight days 
of delivery to these stores. The advantage of this last arrangement was that 
producers received an early payment in full and loss of weight (and returns) 
through shrinkage was minimised . 
The quantity of cheese purchased by the Imperial Government 
increased during each year of the Commandeer. This wa.s attributable to the 
broader range and quality of cheese accepted by the authorities rather than 
to any rapid expansion of dairy farm output, particularly during the war. 
From the first contract during the 1915-16 season to the cessation of the last 
on July I , 1920, under the agreement cheese exports increased from 189,502 
14 An intial offer had been made on behalf of the Imperial War Office for 6000 tons of 
cheese at 6.5d per pound when some factories had already contracted to sell cheese 
during the 1915/16 season for 7.375 d per pound. (Ward, 1975, p34). 
15 Refer to price schedule, AJHR, 1921-22, H-38, p 25. 
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crates to 884,248 crates. In terms of total exports of cheese for the calendar 
years 1916 to 1920 exports increased from 949,000 Cwt to 1,222,000 Cwt 
respectively . In value terms £4,903,500 worth of cheese exports in 1916 had 
become £6,161,000 by 192016 reflecting the strong growth in prices and 
demand. Indeed relative to butter, the price of cheese rose more rapidly until 
1920. In an industry where many dairy factories had the capacity to produce 
both butter and cheese the increasing differential lead to growth in cheese 
output at the expense of butter until 1920. Where factories specialised, by 
1920, 384 were producing cheese compared to 154 producing butter. 
The system of Commandeer provided a basis for overcoming one of the 
more serious problems faced by New Zealand producers during the early 
years of the war; the transportation of goods to markets. In May 1915 
shipping companies notified that cheese freight rates would be increased by 
50 percent from 0.5d per pound to 0.75d while butter would be increased from 
2/6 per box to 3/-1 7. The increase in freight rates compounded the problem 
of limited space on ships and as stocks began to build storage space became 
critical. The level of organisation in the dairy industry was much greater 
than in meat and wool. The National Dairy Association (NDA) and the South 
Island Dairy Association (SIDA) provided an effective lobby for producers 
and obtained concessions from the shipping lines. The role of the NDA and 
SIDA as representative national bodies for producers was important in light 
of later developments for dairy farmers and other producers where the 
benefits of coordinated producer activity were demonstrated. 
The co-operative and vertically integrated dairy industry provided a 
precedent for the sort of negotiation that the meat and wool industry were 
experiencing for the first time. Certainly in terms of negotiations over price 
a protracted debate between producers and the Imperial Government ensued 
over proposals by the British to purchase cheese at below market prices. In 
the early years of the Commandeer these grievances remained unresolved. At 
a meeting between the Prime Minister and over 100 representatives from 
dairy companies in July 1917 the NDA-led delegation aired a number of 
concerns. These related to shortages of labour and shipping, the butter fat 
levy and the "inequitable " impact of the cheese commandeer on dairy 
companies. Price disparities between New Zealand dairy products and those 
from other producers in Australia and Canada may have had less to do with 
market forces than the bargaining power of the respective governments. To 
16 New Zealand External Trade , 1969-70 , Report and Analysis (Department of Statistics, 
1972) p 29. 
l7 Ward (1975). 
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this end New Zealand producers became increasingly aware of the strengths 
in acting together as a single seller. The nature and basis of marketing 
during the Commandeer was undoubtedly associated with the rising prices 
that producers enjoyed, an association that was evoked during debates over 
producer control during the early 1920s. 
The contract for butter was more intensely negotiated than for cheese. 
The July 1917 Conference provided the initial basis for preliminary 
arrangements in the sale and requisition of butter. A smaller committee was 
later appointed by the dairy companies to finalise the purchase agreement. 
Meeting on several occasions the committee achieved settlement with the 
Imperial Government in November 1917. The butter contract differed from 
cheese in the sense that it was negotiated to meet a civilian rather than 
military requirement, hence the urgency of the meat and wool negotiations 
was absent. The provisions of the agreement overcame some of the 
difficulties experienced with the cheese contract. The British authorities 
agreed ; 
that if any profit results from the sale of butter in the United 
Kingdom a sum representing 50 percent of the net profits as 
determined by the Imperial Government will be made available to the 
New Zealand Government for distribution to sellers pro rata in 
accordance with the quantities of butter purchased and shipped .1 8 
The butter contract also provided advances of up to 90 percent of the value of 
the butter grades purchased and placed in storage for a period four weeks 
(later reduced to a period of fourteen days) . Due to the delays in finalising 
the initial agreement a Government advance to dairy companies was 
required for payments to suppliers. 
Negotiation typically occurred annually with amendments to 
condition s and prices. Prices generally increased while provisions were 
added or deleted. The profit sharing condition of the 1917-18 contract for 
example was omitted in the 1918-19 season contract. By the conclusion of the 
1919-20 contract, shipping difficulties had led to the acceptance of liability 
by the Imperial Government for storage of butter in excess of six weeks. 
Whil e butter was one of the last commodities to be requisitioned by the 
Imperial Government it was also the last contract ending March 31, 1921. 
The peculiarities of the meat purchasing arrangement were duplicated 
in the butter and cheese contracts with the Imperial Government 
requisitioning the commodities 'ex factory' and purchasing on the basis of 
delivery f.o .b . In practical terms this meant that the factories were 
18 AJHR, 1918 , H-38, p 7. 
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responsible for storage and insurance despite the 90 percent advance 
payment. The 90 percent advance begs the question why not 100 percent or 
75 percent? The actual figure is probably not as important as the fact that it 
was an "advance" rather than a payment. Payment implies ownership and 
with ownership follows the risk and responsibility for storage, insurance 
and transportation. By ensuring that advances were made the Imperial 
Government minimised its cost structure and protected its commercial 
interests. 
During the duration of the Commandeer 3,148,510 boxes of butter (each 
weighing approximately 60 pounds) were exported at a total value of 
£16,979,748 or 10.6 percent of total payments from sales to the Imperial 
Government. Cheese exports totaled 3,137,765 crates at a value of £21,189,668 
(13.2 percent of total disbursements).19 The point about butter output during 
the war is the way both total production and exports remained largely static. 
Total exports of 434,000 lbs Cwt in 1914 fell to 254,000 lbs Cwt to 1917 and had 
recovered to just 312,000 lbs Cwt by 192020. This may be explained by the 
price differential between cheese and butter, for which the return on a 
butter fat basis in cheese was an estimated 2d to 3d per pound in excess of 
butter21. This was a condition that prevailed until the 1920-21 season when 
the Imperial Government , recognising a shortage of butter, increased the 
contract price from 181/- cwt fob for first grade creamery butter in the 
1919-20 season to 280/- for the 1920-21 season. Similar increases prevailed 
for other grades of butter. 2 2 
The prices for butter offered by the Imperial Government provided an 
impetus for factories to produce for export rather than domestic 
consumption . The contractual provision during the 1917-18 season for profit 
sharing encouraged some dairy factories to withdraw from the domestic 
market in expectation of higher returns through export. While the 
Government had placed controls on maximum prices in the market, the 
shortage of butter necessitated further action . Profits for the 1917-18 season 
of £307,997 were , in consultation with the butter factories, credited to an 
'Equalisation Fund ' for the purpose of supporting returns for factories 
supplying the domestic market. 
Although an 'equalisation fund ' as such was not formally established 
until 1919 , domestic stabilisation had been used as a means of maintaining 
19 AJHR , 1921-22, H-38, p 9 . 
20 Department of Statistics (1972) , p 29. 
21 Ward (1975), p 38. 
22 Refer to price schedule AJHR, 1921-22, H-38, p 25 . 
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balance between the domestic and export markets since 1916. In this instance 
the motivation was more clearly one of ensuring that consumers did not pay 
excessive prices for butter in light of world shortages. The Board of Trade 
recommended that the export of all butter and cheese be prohibited except 
under licence, and that maximum wholesale prices be established with 
distribution charges not exceeding those prevailing before the war. 
Regulations were introduced in October 1916 with the maximum wholesale 
price set at 0.25d per pound and a butter fat levy on all license holders of . 75d 
per pound to subsidise factories supplying the domestic market2 3. 
The Appropriation Act of 1919 and later 1920, provided for Government 
responsibility in the stabilisation of returns to producers. Payments were 
made to dairy factories at the rate of 1.955d per pound on butter sold at no 
more than 1 s 5d per pound. Total payments made for the 1918-19 season 
totalled £208,717 increasing to £277,364 by the 1919-20 season. From 1920 
payments were 6d per pound on butter sold at not more than 1 s 11.5d per 
pound although this rate was reduced to 3d per pound in April 1921 and later 
that month to 2d per pound reflecting falling prices in export markets. 
The scheme proved to be extremely expensive given the return of 
servicemen and an increased level of domestic consumption. As a result of 
these factors and the Government's decision to extend the scheme beyond the 
end of the Commandeer into 1922-23, the initial pool drawn from the 1917-18 
season's profits was exhausted. While £340,000 had been allocated under 
section 16 of the Appropriation Act 1919, funding was insufficient 
particularly when the government decided during 1920 to fix the local price 
of butter at 1/9 per pound while it was receiving 2/6 abroad. 
The Government's faced a 'dilemma' because domestic consumers were 
not prepared to pay the high export price for butter and producers were 
reluctant to subsidise domestic consumption. This became a dilemma in 
funding when unauthorised expenditure of £837,407 between 1919/20 and 
1922/23 was required to support the scheme24 . The complexity and cost of the 
Government's direct involvement in the marketing and control of 
commodities (witnessed in the attempted stabilisation through the butter 
equalisation fund), may help to explain a later willingness to delegate the 
powers of statutory intervention to producers themselves. 
23 New Zealand Journal of Agriculture Vol XIII no.5, 20 November, 1916, pp 423-428. 
24 Memo to the Minster of Finance from the Secretary of Treasury dated 23/5/29, NZNA, 
Treasury Paper, T 27/6/1 (Series 1), 'Butter Equalisation Fund, 1919-29'. 
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1.5 Wool 
Wool growers were at a distinct advantage relative to their Australian 
counterparts when it came to war-time negotiation with the British 
Government. New Zealand production was primarily cross-bred wool and not 
the predominantly finer wool of the Australian flock which was unsuitable 
for military purposes. In a compromise (mainly to Australian growers) the 
Imperial Government agreed to purchase all wool and included the attractive 
provision of returning to New Zealand wool growers half the profits obtained 
from the sale of wool surplus to military requirements25. This system of 
profit distribution closely resembles that operating for butter during the 
1917-18 season. The distinction here was that while the butter scheme 
operated for only one season before it was abandoned, for wool the system 
ran until the end of the wool contract on September 30, 1920. Butter 
producers after the 1917-18 season enjoyed rising prices which approximated 
the value the commodity would realise in the consumer market. In contrast, 
wool growers faced fixed prices with any increment of additional return 
dependent on the Imperial Government's military requirements and the 
price of wool in the open market2 6. Payment to growers under normal 
circumstances followed fourteen days after valuation when the Crown 
accepted both risk and ownership for wool. The arrangement was favourable 
for growers because it secured prompt settlement and determined that fees 
for storage and brokerage were the responsibility of the Imperial 
Government. 
One factor that simplified the sale and distribution of wool was the 
character of the commodity. Whereas meat and dairy products were highly 
perishable, wool could be stored for prolonged periods without significant 
deterioration of quality. Similarly the requirements for specialised 
transportation and handling were minimal which was important at a time of 
shipping shortages particularly for specialised refrigerated vessels. Where 
storage did not result in deterioration, shipment of wool was a lower priority 
25 For contract prices refer to price schedule, AJHR, 1921-22, H-38, pp 25-27. 
26 Under the system of purchase all owners delivered their wool to government 
appointed stores for grading and valuation. Wool was appraised by two valuers, one 
appointed by the government, the other by the wool brokers themselves. Where an owner 
felt aggrieved by the decision of the valuers, an independent umpire was available for 
revaluation. Under the terms of the requisition wool that had not been delivered to 
stores for assessment was liable to seizure. Despite evidence that considerable 
quantities of wool were withheld during the 1919-20 season, either as a result of 
dissatisfaction with the terms of the requisition, or more likely in expectation of higher 
prices following de-control, the seizure provision was never exercised. 
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than perishables, particularly where requisitions from New Zealand and 
Australia for any given season exceeded military requirements. The 
predicament for wool growers in New Zealand was paralleled by those in 
Australia where; 
Graziers realised that for wool to retain its value, the wartime stockpile 
in Australia needed to enter consumption as soon as possible, but not 
precipitously. Once this wool was sold the grower would receive 50% of 
any profits. Also this wool had to be disposed of before the 1920-21 clip 
came onto the market. Otherwise the wartime stock would be 
competing with the 1920-21 clip, thus pushing prices down.2 7 
The requisition of the four years' wool clip from 1916-17 to 1919-20 saw total 
purchases of 2,086,951 bales at a value of £51.3 million and purchases of slipe 
(freezing company) wool of 261,192 bales at a total value of £7.5 million . 
Additional revenues were obtained from the sale of 7,666,864 sheepskins at a 
value of £3 .28 million28 . 
A complicated position emerges out of the distribution of surplus wool 
profits. New Zealand producers (and the Government) believed that the 
profits resulting from each season's clip would be treated as separate and 
distinct. However the Imperial Government maintained that the clips were to 
be taken as a whole. Difficulties arose in 1921 when prices fell while the 
Imperial Government still held large stocks of unsold wool. 
Undistributed profits from New Zealand wool, estimated at £8 million in 
January 1921, were retained by the 
provisional payment in July 1920 of £1.62 
. on wool held in stock at that time2 9. 
Imperial Government (following a 
million) to meet the possible losses 
To New Zealand producers this 
represented a breach of faith if not of contract. It was understood that the 
Imperial Government would incur the risk (and the losses) of each season's 
clip while producers enjoyed half the profits resulting from sales of surplus 
to civilians . 
The problem of undistributed profits obscures the more pressing 
difficulty of this time which was the sharply declining prices and the 
withdrawal of the Imperial Government from the market. Wool growers were 
content to sell their commodity to a government buyer if the price was at 
least as high as the prevailing market price; indeed price was an important 
determining factor for acceptance or rejection of purchase contracts. As 
Smith (1936) observes; 
27 Tsokhas (1988), p 24. 
28 AJHR , 1921-22, H-38, pp 13-14. 
29 Ibid., H-38B, pp 35-44. 
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This explains both the urge to be freed from the stabilised prices of the 
bulk purchase scheme and the desire to return to that system when 
markets are depressed. The wool scheme fulfilled its purpose 
admirably, but hardly furnished a basis for a system of distribution in 
normal times.3 0 
1.6 The End of the Commandeer 
The bulk purchase agreements that had formed the basis of the 
Commandeer ended during the nine month period between June 1920 (frozen 
meat contract) to March 1921 (butter). The termination of contracts were 
paralleled by the removal of price controls and Government regulations in 
Britain . To many producers the free market was associated with low prices; 
partially the inheritance of the Commandeer's failure to deal with the build 
up of stocks, and in part a result of dealing with middlemen instead of single 
institutional buyers. In light of these circumstances many producers were to 
look upon the period of control as one of unprecedented prosperity. Speaking 
to the second reading of the Meat Export Control Bill, William Massey noted 
that the Bill was the outcome; 
... of a feeling , which has been in existence for some time among the 
meat producers of this country, to the effect that they were not 
receiving a fair share of the price which the meat realised in London 
and other centres of population in the United Kingdom, and to which 
they were rightfully and properly entitled.3 1 
Furthermore Massey observed that; 
Our meat was sold at a reasonable price to the Imperial Government, 
and so long as the Commandeer lasted it kept this Country particularly 
prosperous.3 2 
Recall that relative to the years after 1921 producers enjoyed high gross 
incomes during the war and in the immediate post-war period. This passage 
demonstrates the government's regard for the Commandeer and the disdain 
at the emergence of "middlemen" and shipping combines . British companies 
involved in the meat and dairy trades were accused of increasing costs and 
blamed for the speculation. It was widely believed that the weak position of 
New Zealand producers was being exploited by powerful and antagonistic 
external interests. 
The Commandeer was extended beyond the war period following the 
successful negotiation of contracts for all commodities during the 1918-19 
30 Smith (1936), p 32. 
31 NZPD, Vol 194, (February 2, 1922) p 310. 
32 Ibid., p 313 
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season. Smith ( 1936) has argued that the provision for Government buying 
after the war was intended as a means to reduce producer • anxiety' and 
ensure the continuation of supplies to British consumers. Contracts may also 
be viewed as politically expedient. Many observers foresaw the onset of the 
post war commodity boom. Years of repressed demand and the return of 
military personnel to civilian life provided the stimulus that pushed 
commodity prices to unprecedented levels. The Commandeer provided the 
British with a mechanism of price stabilisation when the general cost of 
living was increasing. Indeed it was the Imperial Government and not New 
Zealand producers that initiated negotiations for the continuation of 
purchases. As market prices for commodities increased the British found 
negotiations hampered by producer's attempts to return to free trade. This 
sentiment was reinforced by the realisation that New Zealand had supplied 
commodities to the British below the prevailing market price. Canadian 
Cheese (formerly traded on the same basis as commodities from the other 
Dominions) was traded freely in 1919 and received prices of 30/ to 40/ per 
crate in excess of contract prices paid that season3 3. In expectation of a post-
war commodity boom and in response to market price levels the British 
improved price levels for dairy products and contractual terms for meat and 
wool. To producers these conditions generally proved acceptable while 
returns exceeded those in the open market. 
1.7 Levels of Commodity in Stock 
The completion of the meat and cheese contracts in June 1920 
highlighted the problem of the disposal of accumulated stock, particularly 
when the new seasons production was competing with that of previous years. 
Buying and selling became speculative activities and the management of risk 
shifted from government to producers. The general tendency to falling 
prices and returns to producers after control may be traced to the levels of 
commodity held in stock . For some commodities (such as frozen meat) the 
accumulated level of stocks actually increased following the war. This is 
surprising given the release of shipping from military duties and the 
programme of construction, replacing the shipping stock lost and damaged 
in hostilities. 
For frozen meat the equivalent of 7.15 million 60 lb carcasses remained 
m store on June 30, 1920, a total that more than a full season's production and 
export. Of concern to producers in the short-run was the disposal of these 
33 Smith (1936), p 33 . 
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surpluses and their impact on the new season's production. In expectation of 
difficulties, producers and government sought extension to the Commandeer 
to clear quantities of meat still held on behalf of the Imperial Government. 
The British refusal was final citing the accumulation of stocks which it saw 
persisting into 1921; 
His Majesty's Government is therefore reluctant to increase its 
commitments by any purchases in respect of the 1920-21 
season .. . Purchase would, in our opinion, only increase the difficulties 
likely to be experienced in conducting the new season's operations.3 4 
Massey reacted by stating that; 
We are up against it and it is just as well to know what the position is. 
The commandeer ends on June 30, and there is not the slightest chance 
of it being renewed. It is just as well to know it, so the best 
arrangements can be made.3 5 
The 'best arrangements ' as Massey put it formed the basis of a proposal to 
finance the meat trade and to place a government guarantee behind 
producers. Subsequent events and circumstances overtook this proposal. As 
the contracts for cheese, wool and butter finished, each in tum faced similar 
problems of built-up stocks and falling prices. 
By March 1920 there remained considerable quantities of cheese and 
butter awaiting shipment (some 274,411 crates of cheese and 77,481 boxes of 
butter36 were still to be shipped at this time). However these quantities were 
considerably below those prevailing at the end of 1918. In the disposal of 
surplus cheese, stock levels remained manageable and prices unaffected by 
supply side shocks. Free trading of cheese and increased butter prices in the 
final months of government purchase had a profound impact. Export 
volumes more than doubled over a one year period . While many dairy 
factories specialised in the production of either butter or cheese, a growing 
industry trend was toward the development of dual plants that could produce 
one commodity or the other as prices dictated. While high prices in the 
United States had attracted Continental and Canadian butter to that market 
instead of the United Kingdom, New Zealand producers managed to flood the 
British market with butter. Shipping difficulties meant that butter purchased 
by the Imperial Government was still arriving long after the contract had 
ended. By December 1921 it was estimated 20,000 tons remained in direct 
competition to the new season's production on the open market. 
34 NZNA, Treasury Paper ; T 27/2/6. 
35 Ibid . 
36 AJHR, 1921-22, H-38, p 9. 
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Instead of seeking an extension to the Butter Commandeer the 
government sought to have the commodity held off the market. However 
discussions with the British were unsuccessful. The position of producers in 
March 1921 was in contrast to nine months earlier when price differentials 
had then operated in the opposite direction. The NDA had passed a resolution 
denouncing the open market sale of British and Irish butter while New 
Zealand producers suffered controls and lower prices. This resolution 
demonstrates a concern for issues of equity and an early expression of the 
widely held belief that the British were acting in their own interests and not 
those of New Zealand producers. 
These perceptions reinforced the view that speculators and variously 
described "middlemen" were exploiting the weak position of producers and 
the economy. Upon examination many of these claims are without foundation 
(eg: activities of the 'Meat Trust" in New Zealand) . Indeed producers' support 
or condemnation of the free market was more dependent upon the price of 
commodities than consistent opposition to intermediaries. Ward (1975) notes 
that the main targets of criticism for the 1921-22 collapse were the British 
and New Zealand Governments. The respective governments were accused of 
not preparing for the contingencies that a return to the market would have 
on existing patterns of production; 
' Inefficiency of Government' and 'interference with the normal 
forces of supply and demand ' were the catchcries of an industry that 
believed its market returns would have been better were it not for the 
ineptness of the manner of the conclusion of the com.mandeer 
contracts .3 7 
The issue of why returns were low needs to be placed in the context of 
demand side adjustments. While supply side glut and marketing difficulties 
may be responsible for immediately depressing prices, consumer tastes and 
purchasing power are also important. The war period and its associated 
rationing had led consumers to search for substitutes to traditionally 
consumed goods (for example margarine in place of butter). Despite the end 
of rationing producers found that greater demand elasticity constrained the 
quantity of butter purchased at each price to less than had been the case 
before the war. Similarly rationing had encouraged the elimination of waste 
and consumers now required smaller quantities of a given commodity to 
reach the same level of utility. The most obvious change on the demand side 
was the end of the war itself. The Commandeer had been aimed at procuring 
commodities to satisfy a largely military requirements. Peace brought this 
37 Ward (1975), p 49. 
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demand to an end. The so called 'commodity boom' of 1919 and 1920 
represented a brief respite as economies indulged in restocking. However 
this level of demand was unsustainable. An acknowledgement of demand side 
problems is rare in contemporary commentaries, particularly those of 
producers themselves. Perhaps this amounted to a tacit belief that 'supply 
created its own demand' and given competent distribution and marketing, 
farmers could expect a profitable return whatever they produced. 
Accusations of government ineptitude are unduly harsh when the 
disposal of wool is considered. While total purchases approximate.d 2.1 million 
bales of New Zealand wool during the entire contract period, in January 1921 
stocks of unsold merino and cross bred wool totalled nearly 770 thousand 
bales38. When it is considered that at the same time the British held 1.8 
million Australian and 300 thousand South African bales the enormity of the 
problem and its implications are appreciated . Difficulties were exacerbated 
by the new season's clip which provided a potential total supply in the 
British market for the 1921-22 season exceeding 5 million bales . Producers 
had been paid for stock purchased on behalf of the Imperial Government but 
the problem was the disposal of the surplus with the minimum disruption to 
the new wool. The Australian Wool Council in negotiation with Britain's 
Director of Raw Materials formed the British Australian Wool Realisation 
Association Ltd (BA WRA) tasked with the job of supervising the marketing 
and disposal of stocks to restore stability to the wool market. Total stocks 
taken over by the BA WRA were in excess of 2.6 million bales, of which New 
Zealand ' s share was 712,943 bales. 
A significant practical difficulty for BA WRA in implementing its 
realisation programme was to establish a working arrangement with brokers 
disposing of wool in the open market. BA WRA argued that it could not be 
expected to make the sacrifice of holding back stocks while the owners of 
new wool supplied the market ' s weak demand. Competition between the two 
(it wa s reasoned ) would push prices on a downward spiral, depressing the 
overall market. Negotiation established a controlled offering of quantities 
and reserve minimum prices as a basis for voluntary agreement. The 
Australian experience in this regard found that voluntary co-operation 
failed and government regulation was required. While New Zealand 
introduced Wool industry regulations shortly after their Australian 
counterparts, the lessons 
were not lost when it 
of voluntary co-operation between non-producers 
came to the introduction of statutory control 
legislation . In the meantime at a representative meeting of the wool industry 
38 Smith (1936), p 38 (769,762 bales precisely) 
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convened by the New Zealand Board of Agriculture during March 1921, a 
number of key resolutions were carried and implemented by government on 
behalf of the industry: 
(i) That sales of wool by auction or private treaty be postponed for a 
period not exceeding two months. 
(ii) That negotiations take place with BA WRA, the British Government 
and the Wool Importers Association in London, to limit quantities sold in 
England and Australia to the 'normal' pattern of demand. 
(iii) That minimum reserves be placed on all wool so offered on a 
parity basis, agreed upon between the New Zealand Wool Brokers Association, 
BA WRA and other industry interests39. 
The New Zealand Government also sought to obtain voluntary 
compliance between industry interests . In negotiation with the New Zealand 
Wool Brokers' Association, wool sales were postponed for a period of two 
months and by an undertaking between the association and banks sales 
would not occur below the minimum stipulated price at each respective 
grade. This arrangement operated effectively for a short period but failed to 
satisfy producer and industry interests as an effective method of resolving 
the long term difficulties in marketing wool. The Board of Trade (Wool 
Industry ) Regulations, 1921 addressed these concerns and at the same time 
were a distinct approach to that taken in the Meat and Dairy industries . The 
position of wool was undoubtedly more serious than for meat or dairy given 
that the last bale of BA WRA wool was not sold until May 1924 and prices 
remained depressed for wool after other commodities had recovered. 
The structure of the New Zealand Wool Committee (the wool industry 
equivalent of the producer boards) was derived from a proposal placed before 
the Producers' Committee of the Board of Agriculture and passed to the 
Minister in May 1921. The governing regulations of the Committee were 
simple in comparison to those confered upon the other boards. By Order in 
Council under the Board of Trade Act, 1919 the Authority prohibited the sale 
of wool at prices less than the minimum fixed reserve while the committee 
had the power to embargo the export of wool sold below reserve prices. Of 
more significance was the power to determine the maximum quantity of wool 
offered for sale. The centralisation of sale may be traced to the experience of 
the industry during the war period. Note that the wool industry retained the 
system of auction as the best means of 'marketing' its produce. 'Marketing' to 
all intents and purposes ended 'at the farm gate' and as far as surpluses were 
39 N.Z Journal of Agriculture, Vol XXIII pp 189-190. 
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concerned the committee operated the purest form of 'pooling' through 
provisions that regulated supply. 
1.8 Release of Shipping 
Shipping formed part of the wider costs involved in export which also 
included, insurance, storage and handling charges (that together were seen 
to act to squeeze the returns received by producers). Shortages of shipping 
are particularly important because they precipitated the crisis in stock levels 
and passed on increased charges at a time when shipping was being released 
from military service. Furthermore the phenomenon of rising freight 
charges was important in fostering the perception that producers were 
being deliberately exploited . When one considers the early history of the 
producer boards the reduction of charges for cargo, insurance, storage and 
handling charges are cited time and again as measures of their success. 
The situation of shipping during the war period has been noted above 
as the number of 'insulated steamers' (refrigerated shipping) visiting New 
Zealand fell from 99 in 1914 to just 52 in 191840. This decline was the result of 
the diversion of shipping to the shorter supply lines of the Atlantic, the run-
down of the overall shipping stock as a result of enemy action and the 
general conversion of merchant shipping to specific military duties. As 
shipping was released to its former owners it was expected that shortages 
would be relieved and freight rates fall. Liners were returned during 
February 1919 and improvements were seen in the clearance of general 
cargoes . Nevertheless problems were faced m insulated shipping which 
affected the frozen meat industry . Shortages prevailed and government 
retained control of the insulated space. Massey remarked in a cable to the 
British Controller of Shipping that; 
... the lack of insulated tonnage has very seriously affected the meat 
freezing and kindred interests. A number of freezing works in the 
Dominion are already full and must close down, whilst there is a large 
quantity of stock available which must suffer deterioration and cause 
heavy loss unless treated promptly". (5 March, 1919)4 1 
Congestion affected frozen meat and other perishables such as butter 
and cheese which had accumulated at this time. They were later relieved as 
the British government prioritised edible fats over meat and wool. Reasons 
for shortages according to the British could be found in the time it was 
40 AJHR . H-38 1919, p 19. 
41 AJHR, H-38A, 1919, p 40. 
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taking to repair ships, industrial action and the consequences of the 1918 
influenza epidemic. As far as the New Zealand producer was concerned 
shipping shortages were a symptom of the Government's failure to manage 
the transition to free trade. A Treasury document from the New Zealand 
National Archives remarked in a report on the 1920 Producers' conference; 
They [producers] all know now that the Government control of 
business in England has been a failure, that there has been serious 
bungling in London, and they know also that the present condition of 
things, which will involve all of them to a greater or less extent, has 
been due to mismanagement of the meat control in Britain.4 2 
The government investigated producers' concerns through the 
Agricultural and Pastoral Industries Stock and Commerce Committee43. 
Concern was sparked by a British proposal to increase charges for the 
carriage of private meat in insulated space (still held in requisition in July 
1920). The review undertook a wider consideration of freight charges for all 
exports to the British market. The committee was concerned that the 
activities of the shipping cartels or combines had the potential to manipulate 
freight rates and exclude independent shipping lines . 
When consideration is given to freight charges during the war it is 
apparent that producers ' reservations had some foundation. While charges 
for general cargo undoubtedly fell following the release of shipping, the 
same is not true for insulated shipping charges. The committee found that 
the 2d rate per lb charge for frozen lamb in July 1920 represented a 1.25d 
increase on the pre-war rate of .75d per lb. Similarly for mutton the 1 7/8d 
new charge was well above the pre-war rate of 11/l6d. These figures indicate 
that the charging regime had more than kept pace with both inflation and 
the prices farmers were receiving for their exports. Furthermore at the end 
of the war and the restoration of commercial 'normality' shipping charges 
did not respond (refer to Figure 1, Source; A J H R , 1920, I-10A). The 
committee's report had similar findings; 
While giving full consideration to the various causes which have 
operated in materially increasing the costs of running vessels as 
compared with pre-war times , the committee, after carefully weighing 
the evidence given is of the opinion that the rates now quoted for 
privately owned produce are unwarrantedly high .. . Moreover these 
rates are in excess of those actually ruling during the war period.4 4 
42 NZNA, T 27/2/6, 1920. 
4 3 AJ H R, 1920, I-10A,- 'Report of Inquiry into (1) Proposed Statement by New Zealand 
Overseas Shipowners Committee in Reference to the Increase in Ship Charges: (2) 
Memorandum from the Prime Minister that an Inquiry be made.' 
44 Ibid., p iii. 
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The last accusation may be misleading. In the case of wool and dairy products 
rates peaked in February 1916 and July 1918 respectively, before falling. The 
fact remained that these charges were considerably above their pre war 
levels and for insulated shipping above levels prevailing during the war 
itself. These findings resulted in the committee's recommendation in support 
of the formation of a New Zealand shipping line with government guarantee 
or financial assistance. The committee confirmed what producers had known 
for some time, that input costs both through the costs of production (see 
Chapter 2 below) and costs of marketing had outpaced export prices. As W.J. 
Polson, the Dominion President of the New Zealand Farmers' Union 
suggested, farmers were "being ground between the upper millstone of low 
values and the nether millstone of high production cost."4 5 
Increased costs were also reflected in processing where, by 1921, 
freezing charges for mutton and lamb had increased from 1.1d and 1.2d per 
lb in 1914 to 3.75d and 3.5d per lb respectively by 192146. These increases 
drew the familiar accusations of exploitation of the farming industry by 
cartels, monopolies, trusts, speculators and other 'middlemen'. In many cases 
increases may be explained by the simple interaction of market forces and 
the impact of inflation not a premeditated attempt to extract monopoly 
profits . Indeed the new freight rates that precipitated the Agricultural and 
Pastoral Committee's investigation related to private cargos at a time when 
the British were reducing levels of requisitioned meat held in New Zealand 
storage. 
Falling commodity prices meant that as processing and marketing 
charges increased producers returns were 
reflected in contemporary opinion. An 
Advocate4 7 commented; 
often negligible. This concern is 
editorial in The Farmer Union 
We are pleased to note that Mr Massey has placed such importance on 
this matter of freight rates . It is perhaps the most vital question at the 
moment. Low prices for produce mean a tremendous loss to this 
country but when it costs so much to carry the produce to market it is 
obvious that production cannot increase. 
Benathan and Walters48 in a study of the economics of ocean freight 
rates noted the intuitive character of price setting. They cited two 'rules of 
thumb ', first that the greater the volume, the lower the rate. Secondly, the 
higher the value of the cargo, the higher the rate. While there is nothing 
45 Farmers' Union Advocate, 10/9/21, p 3. 
4 6 Ibid . 
4 7 Ibid., p 5. 
48 Benathan, E. and Walters, A.A., (1969). 
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particularly unusual about discriminatory pricing in an imperfect market 
these features do go some way toward explaining the charging situation. 
Clearly in the case of these two 'rules of thumb' both instances applied. The 
increased rate for private, small lots on insulated shipping post war was in 
contrast to the rate that applied under the higher volumes of Commandeer. 
Freight rates to 1920 mirrored changes in the value of the commodities to 
which they applied (as the price of these commodities increased). 
Other factors also applied. The inefficiency of processing was 
particularly significant given that shipping might spend weeks visiting 
provincial ports up and down New Zealand to load small lots. Legislative 
provisions in the Control Board legislation allowed producers to rationalise 
shipping and freight agreements. The Meat Control Board for example 
secured significant reductions in charges during its early period of 
operation which were estimated to have saved producers £575,000 in the first 
year alone49 . 
1.9 The Operations of "The Meat Trust" 
Concern over the monopolistic practices of some industry interests 
was not confined to the activities of intermediaries but also to the perceived 
threat of the 'American Meat Trust' . The government had been aware of the 
activities of the trusts through the report of the Federal Trade Commission on 
the Meat Packing Industry in 1918. The report found that the five Trust 
companies were involved in collusive activities controlling the processing, 
distribution and sale of meat in the United States and overseas. Such was the 
extent of the control that each offered the same minimum price to farmers 
and excluded independent producers through the ownership and control of a 
vertically integrated industry. The Massey papers held in the National 
Archives contain a 1917 document entitled "Fighting the Meat Trusts: An 
Empire Problem, Practical Measures in Defence of British Interest".5 0 
4 9 N.Z . Meat Producers Board , First Annual Statement of Accounts, 1923. p 6. 
An example of the problem with Multiplicity of Marks in pre-control period is given. 
One vessel with 145,000 carcases on board had 217 separate Bills of Lading, 915 
Different marks and numbers , 381 lots of 100 carcasses or less and 106 lots of 5 
carcasses and under. In consequence damage sustained in sorting and delays in 
discharge had led to deterioration, increases in charges between the consumer and 
producer and finally a smaller net return to the producer. 
50 NZNA, PM 14/103 (1917). This report argued that the primary aim of the Trust was 
the destruction of competition to secure 'excessive' profits. This was achieved first, by 
attacking the independent works or producer, second, by controlling prices paid and the 
volume to be marketed by the farmer, thus restricting production and third, by 'unfair' 
market practices and the control of prices to the consumer 'without regard to supply and 
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Undoubtedly this document and the report of the Federal Commission 
had a marked impact upon contemporary thought to the point of paranoia. 
The operations of Trust firms in Queensland from 1914 and an investigation 
into the activities of Sims and Cooper (buyers and exporters of meat accused 
of acting as local 'stooges' for the American trusts) only served to heighten 
fears. These suspicions were surpassed when Armour and Co, one of the 'big 
five', began operations in New Zealand during 1917. Massey reacted by 
forming a select committee to investigate "the present position and future 
prospects of the meat export trade of the Dominion, and more particularly of 
the organisation known as the American Meat Trust"51. Evidence presented 
before the committee reflected the fears of many producers and freezing 
companies but no evidence was found of unfair or monopolistic practices in 
New Zealand by either Sims Cooper or Armour and Co5 2. Despite these 
findings the Slaughtering and Inspection Amendment Act, 1918 was 
introduced granting the power of absolute discretion to the government over 
the issue of licenses . Massey justified these measures during debate of the 
Meat Export Control Bill when he stated that the Slaughtering and Inspection 
Act; 
... provides that people who export meat must obtain a license 
therefore , and that a license must be obtained for what are called 'meat 
export slaughterhouses'. Those are checks against wrong doing as far 
as the country is concerned . Whether or not they go far enough 
remains to be seen. But the setting up and bringing into operation of 
this pool. .. will be the best safeguard we could possibly have, because it 
will be their business to prevent any wrong doing in connection with 
the export of our produce. 5 3 
While Massey did not allude specifically to what was meant by 'wrong 
doing' its definition would have fallen within the bounds of 'practices 
detrimental to the interests of producers' . Indeed the government's 
perception of 'wrong doing' was pre-emptive when, prior to the end of the 
Meat Commandeer in 1919. Armour and Co were denied an operating license. 
The concern expressed by many producers was that as soon as one Trust firm 
demand'. In terms of the third measure the Trust was alleged to have employed methods 
of cutting prices, selling at below cost price to force out competitors, and following, as 
the only market operator, prices would be increased and monopoly profits extracted. 
51 AJHR, 1917, I-7, pi . 
52 The Committee reported that there was no evidence of Armour and Co operating any 
freezing works or packing houses in New Zealand. No evidence was found that Sims and 
Cooper were financed by American capital or that it had any links with Armour and Co. 
Vestey Bros of Gt Britain and Chicago, USA controlled three freezing companies in New 
Zealand . The committee also found that producers in New Zealand had not suffered from the 
operations of large firms such as Vestey Bros. (refer AJHR, 1917, 1-7, pp ii-iii) 
53NzPD, Vol 194 (February 8, 1922), p 314. 
30 
was allowed to operate in New Zealand the others would follow suit. Opinion 
however was by no means unanimous; one freezing company owner is 
quoted by O'Connor (1972); 
He [the freezing company owner] thought he was witnessing a two-
fold phenomenon: on the one hand 'the farmer loves a grievance 
clearly, on the other there was currently an outbreak of that 'middle 
man fever' which has been endemic among New Zealand farmers for 
many years.5 4 
The fever was endemic not only among producers but politicians and 
many sections of the community. The fear of the 'middle-man' and their 
exploitation of New Zealand producers pervades the discussion of the origins 
of control boards. Trusts are a particularly lucid example because their 
activities in the New Zealand setting were more imagined than real. Such 
were the lengths that the Government went to that Armour's meat purchased 
from the British surplus and held in New Zealand cold-stores since 1919 was 
not actually released until May 1922, some months after the formation of the 
Board. Nevertheless in Massey's own mind (as revealed to Parliament) he 
perceived the Meat Export Control Act as a means of preventing any 'wrong 
doing' in the export of produceS 5. 
54 P.S.O'Connor (1972), p 11. 
55 Brooking (1981) develops the link between the formation of the Meat Board and an 
outbreak of anti-trust feeling . Massey's actions according to Brookings, gained support 
from the Farmers' Union, however the denial of a license to Armour and Co upset some 
large pastoralists and the Sheep Owners' Federation who wanted to develop the American 
meat market. 
3 1 
2. Producers: Production, Income and Returns. 
2.1 Introduction. 
Most histories of the development of control boards argue that boom 
and slump cycles characterised New Zealand agriculture before and after the 
Commandeer. The Boards in this view were formed to reproduce the benefits 
of income security and price stability of the Commandeer and to return to the 
boom conditions with which it had been associated. A survey of New Zealand 
histories however fails to tum up any systematic empirical data analysis to 
assess these claims. The approach taken in this chapter will be to evaluate 
these arguments by extending the Philpott et a/56 series of agricultural 
income data from 1921/22 back to 1914/15. No systematic econometric 
analysis will be undertaken, but the constructed data series used will provide 
some revealing insights into the period. We shall find that the boom and 
slump story for New Zealand post-war agriculture has been overplayed . 
Production and income responses to increasing prices may have to be re-
evaluated to account for the emergence of control boards. We shall see in 
chapter 4 that mono-causal explanations are inadequate when explaining the 
development of boards where key factors include price stabilisation, 
optimum tariffs arguments, technological economies of scale and rent 
seeking . 
2.2 Impact of the Commandeer and Post-War 'Prosperity'. 
Historians have associated the Commandeer and 'post-war boom' with a 
strong upward trend in incomes and prices paid to producers . Sutch (1966) 
for instance has suggested: 
When during that war [World War One] the British Government 
'commandeered' the total New Zealand production of meat, wool and 
dairy produce caused by war conditions, a boom followed.5 7 
56 Philpott, B.P. and Stewart, J.D ., "Capital, Income and Output In New Zealand 
Agriculture , 1922-1956", Economic Record, Volume 34, August 1958. 
Philpott , B.P. et al, " Estimates of Farm Income and Productivity in New Zealand 
1921-65 ", Linco ln College, Agricultural Economics Research Unit Publication No. 30, 
(Lincoln College, 1967) 
Philpott, B.P. and Hussey, D.D., "Productivity and Income of New Zealand 
Agriculture, 1921-67", Lincoln College, Agricultural Economics Research Unit 
Publication No. 59, (Lincoln College, 1969) 
57 Sutch (1966), p 37. 
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Even more emphatic, particularly regarding the post-war prosperity 
to 1921, were Condliffe and Sinclair. Their assertions of war and post-war 
prosperity compounded with the falling prices and demands for producer 
control legislation amongst sectors of the farming community following the 
termination of the Commandeer. Condliffe (1930) for example stated that; 
The conjuncture of favourable circumstances before 1921 brought 
such rapid progress and such widely diffused prosperity that it might 
well be called an economic revolution. 5 8 
Sinclair is a little more guarded, placing the boom in its post-war 
context. Sinclair argues that high prices led to producer demands for a 
return to the competitive market. The boom was not merely the product of 
high prices but was also due to the availability of credit which stimulated 
property speculation. 
They [New Zealanders] enjoyed two years of post-war 
intoxication ... While the high wartime prices for primary produce 
continued enabling the country to share in the British credit boom, 
the Government spent large sums of money to provide farms for ex-
servicemen.5 9 
Similarly, Quigley (1988) states; 
During W.W.I the expansion of New Zealand farming was further 
encouraged by rising prices and the expansion of credit. .. Despite a 
brief downturn in economic activity in 1918, the prosperity of the war 
period continued into 1920 as the British economy underwent a post-
War restocking boom. 6 0 
Hawke (1985), explains the Boards in these terms: 
Post-war inflation in Britain affected first the price of New Zealand 
exports and then those of imports, so that there were large savings in 
the balance of trade at the beginning of the decade. As fluctuations 
continued in later years, the loss of the security of the commandeer 
was soon regretted, and this feeling was influential in the 
establishment of the Meat Export Control Board and the Dairy Export 
Control Board in 1922 and 1923 respectively .61 
Two central propositions emerge from the literature. First, the 
Commandeer is said to have facilitated increasing prices and income stability 
58 Condliffe (1930), pp 228-229 . 
59 Sinclair (1984), p 244. 
6 0 Quigley (1988), p 90. 
61 Hawke, G.R., (1985), pp 99-100. 
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during the war leading to an expansion of the agricultural sector. Second, 
the commodity price boom during the post-war period to 1921 led to strong 
growth and prosperity for the agricultural sector. 
If the first proposition held then one would have expected producers 
to respond to improving prices and conditions by increasing production. 
Figures 2 and 3 use indices of export price data adjusted to June Years from 
official series constructed by the Department of Statistics and an index of 
farm production volumes from Table IX of Data Appendix 1. The pastoral 
production index was based on value aggregates at 1949/50 prices of lambs, 
sheep and cattle slaughtered, wool produced and changes in livestock 
numbers . The dairy produce index was calculated from the volume of butter 
fat produced. All items composing the output indices have been drawn from 
Department of S tati sties data. 
Two observations are apparent. First, producers faced increasing 
nominal prices to 1920/21 with a delayed production/output response to 
increased export prices of between three and five years. Second, that 
contrary to historical accounts of the period, farming did not expand during 
World War One, it contracted. 
Dairy products faced strong nominal price growth during the 
Commandeer and post-war periods. Returns for cheese were greater than for 
butter during the war period, but after 1918 butter faced higher prices 
reflecting the fact that cheese had been purchased to meet military 
requirements while butter was requisitioned to meet the needs of the civilian 
population. 
Pastoral production in general enjoyed rising nominal price levels, 
particularly wool which experienced more rapid increases in price than any 
other commodity until 1918 when the derived demand for military clothing 
came to an end. The serious decline in prices after 1920 is attributable to the 
level of carried-over stocks of New Zealand, Australian and South African 
wool that had entered the market. Frozen meat prices were characterised by 
an initially sharp increase in price followed after 1917 by a price 'plateau'. 
The price disparity between beef and sheep meat explains the growing 
numbers of beef cattle to 1917 and the relatively static position of sheep 
numbers 6 2. However the position of beef has to be placed in perspective 
relative to the more important position of sheep meat. In comparison to all 
62 Refer to Section 1.3. 
1800 
1600 
Figure 2: Pastoral Production: Output and Export Prices 1915-1925 (Base: 
1915= 1 000) 
.q- 1400 
~ 
1200 
1000 •.w.w.·.w .·.w,•.•,w,·· ·>.;, ,; .. ,., ·:··· ·:·· ·<,.,,, __ , _  "'-·· .•..• _.,,>'''''/' 
· · -··;;··.;; ... ,,.. ,.;.····· ';;··'''''.;;-· 
800 ··.;· .. ,,, .. ... , 
600 +----+----+----+----+----T----+----T----+---~--~ 
1915 1917 1919 1921 1923 1925 
June Years 
• · Output 
o Export Price 
V) 
("() 
2000 
1800 
1600 
1400 
1200 
1000 
Figure 3: Pairy Production: Output and Export Prices. 1915-1925 (Base: 
1915=1000} 
;.·:··;.···· 
. ......... ·····• · ·i-•' 
., ... , .. , .. ,,, .• i ' 
,,,.,  ·''',.,,, .... , ..,.· 
........... -.-.· ..... -....... ·.·.·.·.···• ········ ··-·.·.·.·,·.·,',·.··········· • ···,· ····· ...... , .. ,_.,,.,_.,, . _ .. ·.·.·········· ·· .•.· . ..... . .....  
.... , 
800 +- -1 
1915 1917 1919 1921 1923 1925 
June Years 
--- -
• · Output 
o Export Price 
36 
groups of exports meat performed badly with price increases below the 
average. Wool in contrast closely mirrors the average6 3. 
The relationship between nominal export prices and changes in 
output appears to be stronger after 1919, particularly for dairy products. 
Farmers cannot react instantaneously to changes in price because 
investments in increasing livestock have long lead times. Figures 2 and 3 
suggest that production investment decisions had lead times of between three 
and five years before they are reflected in output changes. Price increases 
after 1915 for example are associated with the increased output from 1919 for 
dairy products and from 1918 for pastoral products. But the relationship 
between the two variables is not always clear. 
The most important finding is that output in the pastoral sector fell by 
25 percent between 1915 and 1918, despite export price increases of 48 
percent. Pastoral production did not return to its 1915 level until 1920. A 
similar position emerges for the dairy industry. Between 1915 and 1918 
output fell marginally by 4.5 percent, yet prices over the same period had 
increased by 38 percent. Dairy production reached its 1915 levels of output in 
1920, by which time prices had increased since 1915 by almost 58 percent. 
Total farm production (which included arable agriculture) declined by 22 
percent from 1915 to 1918 and did not return to its 1915 levels until 1921 
These findings are inconclusive because farming output tells us little about 
relative profitability, only production volumes. 
Quigley (1988) constructed a simple graphical representation of the 
relative movements in farmers' costs and export prices to demonstrate the 
profitability of New Zealand farming. Quigley's approach is represented in 
Figures 4 and 5 but dis-aggregated to reflect the relative profitability of 
pastoral and dairy production in the commodities of meat, wool, butter and 
cheese . 
Farmers' costs are derived from the Official Index of Farm Expenditure 
while export prices relate to calendar years for the commodities denoted 
(source; Department of Statistics. In a simplified form t,his graph illustrates 
production profitability for each of the four product categories between 1914 
(base year) and 1925. While Quigley's method is a crude measure of 
fluctuating returns to producers, some interesting trends are revealed. 
Relative to the other commodities frozen meat performs poorly throughout 
most of the period until 1922 with a return to profitability coinciding with 
the formation of the Meat Control Board. Wool achieves high profitability 
during most of the Commandeer but suffers severely from falling prices in 
63 Bloomfield (1984), pp 273, 285. 
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1921 precipitated by high stock levels and poor demand. Finally in terms of 
dairy produce both cheese and butter production provides a positive cash 
flow to producers during the Commandeer but the pattern of poor 
profitability during 1921/22 is repeated. The 1920/21 peak for butter, dairy 
and meat prices occured at a time when wool had hit 'rock bottom'. This 
phenomenon and the subsequent fall of prices for the other three 
commodities can be explained by the interaction of increasing production 
costs and market adjustments when bulk purchase contracts and food price 
controls ended (although the end of each contract was not followed by an 
instantaneous fall of commodity prices in the open market). 
Another way of looking at farming profitability is to construct an 
index of agricultural terms of exchange. Figure 6 represents the agricultural 
terms of exchange (defined as the price index of farm output/price index for 
farm inputs) for the period 1915 to 1925. This data has been derived from 
Table III of data appendix I which analyses prices received and prices paid in 
agriculture. The price index of farm outputs is derived from the ratio of the 
value of gross farm income at current prices to the volume of production at 
1949/50 prices. The price index of farm inputs is derived from a weighted 
index of farm input prices for average expenditure in the base year, 1949/50. 
Finally, terms of exchange represents the price of all products sold in terms 
of all non factor expenses and paid wages6 4. Figure 6 suggests that 
agricultural terms of exchange deteriorated after 1918 until 1923, from 1292 
in 1917/18 to 1003 in 1920/21 and 812 in 1921/22 (Base, 1949/50=1000). This 
finding was implicitly demonstrated in Figure 4 when in 1917/18 the index of 
meat prices fell below that of farm expenditures and the gap closed between 
wool prices and farm expenditures. Figure 5 shows similarly reductions in 
profitability for cheese and butter between 1918 and 1920. These findings 
lead one to question whether the second proposition of the literature relating 
to the post-war 'boom ' has any real substance. 
The approach taken in Figures 4, 5 and 6 provides only a crude 
measures of farming profitability. This evidence can only 'hint' at the 
proposition of real income instability during the Commandeer. A detailed 
analysis of agricultural income and expenditure is required to evaluate the 
propositions found in the literature, and for this purpose Philpott et al has 
been used. Philpott ' s research attempted to compensate for the lack of 
official and unofficial estimates of net farm incomes during the inter-war 
period from 1921/22 on. The basic series of data is taken from official 
statistics for gross farm income. Gross farm income represents the total gross 
64 Philpott, B.P. (1969), p 28. 
0=1 Figure 6: Agricultural Terms of Exchange Index. 1915-1925 (Base 195  000) 
1300 
1100 • 
1000 
0 
""" 900 
800 
600 
500 
400 
.,.·:··=· 
1915 
._  ,... ,·:· 
/·~---~ / . 
• Outputs 
o Inputs 
;::··~ •···· · ..•. ····--· ···· 
-• - Terms of Exchange 
,.·:· 
• • ... ·=·:··;. 
·::,• =········" 
1917 1919 1921 1923 1925 
June Years 
Table 1: Gross Farm Income, Expenditure and Net Income (Current Prices) f$000] 
June Veers 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 
1. Non-Factor Expenses 
Farm Requisites 1,823 1 ,913 2,014 2,162 2,548 3,097 3,164 2 ,590 2,611 2 ,808 2 ,931 
Fertiliser 1 '146 1,391 1,402 1,446 1,433 2 ,017 2,485 761 973 1,271 1,822 
Lime 124 132 143 154 165 184 320 284 304 440 482 
Seeds 483 540 506 592 412 445 490 317 282 475 447 
Fuel, Oil & Grease 115 131 165 210 251 362 451 421 334 294 375 
Electric Power 316 340 392 450 502 608 777 875 895 905 917 
R&M Bldgs etc 2,608 2,745 2 ,755 2,722 2 ,903 2 ,649 3,160 3,492 3 ,387 3 ,248 3,618 
R&M Plant etc 483 560 637 737 843 821 1 ' 117 1,241 1 ,362 1,436 1 ,690 
Rail and Cartage 1,338 1,394 1 ,365 1,444 1,829 2 ,293 2 ,309 2,780 2,485 2 ,223 2,254 
Depr. Bldgs etc 1,719 1,809 1,815 1,793 1,913 1,745 2 ,082 2,301 2 ,234 2 ,140 2,324 
Depr Plant etc 157 166 181 219 272 339 480 606 690 750 912 
Other Expenses 10,201 11 ' 125 12,104 13,473 14,636 12 ,910 15,819 15 ,279 14,044 13 ,699 13,825 
TOial Non-Factor Expenses 20,513 22 ,246 23,479 25,402 27,707 27 ,470 32,654 30,947 29,601 29,689 31 ,597 
13. Factor Expenses 
Wages 9,561 10,056 10,700 11,089 12,124 14 ,372 14 ,312 13,907 16,844 16 ,365 16,200 
Interest 7 ,651 8,267 8 ,756 9 ,211 9 ,770 11 ,405 13,572 14 ,709 15,503 16,108 16,802 
Rent 6,003 5,918 5 ,851 5 ,813 5,586 5,818 5,486 5,682 5,590 5 .646 5,534 
-
Rates 1,916 2,077 2 ,207 2,286 2 ,632 2 ,895 3,258 3,114 3,584 3 ,674 3 ,918 
'<::t Land Tax 480 629 428 831 908 935 1 ,013 982 925 856 801 
Total Factor Expenses 25,611 26,947 27,942 29,230 31,020 35 ,425 37,641 38,394 42,446 42 ,649 43,255 
20. Total Expenses 46,124 49 ,193 51,421 54,632 58,727 62 ,895 70,295 69 ,341 72,047 72 ,338 74 ,852 
21 . Net Farm Income 27,676 30 ,507 28,679 31 ,068 37 ,173 38 ,805 32 ,005 26,059 30 ,753 30 ,662 49,148 
22. Gross Farm Income 73,800 79 ,700 80 ,100 85 ,700 95 ,900 101,700 102,300 95 ,400 102,800 103,000 124,000 
June Veers 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1 921 1922 1923 1924 1925 
Non-Factor Expenses 20,513 22 ,246 23 ,479 25,402 27 ,707 27 ,470 32,654 30 ,947 29 ,601 29,689 31 ,597 
Factor Expenses 25 ,611 26 ,947 27,942 29,230 31 ,020 35 ,425 37 ,641 38,394 42 ,446 42,649 43 ,255 
Net Farm Income 27,676 30 ,507 28 ,679 31 ,068 37 ' 173 38 ,805 32 ,005 26 ,059 30 ,753 30 ,662 49 ,148 
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receipts for farm production valued at 'the farm gate', including inter-farm 
transactions and changes in stock values but excluding the value of 
production from primary processing industries. Estimates for component 
items of factor and non-factor expenses are derived from official series of 
production, trade, local authority and agricultural statistics. 
For the purposes of this thesis Philpott's methodology was applied and 
his data replicated for the 1921/22 to 1924/25 period. The series was then 
extended back to 1914/15. Difficulties were encountered since annual figures 
for some sources (such as industrial production data) only began in 1918/19 
with earlier data in the census years of 1916 and 1911; this has required some 
interpolation. A detailed account of the Philpott methodology and complete 
results of the new calculations are attached in Data Appendix 1; 'Income 
Estimates for New Zealand Agriculture, 1914/15 to 1924/25'. 
Table I analyses Gross Farm Income, Expenditure and Net Income in 
Current Prices. This table indicates that net fann income was high during 
the war relative to the 1921-22 period . The basis for descriptions of 'boom' 
conditions in the immediate post-war era may be found in the increases to 
nominal net farm income from $31.165 million in the 1917/18 season to $37.2 
million in 1918/19 and $38.8 million by 1919/20. Net fann income is defined 
as the income available to fanners after they have paid non-factor and factor 
expenses (including rates, interest and rent) but before income tax and 
mortgage repayments . Gross farm income over the same period increased 
from $87 .5 million to $101.7 million in current prices . Over the war period 
net farm incomes remained relatively stable while gross farm incomes 
continued to rise . These findings generally support the literature. 
Increasing expenses over the period may be accounted for by war-time 
shortages and increasing prices. 
Current-price data however presents a distorted picture of trends in 
net farm income, since the war and post-war periods were characterised by 
historically high inflation. Quite a different picture emerges when farm 
income data are deflated by the retail price index. In the 'post-war boom' 
inflation was running at 7.5 percent per annum for the June year to 1919 
and 9.5 percent per annum to June 1920. Inflation had reached double digits 
in 1916/17 when it peaked at 11.8 percent. The effect of deflating Table I by 
the Department of Statistics retail price index is to produce a number of key 
results. Table II presents fann income data in 1914/15 prices (This data is 
presented graphically in Figure 7). The widely accepted picture of rising 
war-time incomes is clearly incorrect. 1915 and 1916 were good years 
65 Note that £1 = $2. Therefore $31.1 million = £15.55 million 
Table II: Gross Real Farm Income, Real Expenses and Net Real Farm Income (1914/15 Prices) [$000] 
June years 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1 925 
CPI 1949/50=1000 474 495 553 598 643 704 749 725 698 708 725 
Rebased 1915=1000 1000 1044 1167 1262 1357 1485 1580 1530 1473 1494 1530 
1. Real Non-Factor Expenses 
Farm Requisites 1,823 1,832 1,726 1,714 1 ,878 2,085 2,002 1 ,693 1 ,773 1,880 1,916 
Fertiliser 1 '146 1 ,332 1,202 1 '146 1,056 1 ,358 1,573 498 661 851 1 '191 
Lime 124 126 123 122 122 124 203 186 206 295 315 
Seeds 483 517 434 469 304 300 310 207 192 318 292 
Fuel, Oil & Grease 115 125 141 166 185 244 285 275 227 197 245 
Electric Power 316 326 336 357 370 409 492 572 608 606 600 
R&M Bldgs etc 2,608 2 ,629 2 ,361 2 ,158 2 ,140 1 ,784 2 ,000 2 ,283 2 ,300 2, 175 2 ,365 
R&M Plant etc 483 536 546 584 621 553 707 811 925 961 1 ' 105 
Rail and Cartage 1,338 1,335 1 ' 170 1 '145 1,348 1 ,544 1,461 1,818 1,688 1,488 1 ,474 
Depr. Bldgs etc 1,719 1 ,732 1,556 1,421 1 ,410 1 ' 175 1,318 1 ,504 1,517 1.433 1 ,519 
Depr Plant etc 157 159 155 174 201 228 304 396 469 50 2 596 
Other Expenses 10 ,201 10,653 10,375 10 ,679 10 ,789 8 ,692 10,011 9 ,989 9 ,537 9 ,171 9 ,039 
Total Real Non-Factor Exp 20 ,513 21,302 20 ,125 20 , 135 20 ,425 18 ,495 20 ,665 20 ,233 20 ,102 19.877 20 ,658 
~ 13. Real Factor Expenses 
-.;:t Wages 9 ,561 9 ,629 9 ,171 8 ,790 8 ,93 7 9 ,677 9, 057 9, 09 2 11 ,438 10 ,956 10 ,591 
Interest 7,651 7,916 7 ,505 7,301 7 ,202 7 ,679 8 ,589 9 ,617 10 ,528 10 ,784 10 ,9 85 
Rent 6 ,003 5,667 5 ,015 4,608 4,118 3 ,917 3 ,472 3,715 3,796 3 ,780 3, 618 
Rates 1,916 1,989 1,892 1 ,812 1 ,940 1,949 2 ,062 2 ,036 2 ,434 2, 460 2, 562 
Land Tax 480 602 367 659 669 630 641 642 628 573 524 
Total Real Factor Exp 25,611 25 ,804 23 ,950 23 ,169 22 ,867 23 ,851 23,821 25 , 102 28 ,824 28 ,553 28 ,280 
20. Total Real Expenses 46 ,124 47 ,106 44 ,075 43 ,304 43 ,292 42,347 44 ,486 45 ,335 48 ,926 48 ,430 48 ,938 
21 . Net Real Farm Income 27 ,676 29 ,213 24 ,582 24 ,626 27 ,403 26 ,127 20 ,254 17 ,037 20 ,884 20 ,528 32 , 133 
22. Gross Real Farm Income 73 ,800 76 ,319 68 ,657 67 ,929 70,695 68 ,474 64,740 62 ,372 69 ,810 68 ,958 81 .0 70 
June years 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1 925 
Real Non-Factor Expenses 20 ,513 21 ,302 20 ,125 20 ,135 20 ,425 18 ,495 20 ,665 20 ,233 20 ,102 19 ,877 20 ,658 
Real Factor Expenses 25,611 25 ,804 23 ,950 23,169 22,867 2 3 ,851 23 ,821 25 , 102 28 ,824 28 ,553 28 ,280 
Net Real Farm Incomes ?7 ,676 29 ,213 24 ,582 24 ,626 27 ,403 26 ,127 20,254 17 ,037 20 ,884 20 ,528 32 ,133 
"<:t 
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Figure 7: Real Gross Income. Real Expenses & Real Net Income ($1915) 
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supported by high real gross farm income6 6 of $73.8 million and $76.3 
million respectively and real net farm income of $27.7 million and $29.2 
million respectively . By 1918 real gross farm income had fallen to $67.9 and 
net real income to $24.6 million , for 1919 the figures had increased to $70.7 
million and $27.4 million respectively before falling again in 1920 to $68.5 
million and $26.1 million respectively. 
Sinclair ' s 'two years of post-war intoxication' does not appear to be a 
good description for the agricultural sector. Farming enjoyed small increases 
in net real farm output from 1918 to 1919 but it is questionable whether such 
an increase constituted a 'boom' . The 1919 and 1920 real income levels barely 
match those of the early war years. In light of this evidence, the severity of 
the 1921 downturn may be fully appreciated. Net real farm income declined 
from $26.1 million in 1920 to just $20.3 million in 1921 and $17 million in 
1922. After their 1921 decline, real income levels that had prevailed during 
the Commandeer did not return until the upturn of 1924/25. 
Total real non-factor expenses during and after the Commandeer 
remained remarkably stable in deflated 1915 prices. In conditions of falling 
gross real farm income and commodity prices, items of variable expenditure 
were the first to be reduced. This applied primarily to farm requisites , 
fertiliser , and repairs , maintenance and depreciation to the newly expanded 
building stock . General trends in farming had led to greater mechanisation 
and investment in plant and machinery. As a consequence repairs, 
maintenance and depreciation for this item increased along with 
expenditures on fuel , oil, grease 
expenses were non-discretionary 
expenditure . Despite falling real 
composed of a large number of 
inelasti c variable costs . 
and 
and 
gross 
fixed 
electric power. Other non-factor 
comparatively inelastic items of 
income the farmer's budget was 
cost items and relatively income 
Real factor expenses were a far more variable item of expenditure 
reflecting changes in factor contributions. Real wages fell during the war6 7; 
while the total farm labour force remained largely static, wage expenses 
declined in real terms from $9.6 million in 1914/15 to $8.8 million in 1917/18. 
Wage expenses increased after 1918/19 as the volume of farm labour 
6 6 Where components of these series refer to current prices the terms 'incomes· and 
'expenses' have been used . Note that where components refer to 'real' (ie: 1914/15 
prices) Philpott used the terms 'output' and ' input'. respectively. To avoid confusion 
with 'output' in term s of the volume of production, the terms 'real incomes' and real 
expenses' have been used for adjusted values to 1914/15 prices . 
6 7 When the index of agricultural and pastoral wage rates (Column ( 1 ), Table IV, Data 
Append ix I ) is adjusted by the retail price index, a reduction in real wages is apparent. 
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(including farmer occupiers) increased with the return and settlement of ex-
servicemen. Debt servicing (interest payments) also increased substantially 
after the war in line with the abundance of credit and the Government's 
programme of settling returning soldiers on the land. Increasing land values 
saw local county rates and land taxes rise. Rent declined in absolute terms 
along with the quantity of land that was leased. The general trend toward 
freehold rather than leasehold occupancy by farmers was accelerated in the 
post-war period and provides some basis for the appearance of prosperity, 
albeit through the availability of cheap credit rather than real increases to 
net farm incomes 'off the sheep's back'. 
If there was no post-war boom in real farm incomes, where did the 
impression of prosperity come from? The impact of land settlement schemes 
for returned soldiers has already been mentioned. The value of land in the 
agricultural sector is a function of its expected marginal value product. Thus 
with the prices of products increasing in nominal terms during the post-war 
period and an expectation amongst prospective producers that prices would 
continue to rise in the near future, land prices increased. This process was 
exacerbated by abundant credit and a limited stock of land. Demand in this 
case dictated price. Sinclair (1984) estimates that between 1915 and 1924 
approximately half the occupied land in New Zealand changed hands and 
cites as the basis for property speculation in 22,000 new purchasers with 
some £22.6 million of credit68. 
From this evidence it would appear that any 'boom' in the agricultural 
sector was speculative rather than production based. The willingness of 
existing landholders to sell their properties is understandable when land 
prices were increasing and commodity prices began falling after 1921. 
Besides, for most producers the profitability of farming (represented by 
agricultural terms of exchange) had been deteriorating since 1918, although 
this clearly did not deter speculators or would-be first-time farmers. 
Evidence of a boom and slump cycle was more pronounced in the cities 
and the urban districts than in the rural sector. Even agricultural related 
intermediaries such as wool scourers, dairy factories or freezing works may 
have been more prosperous than basic commodity producers . The cost 
structures of these industries differed from farming to the extent that wages 
comprised a larger proportion of costs. This had two important effects. First, 
since wages69 were not keeping pace with inflation, processing and 
servicing industries enjoyed a more favourable position relative to farming. 
6 8 Sinclair (1984 ), p 244 . 
69 Refer to Data Appendix 1, Table X "Price of Farm Inputs , Indices". 
49 
Second, farming was characterised by 'price-less' pricing while the basis of 
returns and pricing in associated industries was typically 'cost-plus·70. 
Agricultural service industries may have also experienced prosperity not 
from a 'speculative boom' but from the positive multiplier effects of 
agricultural investment. Consider for example the positive effects of 
investment in plant and machinery for stock and station agents and rural 
servicing towns. 
rather 
If the 
than 
post-war 'boom' 
real, how do 
in the agricultural sector was speculative 
we account for the enthusiasm for the 
Commandeer? The fact that there was no output boom m the immediate post-
war period to 1920/21 does not discount the evidence that real net farm 
incomes were higher during the Commandeer than the 1921-24 period (refer 
to Figure 7 and Table 2). Real gross farm income fluctuated during the 
Commandeer but net incomes were more stable providing continuity of 
income flows to producers. Thus the conditions and course of farming under 
the Commandeer were in contrast to the period of decontrol in 1921-22. 
Although contract prices were often below those prevailing in the open 
market this was balanced by a guaranteed market for New Zealand's 
exportable surplus at fixed prices and conditions. Marketing transactions 
costs were minimised while some expenses such as insurance, storage and 
shipping were the responsibility of the Imperial Government and not New 
Zealand producers . The Commandeer had managed risk on producers' behalf. 
The market and price uncertainties of the 1921/22 period led to the formation 
of boards as a means (in part) of collectively managing risk. 
What then of the 1921/22 'slump' which led producers to look upon the 
Commandeer favourably? 
The general consensus among producers was that the free market was 
responsible for depressing prices and returns in the face of 'antagonistic' 
external interests . If the market was guilty, it was guilty by association. 
Prices reflected the interaction of market forces after seven years of 
government control and the transition from a controlled to an open market 
was as stark as the resulting price collapse. Evidence points to the conclusion 
that during the first few months of open sale on the British market, prices 
were surprisingly resilient. Despite significant stocks of mutton and lamb 
70 Philpott (1975) has argued that the non-agricultural economy is typically 'cost-plus' 
where cost increases are passed on by processors, marketers and distributors to 
producers with little or no absorption of costs by operators . In the agricultural economy 
"Agricultural export prices are determined by the forces of supply and demand ... The 
agricultural industry is, therefore, the residual legatee of cost increases which it cannot 
pass on." (p 4) . 
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and the imposition of price controls to March 1921 prices held firm until 
July. A similar picture emerges for cheese which suffered only small 
variations in price over a fourteen month period from June 1920 (reflecting 
low accumulated stocks and constant levels of demand for cheese). Butter 
provides the exception due to the extraordinary prices paid in the 1920/21 
contract and the supply response from New Zealand. 
To test the proposition that returns to producers during the critical de-
control period fell as a result of lower prices and additional costs (marketing 
costs that had formerly been paid by the Imperial Government were the 
responsibility of producers when the Commandeer ended) Figure 10 has been 
constructed. Mutton has been used in this graph because price levels in the 
meat industry were attributed as a factor precipitating the Meat Export 
Control Act, 1921/22. From a practical perspective good data is available for 
prices at London's Smithfield market and for marketing related cost during 
December 192171. 
In this example we are interested in establishing movements in the 
net prices received by producers for mutton (patterns of change for lamb 
71 (i) Prices quoted for the London market are those for the last auction of each 
respective month. 
(ii) Prices for lamb refer to the 'light weight' quality, note that this quality of 
meat demanded a premium of as much as 2d per lb over heavy weight and ld per lb over 
'light weight seconds'. For Mutton 'medium wether' are the quoted prices used. 
Source: N .Z. Meat Producers Board, First Annual Statement of Accounts, 1923. 
(iii) Costs calculated for marketing were derived from data in Meat and Wool : 
Journal of the New Zealand Pastoral and Stud Stock Industries, (Volume III, no 7, Jan 
1922). These costings relate to freezing works surveys in December 1921 
(a) Insurance lamb; 0.16d per lb 
(b) Freight 
(c)Freezing & 
Placing 
f.o.b. 
mutton; 0.12d per lb 
beef; 0.11 d per lb. 
Jamb; 1.79d per lb 
mutton; 1.67d per lb 
beef; 1.41d per lb. 
lamb; 1.375d per lb 
mutton; 1.25d per lb 
beef; l.Od per lb. 
(charges vary between works, an average taken from the Southdown, Westfield and 
Horitiu works has been used) 
(d) Land and handling in UK 0.375d per lb. 
(e) Rail and Cartage 0.188d per lb. 
(f) Total Cost (Ex-Commandeer) Jamb; 2.153d per lb 
mutton; 2.353d per lb 
beef; 2.803d per lb 
(g) Total Cost lamb; 3.888d per lb 
mutton; 3.603d per lb 
beef; 3.803d per lb. 
(iv) Costs for other Commodities are estimated at 
butter; 2.75d per lb 
cheese; 2.25d per lb 
wool; 2.50d per lb. 
Figure 10: London Wholesale Prices for N.Z. Mutton. April 1921 to December 1922. 
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and beef prices are similar) in the open relative to the controlled meat 
market. Given exchange rate parity, estimated costs have been deducted from 
the quoted Smithfield wholesale price. Under the meat Commandeer, 
purchase was effectively made when meat entered storage. This meant that 
the Crown took responsibility for insurance, storage, landing and handling, 
freight and the rail and cartage costs of meat from the works to port. Since 
we have accurate ·estimates of individual costs from a survey of freezing 
works charges, the 'less-cost' estimate for mutton (expressed m current 
prices) represents the price received by producers less marketing costs that 
had formerly been the responsibility of the Imperial Government under the 
Commandeer (these total 2.535d per lb). The 'less-cost' price does not include 
freezing charges nor production costs because these costs had been the 
responsibility of producers under the Commandeer. Thus the 'less-cost' price 
in Figure 10 is directly comparable to the Commandeer price, represented as 
the horizontal line across the graph. 
When account is taken of the costs of marketing New Zealand 
commodities in Britain, returns in comparison to price levels under 
Commandeer control are low. This is particularly evident in the case of 
mutton. Net returns in September 1921 were 2.647d per pound compared to a 
Commandeer price of 5.125d per pound. The lowest prices for mutton were in 
November 1921 when producers' returns were 2.397d per pound before 
prices improved after January 1922. When freezing costs are taken into 
account the return to farmers falls to 1.4d per pound in September 1921 and 
1.15d per pound in November 1921; this is before the costs of production have 
been deducted. The position of beef was even worse. Producers received 
approximately ld per lb for beef fores between September 1921 and January 
1922. It has been argued that the prices for dairy products were less affected 
by the 1921-22 downturn than meat and wool. Nonetheless returns in 
contrast to the Commandeer were generally lower particularly for butter. In 
the wool industry controls imposed by BA WRA and the New Zealand 
Government ensured that although prices were low, they were generally 
stable between 1921 and 1922 before they recovered strongly in 1924. 
It is no coincidence that the period of lowest prices in the meat, dairy 
and wool industries preceded debate and legislation that applied statutory 
control and organisation to their respective industries . Politicians and 
producers repeatedly refered to the poor condition of farming as the key 
motivation for the introduction of legislation. Bearing this in mind it would 
be mistaken to regard the origins of the Boards simply in these terms. As far 
as a 'unique' set of circumstances surrounding the formation of the boards 
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are concerned, price 'slumps' were neither special 
context of preceding or subsequent periods. What 
nor unusual in the 
situation is the dramatic transformation of the 
economy and producers operated. 
is unique 
basis upon 
about this 
which the 
The 'boom' and 'slump' imagery used to describe the state of New 
Zealand agriculture before and after the Commandeer has been questioned in 
the preceding analysis . Evidence tends toward the conclusion that neither 
the Commandeer nor the immediate post-war period were characterised by a 
boom in production or net real farm incomes. While the case for a 'boom' has 
been over-stated for the farming sector, there can be no denying the reality 
of the slump when it came. The impact of the slump was compounded by the 
interaction of three factors. First, there was the delayed output response to 
increasing prices during the Commandeer. After four years of falling output 
during the First World War, pastoral and dairy production increased from 
1919 although it did not reach its 1915 levels until 1920. Production continued 
its upward trend after 1920 in the dairy industry and 1921 in the pastoral 
industry. Second, the output response above co-incided with the end of the 
Commandeer during 1920/21 and the destocking by Britain of commodities 
that had been accumulated during the contract period. In some cases stock-
piles exceeded the normal production of a season and were concentrated in 
New Zealand 's principal export market along with the stock-piles of its major 
competitors . Finally the economic recession of 1921/22 was world-wide and 
not confined to New Zealand. The international economy faced a strong 
down-turn with prices for most exports, including agricultural commodities 
falling . These three factors in combination with the increasing cost of 
production to 1921 support the argument that Boards were formed in 
response to the poor conditions that prevailed after the Commandeer. 
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3. The Evolution of Producer Control Legislation. 
3.1 Introduction 
Events immediately surrounding the formation of the Control Boards 
have been detailed in a number of individual histories 7 2. It is not the 
purpose of this chapter to duplicate this material but to briefly review it. 
Material not featured in previous analysis has been derived from papers in 
the National Archives, contemporary opinion found in farming journals, and 
excerpts from Parliamentary debates . One notable finding has been that 
Cabinet papers from November 1921 show that a plan for a 'super board' to 
market all primary produce had been approved one month before the 
proposal for the Meat Board had even been raised in the House of 
Representatives . This suggests that the government may have been a more 
important protagonist m the board movement than the reactive body it has 
often portrayed as. Thi s position is reinforced by Massey ' s active support for 
a ' marketing pool ' and other measures aimed at assisting the development of 
the agricultural sector. Massey's role is pivotal throughout. In Parliamentary 
debate, conferences and discussions with producers and other industry 
interests he was the driving force for the organised producer control of 
commodity marketing. 
The second part of the chapter will briefly review the statutory 
powers and function embodied in the two Board Acts, the Meat Export Control 
.Act, 1921/22 and the Dairy Produce Export Control Act, 1923 . The Board of 
Trade (Wool Industry) Regulations, 1921 are detailed in section 1.7. 
3.2 Background to the Control Boards 
Particularly poor prices m the last months of 1921 precipitated 
concerted action by producers and government to address problems in the 
meat industry . Forms of cooperative marketing and distribution of produce 
(with varying degrees of state involvement) had been advocated by industry 
interests since de-control. The first formalised board proposal emerged from 
the Producers ' Standing Committee of the Board of Agriculture in November 
72 For an account of (a) The New Zealand Wool Marketing Control refer to: New Zealand 
Journal of Agriculture, September 20, 1921 (Government Printer).pp 189-190. 
(b) The Meat Board refer to: Hayward, D., Golden Jubilee: The Story of Fifty Years 
of the Ne w Zealand Meal Producers Board, 1922-1972 (Universal Printers, 1972). 
(c) The Dairy Board see: Ward, A.H., A Command of Co-operatives (New Zealand 
Dairy Board , 1975) 
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1921. Documents in the National Archives 7 3 record that a Producers' Board 
proposal was placed before cabinet and approved on November 19, 1921. The 
Board was to be constituted with membership drawn from dairy associations, 
freezing companies, stock and station agents, producers and government 
"for the purpose of dealing with matters relating to the handling, shipping 
and marketing (including advertising) of primary products, particularly 
meat and dairy produce". The Committee advocated the appointment of 
London representatives to act on the board's behalf and provide market 
information and advice. The Committee was non-specific as to actual powers, 
stating that the board would be at its own discretion to utilise such advice to 
the 'best interests of producers' . While the proposal was general in its 
outlook emphasising the primary sector rather than individual industries, it 
contained all the elements of later control legislation. 
Despite cabinet approval the proposal foundered on a number of 
technicalities. Finance by levy on sheep and cattle (including dairy) was 
regarded by cabinet as unrealistic unless the Board were officially 
constituted or under the direct control of a Government Department. The 
Committee had envisaged that the Board was to be established under 
unspecified existing legislation, but in consultation with the Crown Law 
Office it was found that a special Act of Parliament would be required for the 
formation of the Board setting out its powers and constitution. While 'the 
ball' had been firmly returned into the Committee's court industry based 
developments superseded the sector based proposal for a 'Super board'. 
In a widely publicised meeting, a delegation of meat producers had met 
Massey in October 1921 urging him to take action to address the problems 
faced by farmers . During the same month Massey engaged in the process of 
political 'kite flying', testing proposals on Parliament and the wider 
electorate. An early variant suggested a meat board composed of 
representatives of government , business and producers with the facilities to 
market meat in Britain 7 4 . A government caucus committee was formed with 
the purpose of evaluating the factors leading to the fall in farmers incomes 
and to recommend practical solutions. The exact means of resolving problems 
in the meat industry was the subject of intense debate as it was to be with the 
dairy industry a short time later. 
The findings of the Government Committee were presented by Massey 
during a general debate in the House of Representatives on the issue of 
7 3 NZNA, Agricultural Paper, Agr 40 , Series 1, Ag 1571 , 1930/16D "New Zealand 
Producers Board Conferences" 
74 Hayward (1972) p 8. 
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'Marketing New Zealand Meat to Britain•75. Its genesis was to be found in the 
'marketing pool' proposal with a prominent role for government in the 
operation and finance of its activities. Parliamentary debate records Massey 
commenting: 
I believe the time will come when it will be necessary to supply the 
British market with the quantity of meat required, and to see to it that 
no more than is required is sent forward. If that is so, then it will be 
the time when we shall require strong and substantial finance, 
because the people who are producing cannot afford to go on 
producing without receiving the money for their produce, or a good 
part of it, and so we may be called upon to provide a very large sum of 
money .76 
The proposal met with mixed response from producers. Opposition was 
typified by a feature article in Meat and Wool? 7 . The journal advocated an 
optional rather than a compulsory Act, rejecting Massey's proposal on the 
grounds that it would re-introduce government control. The pool, it was 
argued, would lead to reduced competition and hence (by some twist of logic) 
lower commodity prices. Opponents were critical of placing the control and 
sale of meat in the hands of an inexperienced board, with the burden of any 
loss carried by producers and not the government. Finally the proposal was 
regarded as potentially disruptive to the existing patterns of marketing and 
distribution. This is questionable when one considers that at this time 
markets had only been operating in an open environment for short period. 
The possibility of forming a control board was debated at the 
Producers' Conference on January 10, 1922. The meeting was chaired by 
Massey with delegates representing producers and industry interests from 
throughout New Zealand. Following the debate that had ensued since 
Massey ' s December proposal, a different approach was adopted. Massey 
emphasised that the board would be used to reduce marketing and shipping 
costs and not to enforce a compulsory pool. He emphasised that the board was 
not a tendency toward socialism as some of its opponents had suggested, 
rather it was co-operation through government assistance. Massey reacted to 
accusations of Socialism in typical form: 
There is nothing socialistic about what we are proposing. It is 
cooperation . It is the duty of government to assist the industries of the 
country, especially the primary industries on the prosperity of which 
the prosperity of the whole country depends.? 8 
75 NZPD, Vol 193 (December 20, 1921), pp 208-209 . 
76 Ibid., p 209. 
77 Meat and Wool, Vol III no 1, January 1922, pp 12-17. 
78 Hayward, p 17. 
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At an industry level Stephens (1936)79 has suggested that the 
formation of cooperatives were prompted by the realisation that individual 
producers had relatively weak bargaining power when dealing with 
integrated marketing firms and sought to overcome these difficulties by 
eliminating the 'middleman'. Rhodes (1983)80 suggests that farmers look to 
cooperatives for help to achieve greater control over their own destiny. They 
generally view themselves as weak price takers in a market environment 
where other agent are more knowledgeable and powerful. The logical 
extension from cooperative organisation to control legislation is apparent in 
the dairy industry where cooperatives were the dominant form of processing 
organisation . In contrast the meat industry was almost devoid of cooperative 
processing owing to the nature of the operation and the initially large 
capital requirements for plant and machinery. While the meat industry was 
not cooperative the shareholders of freezing companies were predominantly 
producers with director representation. The essential difference between the 
proprietary and the cooperative concern was that in the former profits were 
distributed on the basis of share holding and were not directly related to the 
volume of raw material supplied. Formalised by the Dairy Industry Act, 1908 
cooperative organisation provided a strong basis from which cooperative 
marketing could develop. This is not to suggest that the introduction of the 
Dairy Export Control Act was without dissent. Opposition was particularly 
intense from proprietary factories, selling agents and a number of Taranaki 
based cooperatives . 
Falling prices and poor returns to dairy producers mirrored the 
problems faced by the pastoral industry. Taking a lead from developments in 
the Meat Export Control Board, representative conferences during March, 
May and June 1922 investigated the possibility of forming a limited liability 
company constituting a compulsory pool to facilitate marketing and to boost 
the returns of Dairy producers . This concept had been abandoned by July 
following scepticism from the Department of Agriculture and oppositiOn 
from the SIDA (South Island Dairy Association) and proprietary interests. The 
NDA and SIDA agreed by resolution to seek government sponsorship for a 
control board on similar lines to the Meat Export Control Board. 
W. Grounds8 1, Chairman of the Dominion Dairy Council, argued that 
control was required for four reasons: 
7 9 Stephens., (1936) p 745 . 
80 Rhodes (1983), p 315 . 
81 NZNA, Agricultural Paper, Agr 40, Series 1, Ag 1422 part 3, 1923/6a, "Dairy Board 
Act" 
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(1) To eliminate the 'speculative manipulator·82. 
(2) To negotiate shipping contracts and supervise shipping conditions. 
(3) To establish a satisfactory intelligence department which would 
cover; 
(a) Methods of marketing, 
(b) Centres of distribution, 
(c) Systematic advertising, 
(d) Development of new markets. 
(4) Urgency of Establishment; threat of competition from Siberia, 
Argentina and South Africa for British market share. 
Opposing interests cited a number of objections to board control. The 
Chamber of Commerce for example opposed the Bill on the grounds that it 
created a legalised monopoly and undermined the position of traders. 
Furthermore it alienated the individual from the product of his or her 
labour. From farmers themselves The New Zealand Dairyman8 3 commented: 
The word 'pool' does not sound quite as forbidding as trust or combine, 
but that is really what the pool proposal means." 
In a later issue it went on to say; 
In the first place every factory will completely lose its identity and its 
individuality in every respect. Factory directors will become 
nonentities ... Statements have been made to the effect that had some 
sort of pool existed when the crash came in the butter market last 
December [ 1921], it would have been possible to have saved some 
hundreds of thousands of pounds for the producer. Such statements 
can only be based on ignorance and misrepresentation. 8 4 
Through subsequent events many of these concerns proved unfounded. 
Indeed a clear line of thought is apparent between the perceived success of 
the meat board and the advocacy of a similar scheme for the Dairy Industry. 
Where the difference lies is in the fragmentation of opinion in the Dairy 
Industry . The process of legislation from proposal to ratification in both 
House and Chamber of Parliament had been completed in less than six 
8 2 The 'Speculative Manipulator' according to Grounds: forward sold without physically 
owning the produce and would then purchase small quantities on the market. These 
quantities were then sold back to the market at a loss depressing prices. When prices 
were sufficiently low the speculator would buy the amount required to meet the forward 
sell agreement and profit at the expense of producers . NB: No specific examples or 
evidence of this phenomenon were presented by Grounds. 
83 The New Zealand Dairyman Vol 26, No 12, September 20, 1922, p 61. 
84 Ward (1975), p 51. 
59 
months for the Meat Producers' Board. The same process for the Dairy 
Produce Control board was more delayed spanning a fifteen month period 
before the act was finally passed on August 28, 1923. 
The extent of dissent over the legislation became apparent when 
industry ratification was required. The Meat Act had been mandatory in the 
sense that once it had passed into law there was no method of endorsement or 
rejection by producers. In contrast the Dairy Export Control Act 1923 
required the support of producers in a referendum to become operational. 
The referendum entitled 55,000 producers involved in the industry to cast a 
vote stating whether the act should, or should not be brought into operation. 
Subsequently 22,284 votes were cast in favour and 9,255 votes against 
providing the majority required to implement the Act. The large number of 
votes in opposition to the Act indicate a far from unanimous mandate for the 
board. Another interesting feature of the poll is that only 57 percent of those 
entitled to vote actually did so, although the significance is questioned by 
Ward (1975)85. Ward suggests that many of these 'non-voters' were 'billy 
can' suppliers with a few cows and no major interest in the affairs of the 
export market. 
Reference needs to made if only in passing to the political conditions 
that characterised the early 1920s. More specifically how did these conditions 
influence the Government's willingness to introduce control legislation? The 
Reform party had been in power since 1912 (in coalition with the Liberals 
duting the war period). As a party it represented an uneasy alliance between 
the small, predominantly North Island farmer and city business interests . 
The electoral instability of the 1920s reflected the political realignment that 
had taken place as Labour gained support in the cities at the expense of the 
Liberals. In this environment Reform had attempted to gain support in the 
Liberal held country and town electorates. Conventional political wisdom (as 
espoused by Massey himself) regarded the primacy and prosperity of 
farming as the central economic activity of the economy and a necessary 
condition for the prosperity of the economy as a whole. 
In light of the above 'conventional wisdom' the collapse of commodity 
prices after 1921 led to a political and economic crisis for Reform and a call 
from some agrarian activists for a separate 'Country Party' to represent the 
interests of farmers. The culmination of these factors undoubtedly 
influenced Massey 's decision to make a number of significant concessions to 
rural interests . The Meat and Dairy Produce Control Acts of 1921-22 and 1923 
respectively may be regarded as part of a wider package that included state 
85 Ibid., p 54. 
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provision of cheap credit through the Rural Advances Act, 1926, The Rural 
Credit Associations Act, 1922 and the Rural Intermediate Credit Act, 1927. 
3.3 The Statutory Powers and Functions of the Control Boards. 
In terms of section 14 of the Meat Export Control Act, 1921-22 and the 
Dairy Produce Export Control Act, 1923, five distinctive powers were delegated 
to the boards. The boards were given full authority to conduct and pursue 
operations as they determined in the following matters: 
(a) For the handling, pooling and storage of produce, 
(b ) For the shipment of such produce, in such quantities and under 
such terms as the board determined, 
(c) For the sale and disposal of produce, 
(d) For the insurance against the loss of produce in New Zealand or in 
transit until disposal and 
(e) Generally for all such matters as are necessary for the due 
discharge of its functions in handling, distribution and the disposal of 
produce . 
Furthermore under the same section of each respective Act the boards 
were given power on behalf of producers to provide security and assurance 
over produce 'as if the board were the legal owners ' of this produce. Beyond 
the specific powers derived under these two sections the boards were 
delegated general and far reaching powers through other provisions of the 
acts . One of the major provisions related to the way in which produce could 
only be exported in accordance with the determination of each respective 
board through a sy stem of licenses . 
Arguabl y the most controversial power delegated to the boards was the 
power to assume control over produce intended for export. The legislation 
empowered the board s to assume absolute or partial control on behalf of 
producers where necessary for the effective operation of the act. Certainly 
where absolute control was exercised the particular powers stated under 
section section 14 and 16 of the Meat and Dairy Board Acts became important. 
Both Acts constituted the power of a London Agency of the Board to be 
established . The function of these agencies was to provide the boards with 
market intelligence on prices and conditions, to act as their agents and 
implement board directives. 
The legislation specified that no contract relating to the export, 
shipment or insurance of produce could be undertaken by any person or 
body other than the board acting on producers behalf. In acting on behalf of 
6 1 
producers the boards were also entitled to impose a levy on those commodities 
exported from New Zealand. Effectively under the provisions of this section, 
Parliament was delegating powers of taxation to a statutory authority. These 
powers were limited only by stated maximum found in the Act and the 
regulations pertaining to the Act. 
Where the two acts differed significantly in their content was in the 
provision of the Meat Export Control Act relating to the guarantee of 
advances made to the board or at the boards request through the Minister of 
Finance. The significance of this section is not to be underestimated since it 
amounts to 'blank cheque' on the part of government. The Act states that for 
the purpose of enabling advances to be made to the owners of produce, the 
Minister of Finance may guarantee to creditors, money from the consolidated 
fund where default had taken place. Where requested: 
... the Minister of Finance may from time to time borrow on the 
security of Treasury bills, or otherwise on the security of the public 
revenues of New Zealand, any moneys that may be required by the 
Board to enable it to carry on its operations under this Act, and pay the 
same into the Board's Accounts . 8 6 
While the statutory powers of the Boards were well defined the Act provided 
regulatory measures for the prescription of maximum charges for levies to 
be paid on the export of produce and regulations where necessary for the 
boards to achieve their functions under their respective Acts. 
Finally under 1924 amendments the boards were given the power to 
exhibit and advertise produce. The amendment provided for expenditure of 
the boards funds for the purpose of publicising produce, to increase its 
consumption, improve its quality and promote its trade and sale. The Meat 
Export Control Amendment Act, 1924 also provided provision for contracts 
that brought the act into line with the Dairy Board . With the exception of the 
provision for government advances made to the Meat board and the different 
constitution of the membership of each board, both Acts in their delegated 
powers were essentially the same and both pursued the same set of objectives 
for a different group of producers. 
The activities of the boards may thus be placed into three broad 
categories : 
( 1) Regulation and Control functions, including the licensing of 
exports and exports , control of grading, storage and transportation facilities. 
(2) Commercial activities, including handling, pooling, storage and 
transportation of produce. 
86 Meat Export Control Act, 1921-22, Section 17 . 
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(3) Leadership and industry servicing activities, including the 
development of marketing strategies and administration. 
It is worth examining the powers that the boards did not possess, and 
in this respect the absence of control over the production of output and the 
marketing of produce in the domestic market are of significance. As a matter 
of course control of domestic production for local consumption and export 
are related stabilisation tools. The absence of power over the domestic market 
and local producers placed a potentially serious constraint on the boards' 
ability effectively to market produce abroad. 
Where the objectives of the Control Acts were to improve returns to 
producers, the fluctuating supply of produce for export mitigated against 
price stability and maximised returns to producers. The domestic market 
mechanism had the ability to act in a number of ways. Through a positive 
price differential between the domestic and foreign market, produce could be 
drawn away from export while an expanding domestic market had the same 
effect. Although this is what would be expected to occur amongst rational 
economic actors, the foreign exchange constraint meant that the outcome 
was not necessarily ideal. 
In the absence of control over producers, excess production presented 
a potential difficulty at time when market growth was static for many 
commodities. Price stabilisation in the marketing of perishable commodities 
without control over supply presented significant difficulties. The potential 
implications of over production were exacerbated by the possible distortion 
of market signals. In achieving greater returns to producers through the co-
ordinated marketing of dairy produce and meat, the boards may well have 
been encouraging production at a time of static demand in the international 
market. 
Nevertheless despite the absence of control over the domestic market 
and production, the powers invested in the boards by the state represented a 
significant delegation of responsibility . In establishing statutory authorities 
with wide ranging powers of compulsion, the government ensured the 
necessary means for producers to market their own produce through joint 
action and statutory intervention. The Export Control Acts were by no means 
unique as instances of government intervention but they are interesting for 
the extent of the powers they delegate to a statutory authority. It is 
furthermore unlikely that a voluntary constituted body would have been 
given the same powers by producers themselves. Similarly it is more than 
likely that the state would have been loathe to exercise these powers itself 
given their potential political implications and practical difficulties . 
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4. The Case for Statutory Intervention. 
4.1 Introduction. 
Until recently the role of statutory producer boards was accepted 
almost without question. During the 1980s however changes in the political 
and economic environment resulted in a re-evaluation of the State's role in 
the economy and the role of statutory bodies. The coercive and wide ranging 
powers of the producer boards have had a pervasive impact on the 
agricultural sector and economy as a whole. What strikes the observer from 
an economic perspective is the apparent absence of any strong explicit 
theoretical underpinning for government action . One key question relates to 
the economic justifications for statutory intervention on producers' behalf. 
The preceding chapters have indicated that the Boards did not emerge out of 
a coherent ideological doctrine. Nor were the Boards formed as a result of the 
careful appraisal and analysis of alternative organisational forms and 
intervention. 
In economic theory, three broad justifications for statutory 
intervention may be identified and this chapter considers them one by one. 
First the ' economic rent' argument examines the extent of New Zealand's 
power as a price maker to maximise producer incomes and foreign exchange 
(in the case of the 'optimum tariff'). Bargaining power imbalances, weak 
selling and price stability arguments are important parts of the economic 
rent case. Second, the transaction costs minimising strategy may be found in 
the provision of public goods and organisational economies through 
statutory intervention . The third justification acknowledges that natural 
monopolies exist in certain aspects of marketing and that technological 
economies of scale can be derived. Similarities in problems and responses 
during the 1920s and 1980s provide some useful insights into the perceived 
role of Boards and their associated attributes . A survey of economic 
development literature also provides some useful perspectives. However the 
orientation of that literature is distinct and a different set of issues are 
considered . 
4.2 Bargaining Power Asymmetry. 
Bargaining power relationships occur on a number of levels between 
producers and consumers, intermediaries and other producers. In nation to 
nation relations, 'optimum tariff arguments' are important when examining 
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the role of government. In any economic interaction one would expect the 
relative strengths or power of the parties to be reflected in contractual 
terms . 
Bargaining power asymmetry was a concern that emerged during the 
negotiation of Imperial Commandeer contracts during the war. The 
monopoly-monopsony contractual arrangement of the Commandeer 
contrasted with the post control conditions that emphasised the difference in 
size (and power) between farmers and intermediaries in processing and 
export. This reflects the relative economies of scale of farming on the one 
hand and intermediary functions on the other. If asymmetry was a problem, 
one might expect the emergence of farmer companies to process, purchase 
or market produce as an alternative to statutory producer boards . Voluntary 
organisation in turn would require farmers to overcome the costs of 
collective association . If these costs were exceeded by the benefits of 
displacing power and bargaining relationships in the producer's favour, 
then collective action would be rational. 
Why didn't voluntary cooperation and producer control emerge out of 
the marketing problems of the early 1920s? There is nothing to suggest that a 
producer response of this sort may not have eventuated, given time. The 
cooperative developments in the dairy industry provide firm precedent for 
further integration into export marketing and similar patterns of 
development in other industries (particularly meat) . Government statutory 
intervention was hastened by a number of key factors that have been 
discu ssed above. The first of these was the farmers experience during the 
war and a realisation of the benefits that government intervention could 
bring to the operation of marketing . The Commandeer was associated 
(unreasonably ) with unprecedented income levels for producers. The second 
factor was the dramatic fall in prices following decontrol. Third, the impact 
of market adjustments and the widespread belief (with some justification) of 
predatory action by intermediaries triggered producer lobbying upon which 
the government acted . 
Government intervention to moderate the economic power of market 
participants was neither unique nor unusual in a contemporary New Zealand 
setting where it was regarded as a legitimate government function. Strong 
precedent for government intervention to address bargaining power 
asymmetries may be found in the 1890-1912 Liberal administration and the 
war time requirement for an active government role in most aspects of 
economic life . Massey was convinced that the national interests were 
mirrored by those in the farming sector and saw no need to wait for a 
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protracted market adjustment of bargaining power asymmetry. Advocates of 
statutory control emphasised that it represented co-operation through 
government assistance. 
Despite the precedents, Control Board legislation marked a clear 
departure from government policy in the marketing and distribution of New 
Zealand meat and dairy produce. Where a co-ordinated approach to 
marketing was both politically and economically appealing, intervention in 
one form or another was the preferable strategy. Given a tradition of state 
activism, producer self-government appeared acceptable to the majority of 
constituents. The State provided a legislative framework that defined the 
boundaries of the boards' activities and ensured government representation 
at board level. If the legislation did not exhibit functional devolution per se, 
it did represent a functionally devolved approach. 
When evaluating bargaining power asymmetries one underlying 
assumption of the contemporary case was that economic rents were being 
made at the expense of producers because monopoly and cartel conditions 
applied. Yet firms involved in the bulk purchase, transport and overseas 
marketing of primary products confronted conditions of relatively open 
entry and exit. Each firm faced a number of competitors and with the 
exception of the shipping conference there was little evidence to support 
accusations of collusion. Debate surrounding the American Meat Trusts (see 
section 1.9) supports the contention that many of these concerns were more 
illusory than real. 
An alternative to statutory intervention to counter monopolistic 
exploitation was the direct regulation of intermediary activities (of the type 
found in the Slaughtering and Inspection Amendment Act, 1918). The Control 
Board structure however provided government with the opportunity to 
functionally devolve rather than participate directly in the monitoring and 
maintenance of a complex system of regulations and legislation. Whether the 
formation of the boards was countervailing to existing asymmetries or 
simply predatory was secondary to the more implicit contemporary view that 
Boards were mechanisms to gain (rather than counter) monopoly power. 
The monopoly case for statutory intervention represents the 
'moderation of economic power' argument in reverse. The potential benefit 
of monopoly behaviour are confined not only to economic rentS 7 and profits 
but the wider implications for innovation and economies of scale. Profits 
8 7 'Economic Rents' are simply the profits that monopolists earn in the long-run, and 
represent the total amount by which payments to a factor of production exceed the 
minimum amount necessary to keep it in its present employment. 
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provide a pool of 'surplus capital' with which to undertake the risky process 
of research . Monopoly marketing can also produce economies of scale which 
are not possible in the perfectly competitive market. The boards achieved 
significant savings in the cost of insurance, freight and handling charges, 
eliminating duplication of effort and balancing bargaining power 
asymmetries. Finally statutory monopoly powers are important for boards to 
maximise their servicing and leadership activities which comprise advocacy, 
negotiation, development of marketing plans, market research, promotion 
and similar activities. 
An optimum tariff maximises an economy's terms of trade by moving 
to higher trade indifference curves while passing on the costs of higher 
prices to the importing economy. The same principle applies to other 
mechanisms that maximise terms of trade for New Zealand producers dealing 
with the rest of the world. Through addressing the weaknesses of multiple 
channel marketing and weak selling, producers sought to utilise the 
perceived benefits of statutory producer boards. The ability of producers to 
act as price makers rather than price takers is important. In 1924 for 
instance New Zealand Jamb and mutton constituted 59 and 42 percent of 
exports into the United Kingdom respectiveJy8 8. While this does not 
constitute monopoly it does suggest the possibility that optimum tariff 
arguments might apply (in the short term at least). Certainly the Ottawa 
Agreement of 1932 shows that New Zealand did have some ability to smooth or 
increase its price path, as it had demonstrated during the Commandeer. 
Nevertheless price making was tempered by the condition of the external 
market, the availability of substitutes and supply side problems of restricting 
output. 
The statutory requirements of the boards were to market the 
producers' exportable surplus without provision to limit production. Early 
advocates of board legislation favoured a compulsory 'pooling arrangement' 
for the meat industry which would have given the board wider powers than 
those finally granted. It is interesting to note how Massey's presentation 
changed on the pooling aspects of the legislation . In December 1921 Hansard 
records the Prime Minister suggesting to Parliament: "I believe the time will 
come when it will be necessary to supply the British market with the 
quantity of meat required and to see to it that no more than is required is sent 
forward"89. Three months later during the second and substantive reading of 
88 Belshaw et a! (1936), p 641. 
89 NZPD , Vol 193 (December 20, 1921), p 209 . 
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The Meat Export Control Bill , Massey was careful to play down the earlier pool 
proposal and the government ' s willingness to underwrite it: 
I should make it quite clear that I am not thinking for a moment of 
doing anything unfair in the way of increasing the price to the 
British consumer. I think we should get a reasonable price, but we are 
not entitled to do anything in the way of exploitation. We are out to 
protect ours~lves.90. 
Massey argued that producers would be served not by raising prices to 
consumers but by "reducing the cost of production, by seeing that the meat is 
properly marketed and by keeping within reason the profits of middlemen 
handling our meat." 
Why the ostensible change in position? The government had always 
been committed to increasing producer's returns through reductions in 
their cost structures. It had also been committed to the positive distribution of 
wealth from higher export receipts. Furthermore the government 
committee ' s proposal for meat pooling had been merely that; a proposal, 
intended as the basis for further discussion and industry debate. The industry 
subsequently expressed its dissatisfaction at the pooling proposal, notably the 
aspects of single channel marketing and compulsion. Explanation may be 
found in concern over the competence of any potential board and producers' 
desire to keep their 'options open' . This passage constitutes a change in 
presentation and not necessarily a change in position. If gaining economic 
rent was an objective of government policy it is unlikely that Massey would 
have drawn attention to the fact for fear of retaliatory action in export 
market s. 
The Board of Trade (Wool Industry) Regulations, 1921 offer a different 
approach than the Control Board structures of the meat and dairy industries . 
Similar regulations in Australia , the activities of BA WRA and the high level 
of cooperation between wool exporters in the international market 
constituted an industry cartel. While acting as monopolists wool growers did 
not enjoy the benefits of monopoly profits because for a portion of the period 
prices were equivalent to, or less than the average cost of production. The 
BA WRA disposal after 1921 meant that farmers were in the unusual position 
of competing with their own wool, purchased by the British in previous 
seasons . To effectively exploit monopoly power the reduction of wool 
stockpiles was a necessary but not a sufficient condition to extract economic 
rents . Collusion in the wool industry had little impact on the demand side 
90 NZPD , Vol 194 (February 8,1922), p 317. 
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where market weakness until 1924 limited producer's returns. It is ironic 
that the final disposal of BA WRA wool in 1924 and improved wool prices 
coincided with the abrogation of the committee's statutory powers. Woods 
(1988) suggests that this reflects two consistent themes in the history of the 
New Zealand wool industry. First, that auctioning (with some caveats) is the 
most effective form of wool disposal. Second is the view that statutory 
intervention in wool marketing should be kept to a minimum. 
4.3 Weak Selling. 
Weak selling is the term used when an exporter or his agent in an 
effort to obtain an order within a trade structure for a non-exclusive 
New Zealand product accepts a lower price than that which could, and 
should, have been achieved. This action could also result in a 
generally lower price level being established for that product across the 
market. 9 1 
Dis-satisfaction with the methods of distribution and disposal of 
surplus stock in the decontrolled market provided a basis. for producer 
advocacy in the early 1920s. Agriculture is characterised by markets where 
commodities of the same quantity and quality are non-differentiable except 
on the basis of price. Thus a purchaser faced with a number of sellers 
offering the same product will purchase on the basis of price. Problems 
emerge because price competition between exporters reduces the revenue of 
both exporters and trading economies involved in the production and export 
of agricultural commodities . Weak selling can occur in two different ways 
according to Treasury (1987); 
(i) When an additional seller is an incompetent marketer and receives 
a lower price than other sellers. 
(ii) Where incumbent New Zealand sellers are extracting a monopoly 
rent and this is reduced by the additional seller. 
Incompetent marketing may occur where a new entrant with 
imperfect market knowledge underestimates the prevailing price. The 
impact of this behaviour is not only that existing market participants are 
faced by new competitors, but that the lower price accepted in this one off 
transaction weakens their own bargaining power in subsequent negotiations 
with buyers. Uncertainty prevails and poor returns may follow where a 
market is characterised by imperfect knowledge and widely ranging prices 
are quoted . There is some evidence to support the claim of incompetent 
marketing in the disposal of surplus meat stocks in the 1920s (producer 
91 IPS (1988), p 39. 
69 
dissatisfaction with the government's management of this matter is well 
known) . If weak selling was a problem it was because of the British 
Government's haste to dispose of stocks (stored for over two years in some 
cases). Armour's 1919 purchase of British stocks held in New Zealand was 
below the prevailing market price but the impact on the domestic producer 
was limited since Armour intended distribution in the United States where 
New Zealand interests were small. Evidence of weak selling may also be found 
in the wool industry . First were the difficulties faced by the Australian 
industry in maintaining voluntary price agreements during the early 1920s. 
The second example was the holding back of stocks of Commandeer wool by 
BAWRA while the owners of new wool supplied weak market demand and 
depressed prices . 
'Weak selling' should not be confused with 'efficient selling' which is 
based on "market discovery and the exploitation of margins and levels of 
efficiency that differ significantly from those of the 'average' or 'pool 
sell er"' 9 2. The distinction is not always clear particularly where changing 
market conditions are characterised by poor demand and excess supply. In a 
shrinking market, falling prices due to the legitimate interaction of market 
forces can closely resemble active price undercutting or weak selling. The 
aberration of weak selling during the 1920-22 period was more likely a 
consequence of 'efficient' selling rather than weak selling. One would expect 
the market to exact discipline on the incompetent operators. Firms that 
continue to indulge in weak selling are likely to enjoy lower profits or pay 
less for commodities . In both cases future prospects for such a firm are 
questionable . As a marginal operator the firm is likely to be forced out of the 
industry or have difficulty in obtaining produce (due to lower prices) when 
profit level s fall. While this may the case, long-term downward pressure on 
prices might re sult from a series of incompetent marketers, one replacing 
another as each in turn is forced out of the market (this may of course 
perform the important function of reducing industry costs) . 
It is often argued that incumbent New Zealand producers extracting 
economic rent s require statutory intervention to exclude new market 
entrant s because competition between exporters of a non-differentiable 
product reduces net earnings to the economy and the industry . Against this 
may be argued that marketing monopolies excluding new entrants have 
negative allocative, efficiency and distributive effects. Advocates of 
intervention have suggested that where monopoly is possible, collusive or 
voluntary arrangements become progressively more difficult to enforce as 
92 Woods (1988), p 43. 
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the number of new participants grows. In this case weak selling provided a 
partial stimulus for government intervention in the meat and wool 
industries during the 1920s. Similarly low prices in the kiwifruit industry 
during the 1980s were seen as a consequence of over-supply and poor quality 
product which resulted in movement toward greater industry control of 
marketing. 
4.4 The 1920s Revisited?: Kiwifruit Marketing. 
Strong parallels may be drawn between the debate over statutory 
control boards in the 1920s and developments in the Kiwifruit industry 
during the 1980s. It is interesting to consider the response of government 
and producers to a similar set of circumstances and issues after sixty-five 
years of board experience in other primary industries. Voluntary 
arrangements had characterised the kiwifruit industry during the 1970s 
until the Kiwifruit Marketing Authority was established under the Primary 
Products Marketing Act, 1953 (Kiwifruit Marketing Licensing Regulations). 
The authority was given the power to issue licenses, collect levies, promote 
exports, monitor minimum quality standards and assist m the general 
development of the industry. 
A 1988 Coopers and Lybrand audit review of the industry, its 
marketing performance and structures, identified four key difficulties 
facing the industry; 
(i) The poor returns to growers out of falling prices, 
(ii) Problems with existing licensing structures, 
(iii) Impact of increased production domestically and overseas, 
competing for the same export markets (including weak selling), 
(iv) The effectiveness and state of the existing regulatory structures 
(N.Z . Kiwifruit Authority) . 
When the case for statutory intervention is considered the report 
suggests " ... the issue reduces to one of risk and who bears it so that, in our 
view, the cost and benefit estimates of the party that bears the primary risk 
should receive most weight"93. The report suggests that statutory 
intervention is justified where two conditions are met: first that the likely 
benefits of intervention exceed the likely costs; and second that a system of 
voluntary contracts would be impractical. The first condition was satisfied 
because the costs of monitoring and establishing a suitable system of 
voluntary contracts was outweighed by the benefits and higher prices that 
93 Coopers and Lybrand & Associates (1988), para 6.12. 
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disciplined marketing would achieve. A single seller was more likely to 
achieve the levels of control and conditions required to maintain competitive 
advantage. As for the second condition, existing industry regulations and the 
externalisation of costs by market participants placed restraints on the 
ex tent to which industry rationalisation could be achieved by voluntary 
contract. 
A number of specific industry characteristics requiring intervention 
were identified . Information failure or knowledge asymmetries make it 
difficult and expensive for individual producers to monitor changes in the 
market and the performance of export agents. Another problem has been the 
"small exporter advantage" . By selling at the beginning of each season when 
prices are higher, the exporter could realise a higher price while 
externalising the costs of depressing market prices. Low barriers to entry for 
intermediaries meant that the industry would fail to achieve distribution 
economies of scale, (This situation may be paralleled in the BA WRA wool 
disposals of 1921-24 and the 1920/21 auction of new season's wool at higher 
prices ). 
Without service and quality characteristics kiwifruit are inherently 
difficult to differentiate as a product. New Zealand producers in each of these 
commodities have attempted to differentiate on the basis of superior quality 
and generic branding. Bureaucratic failure in the execution of Kiwifruit 
Regulations provide a strong case for intervention according to Coopers and 
Lybrand . In their existing form (1988) the statutory framework had failed to 
deliver the competitive advantage producers required . Similarly during the 
1920/21 'bureaucratic failure' in wool , Government had been unable 
adequately to deal with the transition to an open market at the conclusion of 
the Commandeer. 
The most compelling case for statutory intervention can be found in 
the presence of weak selling. A fragmented industry structure was unlikely 
to achieve significant rent where producers and exporters competed against 
one another in the export market. According to producers strategic control 
of prices , volumes and distribution channels required the backing of single 
desk selling to maximise New Zealand's position as the single largest 
international exporter of kiwifruit. Export licensing by the Kiwifruit 
Marketing Authority (as with the Meat Board post 1922) may be viewed as a 
reaction to low prices resulting from over-supply, particularly of inferior 
quality product and perceived weak selling. Licensing has limited effect 
where the objective of policy is to maximise returns and strategic advantage 
rather than manage industry participants . In the final analysis, the 
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response to this apparently strong set of circumstances will be determined 
by producers' own assessment of the costs and benefits of industry 
intervention. 
Government intervention in the export and marketing of primary 
products has been typified by action in response to producer demands. 
Response has not been to the exclusion of other industry interests, but the 
opinions of 
justifications 
'special case' 
consideration 
producers have been given primacy over others. The 
for statutory intervention in these circumstances equate to 
arguments. Intervention in the domestic economy requires 
of the costs and benefits to producers and consumers. In 
contrast intervention in the export sector may be made with little reference 
to foreign consumers where producers can secure monopoly rents or profits . 
'Special case' arguments may also apply to agriculture when the economy is 
faced by a foreign exchange constraint and producers experience difficulties 
in manipulating their inputs to respond to market fluctuations. 
A constant theme that runs through the formation of producer boards 
from the Meat Export Control Act, 1921-22 to the Kiwifruit Marketing Board 
under the Primary Products Marketing Act, 1988 has been the high level of 
interaction intra-industry and industry-Government. The Government has 
acted neither paternally nor unilaterally in its industry dealings. Instead it 
has acted where the body of consensus lies. In the case of the Kiwifruit 
Marketing Board, the Government had asked the industry to survey its 
members and it was found that a strong body of opinion supported the 
concept of a board or an increased level of control by the Kiwifruit 
Authority . Speaking in 1988 to the second reading of the Primary Products 
Marketing Bill, Dr W. Sutton noted: 
The Minister [of Agriculture] carried out a poll of known kiwifruit 
growers on the issue; 84 percent of the valid votes cast favoured the 
board proposal...That gave the Minister the mandate he needed to form 
the board. The Government did not take the decision lightly and, 
indeed , in some respects it can be said that a monopoly kiwifruit 
marketing organisation cuts across the general direction of the 
Governments policies94. 
4.5 Public Goods and Marketing Externalities. 
Board functions which might include a public good element are 
research, market intelligence, government lobbying, promotion and price 
stabilisation. Public goods exhibit two characteristics: non-exclusivity and 
94 NZPD , Vol 495 (December 13, 1988), p 8916. 
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non-rivalness. Where a good or service is non-exclusive individuals cannot 
be prohibited from using it and deriving utility. Non-rival goods are those 
for which additional units may be consumed at zero marginal social cost, in 
other words consumption by one individual does not reduce the total quantity 
available for consumption by all individuals. Thus a good is a (pure) public 
good if, once it has been produced, no one can be excluded from benefiting 
from its availability95. In the absence of some form of intervention it is 
questionable whether many producer related public goods would be provided. 
The formation of voluntary cooperatives or producer based 
organisations may assist in the provision of public goods. However the 
prospect of free riding where the benefits are non-excludable presents some 
difficulties. There are few incentives for individual producers to join such an 
organisation where the private benefits may be enjoyed without cost. 
Treasury's report (1987) notes that "the possibility of free riding can be 
eliminated by passing legislation to set up a compulsory club with levy 
powers on the sector benefiting from its services. This is presumably the 
rationale for the levy powers given statutory producer boards"9 6. The 
existence of pure public goods is admittedly rare and the tendency for 
partially excludable public goods to suffer 'cheap riding' in contrast to free 
riding has already been mentioned . What particular aspects of chracteristics 
of the public goods case required statutory intervention? 
In the first instance, Control Board legislation made provision for the 
establishment of a London Office with the responsibility to gather market 
intelligence on the boards behalf. This service had formerly been provided 
by the High Commissioner in London . Market intelligence may be a non-
rival good but in some cases it can be made excludable. Voluntary producer 
organisations such as the National Dairy Association could collect specific 
intelligence for their own members. Member cooperatives belonging to the 
NDA could utilise market knowledge without disclosure to other market 
participants . 
Lobbying of government by producers or agents . to achieve some 
intervention in the interests of the industry or its components sectors is 
another example of a public good . For instance the lobbying of Government 
by producers and industry interests during the 1920-1923 period was to the 
benefit of all producers (including those that had not been directly involved 
in the lobbying process). 
95 Nicholson (1985), p 709. 
96 New Zealand Treasury (1987), para 14. 
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Development relates not only to new products and production 
techniques but also new markets. Individually none of these aspects would 
provide a convincing argument to legislators although collectively the case 
is stronger. Product development was limited in an agricultural sector which 
specialised in the production of commodities. The operational practice of the 
boards showed that they had little inclination for significant research and 
development expenditure despite the opportunity to internalise benefits. 
Market development focused on Britain and 'development' refered to the 
practice of cultivating a larger market share rather than finding new 
markets outside Britain. 
Promotion (particularly in Britain) exhibited the characteristics of a 
public good and played an important role in the marketing strategy while 
exports continued to be predominantly commodity based. Products were 
differentiated on the basis of origin, which meant that New Zealand was 
promoting a 'generic' brand. Dairy producers were quite successful in this 
regard . and New Zealand usually managed to sell at a premium to its 
Australian and Canadian rivals and a discount to Danish dairy products. The 
premium was based on perceived characteristics of New Zealand goods; 
quality, reliability of supply etc . Notably a 1924 amendment provided for 
expenditure of the board's funds for the purpose of publicising produce to 
enhance this 'generic image'. 
Evaluating the case for statutory intervention two types of marketing 
externalities are important. The first is the negative externality found when 
individual agents sell poor quality products to the detriment of New Zealand's 
product image in general. The second is the positive externality emerging 
from the appropriation of the benefits of new market or product 
development. In addressing the negative externality, grading and quality 
controls are regarded by producers as two of the most important regulatory 
and control functions of statutory control boards . Acting as single sellers or 
utilising their licensing powers boards can prevent the negative 
externalities associated with the export of poor quality products (refered to as 
negative quality spillovers). The quality control argument is particularly 
significant where it relates to new market development. In the early stages 
of development buyers will often purchase commodities by way of trial to 
assess the commodity and supplier relative to the required product 
specifications. Information costs during market development are high and 
knowledge collected about the product and seller will often come from these 
first sales. Poor quality or substandard products in the initial stages of 
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market development may stifle growth and undermine future attempts of 
other New Zealand exporters. 
It is only recently that some boards have attempted to overcome 
negative quality spillovers through moving away from a product based 
simply on price/quality factors to encompass other facets such as 
presentation, service, packaging etc . While country of origin differentiation 
ensured premium prices in some commodities premiums were small and did 
not eliminate the negative externalities in the export market. Branding 
strategies were successfully adopted by the Dairy Board in the 1920s with the 
'Anchor' label which was used widely by the board in Britain and elsewhere. 
One may speculate that the continued emphasis of producer boards on 
commodity rather than product marketing and diversification may be due to 
the nature of quality and grading regulations . Regulations restricting the 
sale of substandard product, licensing and export control weakened the 
incentives for producers to find alternative strategies to marketing 
externalities . 
How serious was the deficient provision of public goods and the 
problem of free-riding? We have seen that in the absence of producer 
boards, a level of services was provided by public and private sector 
agencies, (albeit inadequate if these services represent public goods in their 
'pure' form) . While the market may under-provide for public goods, their 
collective provision through compulsory levy may solve the free rider 
problem but may also lead to other forms of 'collective failure'. 'Forced-
riding ' may emerge in the place of 'free-riding'. Because each producer will 
derive different utilities from the provision of public goods, it is unlikely 
that this utility will equate to the statutory levy imposed upon him or her. In 
this way agents or producers in any given situation may face a net loss (or 
profit) by compulsion . 
Negative externalities also emerge when a developed or mature market 
faces a 'hit and run ' strategy by a market agent. Where the market is 
disrupted by an excess volume of sub-standard product (possibly rejected by 
other exporters on quality grounds ) prices may fall and serious harm be 
done to New Zealand 's 'generic' product image. Illustration of this may be 
found in the apparent case of 'hit and run ' selling by the British Government 
of New Zealand mutton , lamb and beef after 1920. High levels of accumulated 
stock , a portion of which had deteriorated while in storage for over two 
years, depressed the general level of prices and perceptions of product 
quality in the market. 
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While the prima facie case for statutory intervention to counter 
quality externalities is persuasive, a number of points need to be made. 
Grading as a response to quality externalities had been widely accepted in 
New Zealand prior to the introduction of control legislation. Official grading 
developed out of concern to protect domestic consumers under the Dairy 
Industry Act, 1894 and later extended to export markets where supervision 
and inspection was taken under the Product Export Act, 1903 and the 
Slaughtering and Inspection Act, 1908. Recall that wide application of the 
grading principle was a key feature of the 'Commandeer' where meat, dairy 
and wool products faced quality-price differentials. Existing legislation and 
industry practices meant that producer boards provided an additional layer 
of control and a delegation of responsibility from government to producers. 
Nevertheless it was logical and economically efficient (technological 
economies of scale) for the boards as marketing agents to perform this 
function. 
Bauer and Yamey (1968) cast doubt on the positive externalities 
allegedly associated with quality control and grading . Grading measures 
imply that marketing authorities do not regard export market valuations as 
relevant criteria for production and export decisions. The tendency for 
minimum export standards to be higher than the lowest qualities acceptable 
on world markets can have three important consequences according to Bauer 
and Yamey . 
First , to frustrate the export of substandard product. Where production 
has taken place and that product is not marketed (even if it is substandard) 
then an economic loss to producers and the economy is possible. To use 
frozen meat as an example, the sale of substandard product at low prices 
provided a higher return to producers than alternative uses such as 
processing for fertiliser or pet food. In this case the economic benefits of 
selling sub-standard product in the short-run have to be assessed in terms of 
the long-run costs of damaged product image. As far as producers were 
concerned the long-run costs have justified the use of statutory control for 
grading . 
Second, grading standards can have the effect of inducing 
uneconomic expenditure in additional resources. Where producers attempt to 
raise the quality of sub-standard products to export levels the additional 
resources are greater than the incremental increase in the realisable 
commercial value . Were this not the case, producers would have already 
incurred the additional expenditure, even where the export of lower grades 
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was permitted97 (this may not hold where the sub-standard product has little 
value on the domestic market and a proportionately greater increase can be 
gained by bringing the product up to export standard9 8). Furthermore price 
premiums for quality products may be a function of limited supply to export 
markets. Thus additional resources to meet required standards may depress 
prices as exportable quantities increase. 
Third, as an ad hoc argument, quality control may push production 
into less valuable activities. Requirements for additional resources to 
improve quality to the required standard may deter producers from its 
production. Where production is transfered to another commodity as a result 
of grading restrictions economic loss takes place (presumably based on the 
assumption that producers have already maximised their returns). The path 
taken by the profit maximising producer will be determined by the 
differential between the export price and the substandard commodity price, 
and also the resources required to improve the product from the latter to the 
former standard . 
Bauer and Yamey argue that pre-occupation by statutory authorities 
with quality control and grading reflect confusion between the objectives of 
technical and economic efficiency. In their view there is no case for 
preventing the export of inferior grades for which there is demand at lower 
prices simply because they do not conform to the prescribed technical 
standard 9 9 (they do not believe an externality exists). For allocative 
efficiency in commodity production it is necessary that specified grade-price 
differentials reflect the differentials in the market. 
Some distinction needs to be made between quality control schemes 
that grade for the purpose of differentiation between apparently identical 
commodities and those that grade to set minimum standards for export. The 
benefits and costs of the latter have been discussed above. The former 
imposes considerable costs upon producers that arguably should be borne by 
the exporter or agent. Producer grading may be justified where there is some 
evidence of exploitation by middlemen or exporters. Similarly unless 
intermediaries and purchasers can be convinced that grading is fair, 
consistent and reliable there is little point in boards undertaking this 
function . 
4.6 Price Stability Arguments. 
97 Bauer and Yamey (1968), p 56 . 
9 8 This applies where the board has a domestic monopoly with quality control, for 
example the Apple and Pear Marketing Board. 
99 Bauer and Yamey (1968), p.37. 
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The implicit objective of the public goods and marketing externalities 
case is often to smooth the income and price path of commodity producers by 
minimising transactions costs and exploiting economies of scale (eg: through 
promotion). More explicitly price stability could be achieved through the 
direct manipulation of supply and regulatory price setting. Price stability 
and its impact on the agricultural sector has been the focus of significant 
portion of the literature survey (see below, 4.7). The relative costs and 
benefits of stabilisation schemes have been considered by Bauer (1957), later 
questioned by Mac Bean ( 1966) and debated by subsequent writers such as 
Stein (1977) and Newbury and Stiglitz (1981) . Price and quantity variables 
cannot simply be regarded as independent; each is very much a function of 
the other. While control legislation for meat and dairy products did not make 
any specific provision for price stabilisation, the reserve powers of 
compulsion in the pooling of export produce and the provision for regulation 
by Order in Council effectively gave producers the ability to stabilise prices. 
Price stabilisation in the wool industry was more · explicit with 
regulatory minimum prices after 1921. Under normal conditions a legislated 
price in the face of competitors and without reference to equilibrium price 
would be likely to fail. The conditions that supported this strategy have been 
mentioned in section 1.7. The minimum price of wool was supported by the 
high level of cooperation (voluntary and enforced) between various 
industry participants who directly benefited from price stabilisation. The 
cooperative enforcement of minimum prices was supported by the controlled 
release of stocks which maintained prices at a level approximate to or above 
the statutory minimum . 
Price stabilisation was briefly attempted by the Dairy Board during the 
1926-27 season. The system operated through the London agency of the board 
with three representatives of selling agents that jointly issued price 
quotations . In brief, the board's handling of the scheme was poor and 
unsuccessful. Prices were out of touch with the market and in the face of 
growin g producer pressure the scheme was abandoned after only four 
month s I 00. Failure may be traced to number of causes . Notice had been given 
of the scheme's introduction while trading interests had accumulated 
stockpiles and mounted a campaign against the scheme in Britain. Another 
problem related to the rigidity of the scheme and the manner in which it had 
been executed. This reflected the inexperience of the board in price 
I 00 For a full account see Ward (1975) pp 61-72, Philpott (1937) pp 272-274. 
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stabilisation and vindicated the views held by many opponents concerning 
the appropriate statutory role for the boards. 
While the period of Commandeer engendered a high level of price 
stability for producers, changing market circumstances during the post-war 
period emphasised the difficulties in maintaining price stability. The 
monopoly-monopsony relationship between New Zealand and the British 
government was the 'cornerstone' of price stability during the Commandeer. 
Once producers were participating in an open, international economy 
variables such as price became more difficult to control. The practical 
problems of implementing stabilisation policies were illustrated by the 
experience of the Dairy Board. This discussion suggests that 'price 
stabilisation' and the method by which it was secured emphasises the 
different priorities and objectives of each statutory authority. The Wool 
Committee regarded stabilisation as its central function through both 
minimum prices and a controlled release of stocks. The Meat Producers' Board 
was content to monitor and where necessary regulate the activities of 
industry participants without invoking full statutory powers of compulsion. 
While implicitly accepting the price stability argument, government was 
prepared to present a 'blank cheque' with which producers themselves could 
determine how best to use a wide range of powers in the interests of their 
own industry . 
4.7 Literature Survey. 
The established literature on Control Boards, particularly from the 
economic development discipline, appears orientated to a different set of 
problems from those of relevance in the New Zealand setting. The literature 
debate concentrates on the relationship between commodity price instability 
and its impact on economic growth. There is also a strong interest in the costs 
and benefits of price and income stabilisation policies. The perspectives 
provided are useful but often limited by survey-specific analysis and 
conclusions. The debate is conducted in an environment that fails to 
recognise the existence of trading blocks, power based relationships and 
transaction costs -important factors when considering New Zealand. 
The hypothesis that price fluctuations in export markets are 
disruptive to economic growth and development has been elucidated by P.T. 
Bauer (1957); 
Price fluctuations in the markets in which their [producers] output is 
sold affect their incomes directly and create uncertainties. Wide and 
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discontinuous fluctuations in the prices of cash crops tend to retard 
the development of a sense of continuity in economic life which is 
desirable in the interests of sustained economic growth. I 0 1 
Bauer argues that significant benefits might be enjoyed by producers and 
the economy if the discontinuous and wide fluctuations of incomes and prices 
in the agricultural sector can be smoothed. The impact of price fluctuations 
on income levels in the long-run depend on the extent to which producers 
can shift resources from the production of one commodity to another. 
On a cautionary note Bauer warns that there is a clear need carefully 
to define the objectives of stabilisation policy so that incomes or prices 
received by producers are smoothed without producing serious risks for the 
wider economy. Where statutory monopolies are advocated as a means of 
countering these fluctuations the possible advantage of economies of scale 
(through processing, negotiation, marketing etc) must be set against the 
disadvantages . The disadvantages according to Bauer relate to the exclusion 
of minority interests, the denial of marketing alternatives to producers, 
potential inefficiencies and failure to adapt to a changing external 
environment. Thus in Bauer's analysis fluctuations in price have an adverse 
affect on investment and economic growth through the medium of 
uncertainty. In this analysis benefits would be derived from some smoothing 
of producers ' incomes or prices while market imperfections require an 
active role by government in stabilisation. 
A later work by Bauer in collaboration with Yamey (1968) takes a 
closer look at Statutory marketing authorities. While Bauer and Yamey used 
third world African economies in their analysis, their findings are 
nevertheless useful when considering New Zealand producer boards. 
Statutory marketing authorities may perform three functions 
(1) to raise returns to producers (eg; through monopolies or subsidies). 
(2) to stabilise prices and/or incomes. 
(3) to improve the efficiency of agricultural commodity marketing 
(through grading, the elimination of unnecessary intermediaries, industry 
negotiation of shipping, insurance and other similar measures). 
Bauer and Yamey found that circumstances justifying government 
intervention relate to the commercial competence of producers, the 
adequacy of competition and specific instances of market failure or 
inefficiency . The emergence of Boards as a direct response to the assumption 
that producers were ignorant of their own interests and market 
101 Bauer (1957), p 229. 
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opportunities carries little credence in the New Zealand experience. The 
second and third areas provide a more logical basis for analysis. 
If producer boards were formed in response to unnecessary levels of 
intermediaries and poor competition amongst middlemen, a number of key 
questions have to asked. If there are unnecessary levels of intermediaries, 
why were they not by-passed by those that used them? Bauer and Yamey 
argue that the services of intermediaries will only be used where the prices 
asked are less than the value the consumer places on the services. Similarly 
it is unlikely that intermediaries will fail to see an opportunity or take 
advantage of one within their own field of business. This limits the extent to 
which intermediaries can extract excessive profits at the producer's expense. 
The implications of income and price instability in the primary sector 
for the economy as a whole are challenged by MacBean (1966). MacBean 
accepts the general proposition that prices for primary products vary more 
sharply over a given time span than prices for manufactured goods. This is 
attributable to the low elasticity of supply and demand for primary 
commodities and the short-run inflexibility of consumption and output in 
relation to price changes for primary relative to manufactured goods. Simply 
stated , MacBean suggests that "low price elasticities combined with 
uncontrolled variability 
credible explanation for 
primary products."! 02 
in demand , supply or both provide an entirely 
sharp instability in both prices and proceeds of 
Stabilisation may be regarded as an attempt to weaken the relationship 
between prices paid on the world market for exports and the prices and 
incomes received by producers . MacBean warns that price stabilisation may 
be disruptive to producer's income and in most cases will only partially 
remove income instability. Fluctuations are difficult to control in a 
competitive market where the output of producers and an economy is limited 
in the context of world trade. Indeed MacBean suggests that stabilisation is 
only tolerable under a limited set of conditions! 03. The important question is ; 
how serious are the hardships inflicted upon farmers as a result of 
fluctuations ? 
MacBean 's analysis concludes by stating: 
... our search for evidence demonstrating the adverse influence of 
short term instability of export earnings on the prospects of growth in 
102 MacBean (1966), p 25. 
103 MacBean specifies conditions justifying stabilisation as reductions of uncertainty 
and disincentives to producers to increase output, the avoidance of inflationary ratchet 
effects and the avoidance of arbitrary government intervention (MacBean, 1966, p 213) . 
... 
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under developed countries gives us no grounds for believing that 
export instability is in fact so harmful. I 04 
Thus it is not immediately apparent that price smoothing would improve the 
conditions of producers nor would it necessarily increase investment or 
promote social and economic change. There may even be a positive 
correlation between investment and export instability. 
Yotopoulos and Nugent (1976) have taken the MacBean hypothesis a 
step further by using two indices of instability to demonstrate that 
investment is not deterred by income instability, but stimulated by it. How 
can this be so? High levels of instability are often accompanied by lower 
propensities to consume than might otherwise be the case. These have 
resulted in greater aggregate savings (largely precautionary) and 
consequently an increased level of aggregate investment. Similarly the 
conventional hypothesis has characterised capital markets as imperfect and 
risk averse where export income instability will lower the propensity to 
invest in the export sector. In contrast Yotopoulos and Nugent have 
suggested that Friedman 's permanent income hypothesis 105 may offset this 
phenomenon by the positive impact of export and income instability on 
capital formation and aggregate capacity, including capacity for export. 
These conclusions undermine the assertion that high concentrations of 
resources in a few commodities and on a small number of markets is an 
important factor exacerbating instability and retarding growth. In fact the 
opposite may be true . If producers diversify into more stable (but less 
profitable) commodities and markets the result could be lower rates of 
growth of exports and income. 
Leslie Stein ( 1977) examines the positive relationship between export 
instability and investment. Stein argues that while savings are necessary for 
investment it does not always follow that a decline in consumption, ceteris 
parabi s will promote capital formation; the opposite may equally be true. 
Even if this were not the case savings are likely to be held as liquid securities 
and not m long-term investment. This runs counter to the permanent 
income hypothesis used by Yotopoulos and Nugent and also MacBean who 
stated ; 
104 Ibid., p 127. 
105 Where consumption/investment does not depend on current disposable income but 
long run permanent income. 
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... almost the entire amount of any increase in income will be saved 
[but] equally any decline in current cash income will be met by 
liquidation and indebtedness.! 0 6 
Development literature typically concentrates on demand side 
solutions and prescriptions to problems of commodity price stabilisation. 
Yotopoulos and Nugent suggest that this may be due to the fact that in 
practical terms prices and demand are more easily stabilised than quantities 
and supply 107 . Alternately this implies the tacit assumption that export 
income instability is a function of price and not volume. Glezakos (1973) has 
tested this assumption by examining the empirical relationship between 
export value, volumes and prices . While price and quantity are regarded as 
interdependent Glezakos has found that export volume instability is higher 
than price instability! 08 . 
... price instability acts as a more serious deterrent to export and 
income growth than volume instability. It is not surprising, therefore, 
to find that farmers more frequently demand government price 
protection against price fluctuations than crop fluctuations. Since 
prices are likely to be easier to control, these results suggest that the 
government of a LDC which wishes to promote domestic stabilisation 
should concentrate on a producers' price rather than a producers' 
income stabilisation scheme. I 09 
Newbury and Stiglitz (1981) take a different approach to the question 
of commodity prices and consider stabilisation in terms of risk. Conventional 
analysis (eg; Bauer) demonstrates that risk lowers the effective rate of 
return which constrains the work effort. Alternatively it may be postulated 
that producers work harder as a result of risk, in order to provide a margin 
for error or a surplus with which the individual can smooth or stabilise 
periods of poor returns . Stiglitz questions the desirability of price 
stabilisation schemes from the view point of both producers and consumers. 
Under the perfect market hypothesis, if it is desirable to stabilise prices in 
the interests of both groups, then why is it not profitable for private firms 
rather than government to do so? The answer may well be that it is, 
evidenced by the activities of arbitragers and speculators. While the market 
may view the activities of these participants as legitimate, if not desirable, to 
many producers the activities of speculators are viewed as predatory. 
106 Stein (1977), p 286. 
107 Yotopolous and Nugent (1976), p 340. 
108 Glezakos (1973), p 676. 
109 Ibid . 
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Newbury and Stiglitz accept that agricultural markets may be 
characterised by imperfect knowledge, and non-pareto efficient allocations. 
Under these circumstances government intervention is useful where it 
improves economic efficiency. One of two results may follow from price 
stabilisation. The first reduces income risk leading to the adoption of new and 
risky production techniques and the utilisation of marginal land and 
resources. The long-run effect of this technique is to weaken relative prices 
as a result of commodity production concentration. The second possibility is 
that price stabilisation may promote a more stable pattern of supply through 
improving the ability of producers to forecast and adapt their production 
decisions accordingly. 
The concept of risk is important in the producer board debate. In its 
historical context the transfer of risk from the Imperial government back to 
producers during 1920/21 appears to be a major motivation for the 
establishment of the boards and the collective management of risk that they 
embodied . McKinlay (1988) argues that statutory boards can only manage 
risk and cannot avoid it. The producer is ultimately the bearer of risk 
although schemes which have a tendency to 'blur' or distort market signals 
may lead to the perception that their own risk ends at the farm gate. 
Perceptions that it should be government that carried the burden of risk 
were reinforced by legislative provisions guaranteeing the finance of the 
Meat Producers Board in 1922. 
McKinlay characterises the producer as one of many small 
businessmen producing largely the same non-differentiable commodity. 
Typically producers lack the resources to acquire a level of knowledge 
necessary to establish whether the services and prices offered by 
intermediaries represented a fair or equilibrium price. The move toward 
statutory government intervention may be seen as a rational response to 
counter the relatively weak bargaining power that producers had. McKinlay 
argues that; 
.. . each of these issues should be looked at from a transaction cost 
perspective with voluntary contract seen as the ideal and state 
intervention appropriate only when two conditions were satisfied; 
first that the costs of monitoring a system of voluntary contracts was 
prohibitive and secondly, that the net loss of national welfare, if 
collective arrangements could not be put in place, justified state 
intervention. 1 1 0 
110 McKinlay (1988) , p 42. 
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5. Producer Boards; Some Organisational Issues. 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses some of the issues hinted at in earlier sections. 
It deals with what some authors see as a failure by the Board's architects to 
"consider the wide range of issues which were wrapped up in the one 
package . "111 It examines some of the concerns raised in the debate over 
producer boards and State Owned Enterprises during the 1980s and applies 
these to an analysis of statutory producer boards in the 1920s. A principal-
agent approach will be used to evaluate some of the problems that have 
emerged . The organisational status of boards from a public administration 
point of view will be considered along with an associated range of issues such 
as legislative clarity, accountability, performance monitoring and conflicts 
of interest. While there are some methodological difficulties in a applying 
current framework of analysis to institutions formed during the 1920s, the 
contrasting methods of analysis and issues of concern provide some useful 
insights. In this context the insights have flowed in both directions. In the 
first instance by today ' s standards it would appear that a number of 
important issues were overlooked and these deficiencies are reflected in the 
enabling legislation . In the second instance an understanding of the 1920s 
approach to the issues tied to the Boards helps to explain the structures and 
problems Boards presently face. 
5.2 Perspectives on Organisational Issues: Transactions Costs 
Economics and Principal-Agent Approaches 
The principal-agent approach would suggest that Boards as agents are 
responsible to two separate principals. Problems emerge where the 
objectives of the two principals begin to diverge . An example of this has 
been the demand by producers for the continued use of compulsory 
acquisition and monopoly powers although this has clearly been 
inconsistent with the government's objective to deregulate the economy and 
abandon statutory monopolies. Where the agent is faced by two principals 
with differing objectives , only one can be satisfied. Given that the boards 
consider themselves accountable to producers, it is unlikely that the 
government ' s objectives will be put above those of producers. That objectives 
11 1 Ibid . 
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(whatever they happen to be at any given time) of the two principals have 
rarely appeared to diverge may be attributable to the fact that government 
authority has not been required for board decision making. This does not 
necessarily equate to parallel interests. Given that the government has not 
taken a key role in its own principal-agent relationship with the Boards, 
there is an argument to be made for a statutory delegation of power to the 
producer-board relationship. 
Neoclassical perspectives on the firm have characterised it as a profit 
maximising body that functions in competitive product and capital markets 
where the costs of transactions are zero . The firm is regarded as a production 
function where the objective of economic activity is the maximisation of 
profits. While the neoclassical model is useful, simplifications such as these 
contribute little to our understanding of firms on a micro level where the 
costs of transactions may not always be zero. The transaction cost approach 
developed by Oliver Williamson (amongst others) has emerged out of the 
hypothesis that organisational development can be explained by a 'desire to 
promote economy in transactions costs' 1 12 . Organisations may then be 
viewed as an alternative governance structures to the market where 
transactions costs are minimised within the firm (while acknowledging that 
profit maximisation may still be an economic goal) . 
Economic transactions represent costs associated with contracts 1 1 3 
such as the negotiation, formation, monitoring of performance and 
enforcement of contractual conditions . Economic actors are assumed to 
exhibit two behavioural characteristics based on their responses to 
conditions of uncertainty . The first is 'bounded rationality' -bounded by the 
extent to which economic actors can be assumed rational within the 
constraints of imperfect knowledge. The second characteristic is 
'opportunism' which Williamson defines as being "self interest seeking with 
guile"ll4 . Opportunism breaks down into two forms; ex ante and ex post, 
described as 'adverse selection' and 'moral hazard' respectively. Ex ante 
adverse selection occurs when information asymmetries exist at the time a 
contract is drawn . Ex post moral hazard occurs where the agent acts in a way 
that imposes monitoring or enforcement costs on the principal as a result of 
the agent's actions . The presence of bounded rationality and opportunism 
mean that in a second best world, incomplete contracting is the best non-
112 Williamson (1981), p 1564. 
1 1 3 A 'contract' may be regarded as any agreed relationship formalised by written 
agreement or not. 
1 14 Williamson (1985) , p 4 7. 
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Pareto outcome that can be achieved. Williamson 1 15 identifies three 
attributes of transactions that can have important implications in assessing 
alternative governance structures. 
(1) The frequency of transactions, 
(2) The uncertainty to which transactions are subject, 
(3) The degree to which transactions are supported by asset specific 
investments. 
Thus organisational design attempts 
economising on production expenses 
emerge where agents have sub-goals or 
those of the principal. Principal-agent 
to minimise the costs through 
and transactions costs. Problems 
interests that are inconsistent with 
theory than becomes a useful 
mechanism for evaluating organisational relationships. 
While the utility maximising approach of principal-agent theory is 
distinct from the comparative institutional analysis of transactions cost 
economics the two approaches are complementary. Carol and Lewis (1991) 
define the principal-agent relationship where "one actor - the principal (P) 
- can design a contract in which another actor - the agent (A) is induced to 
act in the principal's interest, even when there is asymmetric information 
entailing the principal not observing the agent's action"116. In the 
principal-agent relationship the behavioural assumptions of the 
transactions cost approach hold where the actors are faced with uncertain 
knowledge and opportunistically pursue their own objectives. Similarly 
'agency problems' associated with the contractual relationship may be 
defined in terms of adverse selection and moral hazard. Principal-agent 
theory may be usefully applied when explaining a number of organisational 
issues that relate to producer boards. 
Adopting a principal-agent approach to the problem of accountability, 
delegation of power will only take place where the principal is confident 
that the agent will act in a manner consistent with the principal's objectives 
(ie; revealed preference) . It is important that the agent be held to account 
for the performance of these objectives, but costs will be marked in 
monitoring performance. Three steps are typically prescribed to reduce 
agency costs . The first is to establish clearly defined objectives and to avoid 
conflicts , particularly of the referee-player type. Second, performance of 
the agent must be monitored . Thirdly , a defined set of sanctions and rewards 
should be in place to ensure that the agent pursues the objectives of the 
115 Williamson (1981), p 1546. 
116 Carol and Lewis (1991), p 4. 
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principal. Principal-agent theory has important implications for ideal forms 
of organisational structure and channels of accountability. 
It is apparent that there is an absence of any legislative provision 
resembling these guiding principles regarding producer boards 117. 
Arguably it was difficult for the boards to be accountable to Parliament when 
there were few statutory requirements and no strong incentive to do so. 
Similarly where objectives are not explicitly defined it may be difficult for 
the principal (either the government or producers) to determine the 
performance of the agent, in other words no 'yard stick' for accountability 
exists. 
Transactions cost economics may be used to explain the emergence of 
Boards in the context of vertical integration. This approach argues that 
unless there are serious transactions costs as a result of market exchange, 
transactions will take place within the market and not the firm. Of the three 
factors noted above (uncertainty, frequency and asset specificity of 
transactions) the last is the most important in determining vertical 
integration . Williamson argues that as assets become more. specific, the 
governance costs of markets increase and the cost advantages of using the 
market( as opposed to the firm) decrease. For this reason " ... as assets become 
more fully specialised to a single use or user, hence are less transferable to 
other uses and users , economies of scale can be as fully realised when a firm 
operates the asset under its own internal direction as when its services are 
obtained externally by contract."118 If domestic primary producers can be 
regarded as a 'firm' then it is a simple extension to equate the commandeer 
and the dependence on Britain as a market with asset-specificity (to the 
extent that New Zealand was largely producing for a single buyer). The 
return to market rather than contractual based transactions immediately 
increased governance and agency costs , particularly where producers were 
faced with the prospect of dealing with a number of intermediaries. 
Additional transactions costs associated with the changing system of 
marketing coupled with falling prices and over-supply may help to explain 
producers' attempts to internalise these costs through vertical integration 
into marketing . 
1 1 7 This suggests either high agency costs or a weak principal-agent relationship 
between the State and the Boards. 
118 Williamson (1981), p. 1548 . 
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5.3 Functional Devolution 
An analysis of producer boards highlights the difficulties embodied in 
establishing organisational forms. Boards have been characterised by W .M. 
Smith (1936) in two ways. The first position is that of governments which 
"implement policy with an eye upon the electorate and an ear constantly 
attuned to catch the note of current opinion" 1 19. In their other form boards 
were characterised as profit maximising firms with the organisational 
objective of effectively marketing produce to secure the highest return for 
their shareholders (producers). Control boards are neither businesses 
capable of manipulating their inputs (noting that boards have no power to 
control producers outputs) nor simply regulatory government bodies. This 
construct may be identified in the clash between the boards regulatory and 
commercial functions. 
Boards may be portrayed as an example of functional devolution by 
government where responsibility for monitoring markets, handling, 
distribution and marketing of produce is one step removed from the process 
of government and passed to an administrative or statutory body. In more 
definitive terms devolution may be defined as "the delegation of portions or 
details of duties to subordinate officers or committees, and to devolve 
therefore is to delegate to deputies duties for which the principal remains 
responsible" 120. This form of devolution as it relates to control boards may be 
regarded in two ways . In the first instance the boards were delegated powers 
that the state had never exercised itself (even during the commandeer) nor 
was likely to under any given scenario . Furthermore it was unlikely that 
producers would have willingly delegated powers to a control authority 
constituted on a cooperative or voluntary principle (recall the difficulties of 
maintaining voluntary sales and minimum price agreements in the wool 
industry) . Conservatism in the meat industry tempered initial proposals for 
compulsory produce pooling in 192I. Even in its weakened form the power to 
expropriate produce for export was a function the state was reluctant directly 
to exercise itself. Massey argued in Parliamentary debate that the objective of 
the Meat Export legislation was to create an organisation "managed and run 
by the producers themselves" I 2 I . Forbes, MP for Hurunui (later Prime 
Minister, I930-35) noted that the Government were " ... giving wide powers to 
the board - quite unprecedented; the Board is to have the power of taxation . 
119 Smith (1936), p 85 . 
1 20 Bushnell and Scott (1988), p 19. 
121 NZPD, Vol 194 (February 8, 1922), p 318. 
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One clause about the levy says , "There shall be paid by way of levy on all 
meat exported from New Zealand such charges as may from time to time be 
fixed by the Board." That provision gives the Board the power of taxation as 
far as meat is concerned, and it is a tremendous power to give to such a 
body ."122 
The statutory powers of taxation were just one of a number of 
delegated functions that encompassed other marketing dimensions such as 
insurance, freight, disposal and promotion as earlier discussed. The second 
feature of these 'delegated' powers was that they do not represent devolution 
in the strictest sense. Since boards were not given responsibility for 
functions previously performed by government (other than basic export 
quality control), devolution in a semantic sense was not a consequence. The 
Commandeer provided a model that demonstrated the potential of single 
selling through compulsory co-operation, however the operational 
circumstances of the Commandeer were unusual. The contractual 
monopoly/monopsony characteristics of the commandeer meant that 
'marketing' as such was limited, while the war and subsequent market/price 
adjustments made state participation in commodity stabilisation unlikely. If 
the degree of devolution to the Boards is questionable, it remains that the 
final authority for the use of statutory and taxation powers lies with the 
State . To the extent that the control boards were constituted under legislation 
enacted by Parliament, a devolution of contingent powers may be argued. 
Some commentators (such as Drummond) have equated the 
government 's interest in raising farm incomes in the 1920s, (for example 
through Producer Boards), with a desire to settle more people on the land, an 
important consideration given the return of ex-servicemen. Certainly the 
board structure may be seen as a mean s for producers to find their own 
solutions with little responsibility or cost for operating the boards carried by 
the Government. Properly managed markets were seen as key with cost 
reduction and qualit y control interacting to secure improved returns. 
Nasworthy typified the Reform Government 's position when he stated that " ... 
it is only by organisation and combination amongst the producers that they 
will improve their position; and surely the primary producers of this 
country have an absolute right to organi se and have a Board to deal with 
their own produce. "12 3 Nasworthy's statement demonstrates the importance 
that 'producer self-government ' held in the thrust of wider policy . 
Devolution in this form may even be regarded as an extension of democracy 
12 2 Ibid., pp 330-331. 
123 NZPD, Vol 202 (August 23, 1923), p 459. 
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(albeit through compulsion) where a separation of powers between 
government and decisions over production and pricing took place. I 2 4 
Drummond makes the point that there can be little value in granting 
'self government' unless producers are capable and interested in exercising 
control. Four key factors are offered in determining levels of participation 
that relate to; 
(i) The scale of production, 
(ii) Experience of producers in cooperative enterprise , 
(iii) Levels of education amongst producers, 
(iv) The prosperity or wealth of the agricultural sector relative to the 
rest of the economy . 
As far as these factors are concerned one can contrast the development of 
Marketing Boards in the so called 'White Dominions' of the British 
Commonwealth (Australia , Canada, South Africa and New Zealand) with the 
development of Boards in British Africa as documented by Bauer and Yamey 
(1968 ). While a racial bias undoubtedly had some impact on their respective 
paths of development, fundamental differences in the relative strength of 
the four factors listed above may be seen . In the case of African colonies 
where production in certain economies was dominated by small scale 
farming by an indigenous population using traditional methods, the extent of 
Board development along paths similar to those found in the 'White 
Dominion s' is limited . Drummond 125 suggests that in the case of the African 
colonies where producers could not be 'trusted' to run their own affairs, 
Boards operated as an extension of the Imperial Government in all but name. 
'Trust' rarely features as an issue in the New Zealand debate, as the following 
quote by Massey demonstrates (by the same token this does not pay much 
attention to the different skills required to administer and run a Board). 
In connection with his own business there is no smarter man than the 
average farmer , and this Bill is essentially a producers ' Bill. I know of 
numbers of farmers who are quite capable of taking control and 
managing a board of thi s kind.l 2 6 
De spite th e rhetorical lip service pa id by the government and 
producer authorities to the independence of one from the other, the nature 
and extent of the Boards' respective powers demanded some government 
monitoring or public accountability. Control over finance provided . one such 
method , although by the governments 's own admission it was a mechanism 
124 Drummond (1985), pp 204-205 . 
125 Ibid . 
126 NZPD , Vol 194 (February 8, 1922), p 317. 
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of limited value given the apparent sufficiency of the government's 
guarantee. More directly jurisdiction was exercised through government 
appointment of two of the twelve members of the Dairy Produce Control 
Board, two of the eight members of the Meat Producer's and all members of 
the Wool Committee (some on the recommendation of industry interests). 
While producers held a majority in the Meat and Dairy Boards, the 
appointment of government representatives was significant particularly for 
the principle of devolution and the government's declared intent to establish 
a Board 'managed and run by the producers themselves'. Anecdotal evidence 
shows that the government was not beyond interfering with the operations 
of the Boards. One incident for the purposes of illustration occured in 1922 
when the Minister of Agriculture, Nasworthy refused to accept the 
nomination by proprietary and merchant interests of W.D. Hunt to the Meat 
Producer's Board , on the grounds that Hunt had been an opponent to the 
enacting legislation. 
Some parallels are apparent between the establishment of Control 
Boards in the 1920s and the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) debate during the 
1980s. Accepting the proposition that the provision of public services is one 
of the essential roles of any government, the question remains; how are 
these services to be provided and at what cost? If government considered that 
maximising foreign exchange earnings m the export of primary produce 
was essential for the success of its economic and social objectives, a defined 
solution that maximises sales of farm outputs and minimises inputs is 
required . The government was faced by a number of models in the 1920s 
stretching from the experience of subsidies (in butter) to 
departmentalisation (with Imperial Government Supplies) and trading 
departments 12 7. While these solutions were not adopted, similarities may be 
noted between the Boards and the State Trading Departments . Both bodies had 
the dual function of carrying out commercial activities and achieving 
operations 
over the 
Trading 
departments that the SOEs emerged in the 1980s. In this case issues such as 
limited social objectives (although this aspect of the board's 
should not be over-emphasised) . It was partly out of a concern 
blurring between commercial and social functions of the 
127 Examples of Government Trading Departments in the 1920s were widespread with 
Public Trust Office, State Insurance, Government Life Insurance, State Coal and others 
operating as publicly owned commercial operations. Conceivably the government could 
have adopted a similar organisational form to deal with the marketing of produce, but for 
reasons discussed (such as the general desire of government to allow producers manage 
their own affairs , the political influence and strength of the farming community, the 
government's experience in agricultural intervention etc) this option appears to have 
been discounted . 
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accountability, transparency and the costs of political intervention have 
become important. To some extent the Boards managed to avoid the problems 
of political intervention, which is consistent with the argument that 
government (and producers, given accusations of Government incompetence 
during the Commandeer) desired a clear separation between itself and 
production decisions . Nevertheless m a wider context the Boards were 
affected by a similar bundle of issues to the Trading Departments. 
If Producer Boards have similarities to Government Trading 
Departments , yet occupy a unique 
R .C. Mascarenhas (1982) has 
highlighting five key attributes of 
position, how can we clarify their status? 
attempted to clarify this position by 
Producer Boards 1 2 8 . They 
(1) are constituted by statute and serve private enterprise; 
(2) obtain finance for their operations comes from fees, levies on the 
industry and trading surpluses; 
(3 ) have a majority of producer representation on the controlling 
body; 
( 4) are given the power to carry out their functions but may be 
subject to government intervention on policy matters ; 
(5 ) possess monopoly power granted by the 
distinguishes them from private enterprises subject to 
in pricing and marketing . 
5.4 The 'Blank Cheque' 
government. This 
greater competition 
A common critic ism of Producer Boards in the 1980s and 1990s has 
been the lack of clarity associated with the various powers and functions the 
Boards performed. These 'contingent' and in some cases poorly defined 
powers were however an important part of the original legislation. 
Recent analysis has focu sed on a perceived lack of clarity and internal 
consistency in the legislative and regulatory instruments administered by 
the Boards . Although the Boards have faced over sixty years of development 
by the 1980s , in many respects the legislation governing their operation was 
similar to that operating during th e 1920s. Commentators such as Woods 
(1988 ) have argued that the Boards fail to represent any particular 
philosophy (such as stabilising producer incomes or 'moderating economic 
power) and similarly may not provide effective mechanisms to react to 
changes in market condition s. More importantly the legislation fails 
128 Mascarenhas (1982), p 104, [NB ; The Producer Board classification is based on the 
New Zealand Institutional Sector Classification Manual}. 
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adequately to address the serious conflicts arising out of the Regulatory and 
Control, Commercial and Industry servicing functions of the Boards. In 
practical terms, the growth of the commercial functions of the Boards was 
not envisaged by the original legislation and as a consequence problems 
relating to capital structure , ownership, borrowing etc could not have been 
foreseen. However even in regulatory and control activities there has been 
some conflict over the control and monopoly powers vested in the Boards, in 
other words there has been conflict over the allocation and extension of 
trading rights . 
Concern over the separation of powers in the Boards activities 
emerged out of the formation of the SOEs and an ideological belief that 
statutory powers should be kept separate from commercial activities. 
Conflicts of this nature may be found in the allocation of meat export licenses 
to exporters who are in direct competition with the Board (an example of a 
referee I player conflict of interest) . Woods is critical of the considerable 
scope for discretion as to how statutory powers are used and applied, 
including decisions not to undertake functions for which Boards had been 
empowered . The underlying motivation for providing a separation of 
statutory and commercial functions has been to ensure accountability and 
transparency between the respective roles (these issues will be considered 
more fully in the next section). 
The framework for analysis in the 1980s particularly by State 
institutions such as The Treasury or the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries has been one that asks "What Powers if any are required?". The 
analysis is based on the presumption that competitive market situations 
where agents are free to pursue their own interests are the most effective 
mechanisms for ensuring an 'efficient ' allocation of goods and services. 
Statutory producer boards are not faced by the same set of forces as 
competitive firms and for this reason non market allocations will occur, 
particularly through the political nature of the Boards . More specifically 
allocation inefficiencies can arise through cross-subsidisation , 
player/referee problems, undue influence by vested industry interests and 
the pnce distortion of market signals. This raises the question of the 
economic desirability of protecting the interests of producers through 
coercive powers at the expense of other economic agent s. 
How serious are these concerns? Do they reflect poor drafting and 
limited foresight by the Massey Government? Undoubtedly there is some 
justification for arguing that Statutory Control legislation lacked clarity. 
Powers delegated by the state were extensive and potentially far reaching, 
95 
yet in the legislation the use and focus of these powers never clearly spelt 
out. Smith (1936) suggested that the Boards in effect were presented with a 
'blank cheque' and number of suggestions as to how it might be filled in. But 
then, had the various interests concerned (Government, producers, industry 
etc) not been convinced that the statutory powers would be used in an 
experimental and tentative manner, they would never have given their 
assent I 2 9. There is some evidence to support this contention. In 
Parliamentary debate Massey stated; 
.. .If there is any movement on the part of any section antagomst1c to 
the interest of the producers it will be for the board to take action .... it 
will only be absolute control in the case of some action or actions 
which may be detrimental to the int.erests of the producers, and 
consequently detrimental to the interests of the Dominion. 1 3 0 
Massey is clearly suggesting that the responsibility for action lies 
with the Board with the use of full statutory powers only in extreme 
circumstances. This position was reinforced by Nasworthy, Minister of 
Agriculture, during debate on the Dairy Produce Export Control Bill, 1923. 
Criticism of the Bill's compulsory clauses led the Minister to comment; 
"Without the compulsory clauses the Bill is not worth the paper it is printed 
on - not worth Parliament wasting an hour over it, it may not be necessary to 
bring them into operation . They may not ever be required."} 3 I 
The lack of clarity embodied in the statutory control legislation may 
have been intentional. Commentators such as Woods have failed to adequately 
place Boards in their historical context. To deal effectively with the problems 
faced by their industry, producers required a 'bag of tools' with a variety of 
powers. While legislative focus has not been sharp, there appears to have 
been a tacit understanding between government and producers over 
circumstances and conditions in which statutory powers could be used. A 
similar level of understanding may assist in explaining the accusations of 
limited channels of accountability which overlook the importance of 
informal networks . Political patronage is a 'grey' area as far as historical 
evidence is concerned . However the small size of the ruling elite in I920s 
New Zealand and the frequency with which the same personalities and 
individual s appear , leads one to speculate that the level of interaction 
between the political and farming communities had important consequences 
not just for the formation of the Boards but for their operation and control. 
1 2 9 Smith (1936) , pp 84-85 . 
130 NZPD, Vol 194 (February 2, 1922), pp 110-111. 
131NZPD, Vol 202 (August 23, 1923), pp 458-459. 
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If one accepts that statutory control legislation was enacted as a result 
of an unusual combination of circumstances faced by producers during the 
early 1920s, it must also be asked why this legislation was not revoked when 
these conditions had passed? First, there was no legislative provision for the 
review of statutory powers. This could be a disadvantage where market 
conditions changed rapidly and inefficiencies became institutionalised. 
Secondly, in any given situation it is unlikely that a self-interested sector 
group would voluntarily relinquish its statutory monopoly. The 
government's attitude towards Boards seemed to be driven by the belief that 
the prosperity of the wider economy was dependent on the prosperity of 
producers . While the Boards found a common catalyst in low, uncertain 
prices and perceived power imbalances in existing marketing channels, the 
changes that took place in the marketing channel were a function of the 
political, commercial and economic environment of the industry 13 2. 
Distinctive internal political economies may be why the cooperatively based 
dairy industry has applied these principles to marketing while the Meat 
Board with its independent processors have adopted Export licensing. 
The Wool industry provides an example of voluntary surrender of 
power; the 1921 statutory regulations were revoked following a 1924 review. 
Market conditions had returned to 'normal' following the disposal of surplus 
stocks by BA WRA and improvements in prices after 1924. New regulations 
established a committee comprising the same membership 13 3, but with 
diminished powers to determine the quantities of wool offered for Auction. 
The key to understanding marketing channels in the wool industry is that 
sale by auction limited the extent to which producers were responsible for 
dealing with intermediaries and therefore exposed to any actual or perceived 
exploitation . 
Thirdly, while prices and farm incomes may have improved, the threat 
of potentially exploitative external interests remained. The formation of the 
Boards may be viewed as a logical consequence of the growing cooperative 
movement in New Zealand agriculture (particularly Dairying) and the 
experience of single-desk selling during and immediately after the First 
World War. Producer boards were seen as a method of securing greater 
control over vertically non-integrated components of the marketing system. 
As a result the Boards became not merely a transitional mechanism to 
13 2 Martin, S.K. et a! (1986), p 4. 
133 The Wool Committee comprised five members; A Chairman appointed by the Minister 
of Agriculture, Two members of the Sheepowner's Federation and two members of the 
Wool Broker's Association . 
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counter a down-turn in the primary sector, but an integral part of the 
overall industry . 
The Reform Government's assistance to producers is historically 
consistent with the role of the State in New Zealand. Hawke (1985) for 
example suggests that the " ... State was not confined to setting the framework 
within which private enterprise should be undisturbed; it was expected to act 
where it could be useful, to moderate conflict within society as well as 
protecting it from outsiders"134. Government had traditionally been 
involved in extensive programmes, notably in the development of social 
overhead capital where long planning horizons and the economies of lower 
interest rates facilitated state investment. A similar lack of laissez-faire 
'orthodoxy' was demonstrated by pragmatic government intervention that 
sought to maximise the positive impact of manipulations from transfer 
payments to labour markets . Forbes commented correctly when he said that 
the Boards had been given unprecedented powers, certainly with respect to 
delegated responsibilities. Government action is more usefully viewed in the 
context of a doctrine that utilised the mechanisms of state machinery where 
they were regarded as useful. What marked the Producer Boards was the fact 
that the 'blank cheque' had been passed from the government to producers. 
This raises the question of whether the critique of Woods et al was aimed 
directly at the Boards or at the wider issue of state activism in the economy. 
5.5 Board Accountability 
The question of accountability is one closely tied with legislative 
clarity and consideration of how control powers were to be used, in what 
circumstances and how, and to whom they should be accounted. Two distinct 
views of accountability may be taken. In the first instance Boards are 
accountable to Parliament from which they have derived statutory backing. 
In the second instance Boards are accountable to their producer 
'constituents ' in whose interests they are supposed to serve. In the absence of 
strong mechanisms for accountability to Parliament, Statutory Control 
organisations have predictably argued that producers are the ultimate 
bearers of risk, fund the activities of the Boards and benefit (or suffer) from 
their actions, and thus the Boards should be accountable to producers. This 
does not adequately address the issues tied to the question of accountability. It 
also reflects what Woods has described a the desire of producers to get the 
best of both worlds; "They [Producers] want statutory authority to enforce 
134 Hawke (1985) , p 116. 
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marketing strategies and disciplines, but they also want the autonomy to 
exercise these powers without government inference."13 5 
Accountability may be defined as the process by which a statutory 
body (such as a board) accounts for its activities during a given period in the 
form of accounts and reports, as required by legislation. As the so called 
'guardian of the public interest' Parliament has a role to ensure that the 
operation of statutory bodies are consistent with the overall intent of the 
enabling legislation, that operations are carried out efficiently and legally, 
and that adequate information is provided to ensure effectiveness can be 
monitored.13 6 
What then did the government prescribe with regards to Board 
accountability? The principal requirement was that Accounts be audited in 
the same way as for other public funds . Hence the only formalised reporting 
that took place to Parliament was through these audited accounts. There was 
no requirement for Boards to report or account to producers for either their 
operation or actions . Woods et a! have however failed to recognise the 
informal and voluntary channels of accountability. Despite there being no 
legal requirement for reporting to producers, the Meat and Dairy Boards 
produced Annual Reports including financial accounts and a commentary of 
the Boards activities during the preceding year. Nevertheless reporting was 
very much on the board's own terms and not directly comparable to public 
companies where accountability criteria are defined under the Companies 
Act. Statutory activities demonstrate limited public scrutiny where the boards 
were not required to account or explain for any given decision (eg: the 
allocation of an export license) and no channel for appeal exists. 
Accountability is monitored through the election of producer 
representatives and government appointed members 13 7 . Thus with a dual 
principal-agent rei a tion ship-government/board and board/producer-
channels of monitoring were in place. This form of monitoring provides 
135 IPS/EDC (1988), p 84. 
136 Mascarenhas (1982), p 128. 
1 3 7 Note that two government appointments were made to each of the Meat and Dairy 
Control Boards along with one appointment to the Wool Committee. The government 
appointment to the Meat Board was regarded as a necessary function of the financial 
guarantee. Papers in the National Archives (Ag 1422/424, pt3, 1923/6a) reveal that the 
Government was opposed to representation for itself in early negotiations over the Dairy 
Produce Control Legislation with the Dairy Producers' Committee, 15th September, 1922: 
MR GROUNDS; "We thought that the Government would insist on being 
represented, similarly to the Meat Control Board." 
MR MASSEY; "We have financial interests in connection with the Meat Control 
Board and its is therefore necessary to have Government representation on the 
Board ... Personally, I don't see the same necessity to have Government representation on 
your Board as was the case with the Meat Control Board." 
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only an indirect form of accountability. Elections are often held on a 
rotational basis and depending on the individual board may be held through 
'electoral colleges'. The mandatory provisions of the legislation meant that 
minority interests could be overlooked or ignored (recognising that 
producers as a principal are not a homogeneous group), a phenomenon 
perpetuated by the electoral system. In terms of transparency and 
monitoring, what is regarded as 'adequate' will largely depend on the 
information needed to satisfy the minimum requirements of any given 
observer. More specifically transparency might relate to the extent to which 
the costs and benefits of particular interventions by the Boards on behalf of 
producers are observable and apparent. 
Informal networks between individual board members and members 
of the political ruling elite provide greater levels of accountability and 
transparency than might at first seem the case. The level of trust between 
the principal and agent, and the high level of interest and mutual 
interaction between the Minister of Agriculture and representatives of the 
Producer Boards may help to explain in part why formalised requirements 
for accountability were limited. The recent interest in accountability issues 
has been a phenomenon of the SOE restructuring that occured in New 
Zealand during the 1980s. It is debatable whether the benefits of clearly 
defined structures were evident or even important as tenets of public policy 
in the 1920s. Similarly it has only been as the Boards developed their 
commercial structures and overall marketing sophistication that issues of 
accountability have assumed importance. While the original Boards were 
concerned with the simple process of control of commodities to essentially 
one market, elaborate monitoring structures were un-necessary. 
Comparisons between the public and private sectors provide some 
useful insights into how performance is monitored in producer boards. 
Incentives for performance and monitoring in the private sector are derived 
from tradeable equity where individual assessments of the financial criteria 
(such as earnings, asset backings, profit and dividend levels etc) will be 
reflected in share prices. The impact of share price assessments are to 
indicate to management market evaluation of their performance. Where this 
is poor the company may have difficulty raising capital and face the ultimate 
sanction of takeover. Ideally these two consequences act as important 
incentives for management to maintain and improve performance levels. 
Thus in the private sector performance is allegedly monitored by market 
prices for tradeable equity (and tradeable debt for that matter) and where 
management is contestable, to the threat of hostile takeover. On a product 
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level efficiency is tested where competitors in any given market attempt to 
supply at lower prices or develop new products. In contrast where boards act 
as statutory monopolies, the costs of inefficient decisions (eg: 'forced riding' 
with compulsory levy payments) may be passed back to the producerl3 8. 
Statutory Control Boards are without the sanctions of share price fluctuation 
and takeover where management is faced by an entirely different set of 
incentives. These problems are exacerbated by the fact that as monopolies, 
performance (in other than an international context) cannot be compared to 
other organisations. The Principal has difficulty establishing what is a 'good' 
or 'bad' performance by the Agent where reference to defined objectives, 
comparable organisations or alternative marketing channels are distorted by 
statutory provisions. 
The situation facing Statutory Control Boards may be contrasted to SOEs 
where ownership is held by government, through the relevant Minister. 
Equity and ownership issues for the Boards are complicated by the fact that 
the actual ownership of assets is not immediately apparent. Without tradeable 
equity and separate dividend payments it is difficult for producers to evaluate 
their 'ownership' in the board and its value. Producers as investors in their 
own industry may also find it difficult to assess whether their continued 
capital investment is justified under the usual decision criteria used in the 
private sector. Despite the Boards claim that individual producers' share of 
the dairy industry is capitalised back into farm values (including their share 
of the Board's assets), producers cannot leave an industry and take that 
contribution with them. Nor is it apparent that a buyer would pay a premium 
for a dairy farm (equivalent to the average producers equity share of the 
board) over an alternative use (eg: Pastoral production). For the Boards 
themselves equity problems have provided serious constraints to growth 
which has typically been funded from retained earnings or borrowings that 
have distorted capital structures 1 3 9. 
With a distinct set of performance mechanisms to the private sector, 
incentives for marketing efficiencies have been influenced by criteria 
other than economic factors of cost minimisation and profit maximisation. 
Social, political and principal - agent considerations act to distort the market 
signals sent to producers, particularly those related to returns on 
investments and production viability. McKinlay (1988) has argued that 
signals about risk bearing were being significantly blurred and producers 
1 3 8 New Zealand Treasury (1987), para 55 . 
139 See Treasury Paper 6678 (1988), p 1. 
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were led to believe that their share of the risk ended at the farm gate. I 4 0 
Inadequate performance mechanisms inflict potential economic losses on 
producers and consequently on the public at large. Nevertheless one can see 
producers' rejection of the worst forms of commercial exploitation in the 
1920-23 period as emphatic. 
5.6 Conflicts of Interest 
The player/referee problem emerges as a consequence of the diverse 
range of powers and the overlap of responsibilities held by the boards. 
Advocates of the separation of powers point to the potential for the referee to 
control the game to the advantage of his or her own operations. Thus 
conflicts are strongest where a board administers it discretionary regulatory 
powers to influence decisions in the commercial sphere, while itself 
involved in commercial activities (ie : a player in the game). Even where the 
Board as a referee is not a player, it may still influence the commercial 
performance of others involved in the industry (eg: through grading or 
export licensing). The principle of separation of commercial activities from 
political decision making and regulatory functions may be regarded as an 
important factor in the formation of SOEs. As Woods has noted; 
In todays economic and political climate , and in the light of past 
experience, the need to separate statutory powers from commercial 
activities probably provides the single most compelling reason for 
changing . the way in which statutory powers are exercised in the 
agricultural export sector.14 1 
While the separation of functions provided the basis for change in the 
1980s this principle does not readily translate to an evaluation of formative 
conditions in the 1920s. Woods considers the issue of conflict in a rules and 
discretion framework of analysis where contemporary (1920s) commentators 
favoured a more pragmatic role for government. The boards recognised the 
interaction of political and commercial forces encompassed in an 
institutional structure which equates to a rejection of the SOE model. The 
important point to note is that referee-player conflicts were acceptable 
where New Zealand could capture economic rent from abroad . This is distinct 
140 In fairness, McKinlay ' s criticisms related to price and income stabilisation policies 
which were not a significant part of the Board's activities in the 1920s, nevertheless to 
the extent that these problems were indicative of monitoring and performance 
difficulties in statutory control bodies the observation is relevant. 
141 IPS!EDC (1988 ) p 9. 
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from Woods analysis which emphasises the implications of domestic rent 
seeking. 
To what extent were conflicts of interest apparent during the 
formative and subsequent stages of producer board development? Claims 
about agency capture tend to highlight the potential for conflicts that can 
arise. Agents' pursuit of their own interests often to the detriment of other 
industry participants has resulted on occassions m political rather than 
'rational' economic decision making. The Dairy Board provides a good 
example of this where the advocates of compulsory pooling were the driving 
force behind the failed attempt to manage prices during the 1926/27 
season142. In another example of agency capture one may discern some 
tentative but nevertheless significant links between the demise of 
proprietary dairy companies and the sometimes open hostility and suspicion 
they faced by a board dominated by Co-operative factory interests. While 
proprietary and merchant interest were represented by one of the twelve 
board members this was not reflective of their proportion of production or 
importance to the industry. More apparent evidence of conflicts may be 
found in Meat Board licensing of export activities which has been noted 
above. Indeed the activities of Freesia (a commercial subsidiary of the Meat 
Producers Board) were regarded with suspicion by meat processing 
companies during the 1980s, particularly when investments were made in 
domestic meat processors and exporters (such as W aitaki). Thus the Board was 
placing itself in a position of allocating licenses and determining regulatory 
conditions for companies with which it may have been in direct competition. 
While there is little evidence to suggest that there have been serious 
compromises of ethics, or that the Boards have acted in anything other than 
the interests of producers, attention needs to be paid to the potential for 
conflict. In the Dairy Board conflicts of interest may arise where Dairy Board 
members are also directors of dairy companies. Consider the first elected 
Dairy Board and the composition of its members143: 
14 2 Events surrounding the 1926/27 period of absolute control are well documented by 
Ward (1975) pp 61-72. It should be noted that export control was strongly opposed 
proprietary and free trade interests. The 'Free Marketing League' was set set up to 
oppose the Board's plans and it fielded candidates when three board positions came up 
for election in 1926. Dalyrmple and Fischer, both advocates of control were unseated by 
two League candidates while the third sitting member, Iorns, an opponent of control was 
re-elected. Elections in the following year saw two additional pooling opponents elected 
to the Board and the scheme abandoned. The case for agency capture may be argued where 
the Board did not represent the views of the majority of producers (reflected in the 
defeat of sitting members supporting control). 
143 In addition to the seven members listed below were Messers J. Fischer and J.R. 
Hamilton, their respectives company associations are unknown. 
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W. Goodfellow; Responsible for the amalgamation of the NZDA and the 
Waikato Dairy Ass, managing director of N.Z Co-op Dairy Co. 
W. Grounds; Managing director of the Hokianga Dairy Company. 
H.D. Forsyth; Director of the Eltham Dairy Company. 
W.C. Motion; Chairman of the N.Z. Cooperative Dairy Company. 
W.A. Ioms; Chairman of the Otaraia Dairy Company. 
K. Dalrymple; Director of the Rangitikei Dairy Company. 
J.R. Thacker; Chairman Okain's Bay Dairy Company. 
In addition to these nine elected members (six North Island, three South 
Island) were two government appointed representatives, one representative 
of merchant and proprietary interests and W.D . Hunt (whose difficulties with 
the government have been noted). The backgrounds of individual members 
are not where the sources of conflict lie, but rather m the continuation of 
commercial responsibilities whilst holding positions on the Board. The 
government's attitude toward this problem is revealing. Opponents of the 
Dairy Export Control Act sought provision that "no director of a Dairy 
Company may be a member of the Control Board" 144 . The rationale for this 
demand came from the concern that members of the Board might be placed 
in the position of obtaining information that could be used to the detriment 
of other firms. The Minister of Agriculture responded to these accusations by 
stating that; 
... 1 do not consider it would be in accordance with the spirit of the Act 
for the Government through regulations , to restrict to such an extent 
the right of producers to elect to the Board the men who they consider 
are best fitted and best qualified to act as their representatives on this 
body with its extensive responsibilities .14 5 
This response is largely consistent with the characterisation which reflects 
commitment to the principle of devolution and allowing producers to find 
solutions to their own problems . This principle do'es not reflect the 
importance of establishing effective parameters or rules by which 'the 
game ' is played . In this example potential for conflict and agency capture 
may be seen, where five representatives were also members of the Dairy 
144 NZNA., Ag 1422, 1924/71, correspondence from F.H. Leonard to Nosworthy, The 
Minister of Agriculture, 30.1 0. 1923 
14 5 NZNA., Ag 1422, 1924/71, correspondence from Nosworthy, The Minister of 
Agriculture to F.H. Leonard, 9.11. 1923 . 
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Council (Grounds, Goodfellow, Motion, Forsyth, Ioms and Dalrymple) and two 
Board members were members of the country's largest Dairy Cooperative146. 
Conflicts were regarded as manageable while the Boards were 
confined to regulatory control and commercial activities were insignificant. 
Transparency was adequate while the scope and scale of these activities 
remained limited. In a small society such as New Zealand conflicts of interest 
were commo·n given the size of the ruling and managerial 'elite'. Within the 
bounds of 'acceptable' practice, conflicts in a limited form were tolerated 
because in many instances they were unavoidable and usually insignificant. 
Occasionally individuals overstepped the bounds; well documented examples 
may be found through New Zealand's early history and included prominent 
figures from Russell and Whitaker in the 1860s to Stout and Vogel in the 
1880s and Reeves in the 1890s. Ward was alleged to have had a personal 
interest in the government's rescue of the Bank of New Zealand in 1894 
through £55,000 of his debt being written off when the Colonial Bank was 
taken over. As a consequence there were demands for Ward's resignation and 
Seddon, the then Prime Minister was forced to hold an enquiry .14 7 Hawke 
has argued that activities of these public figures " ... constitute not widespread 
graft, patronage and corruption, but occasional transgressions of both 
contemporary and modern standards of official behaviour" .1 4 8 The 
important point to note is not that transgressions of this magnitude may have 
been experienced in the operations of the Boards, but that informal 
monitoring ensured serious conflicts of interest were addressed. 
14 6 The NZCDC was a strong advocate of compulsory marketing while Motion and 
Goodfellow played a key role in the London Agency and control movement. The NZCDC 
was accused by control opponents of an unfair use of industry politics to implement 
control (See Ward, 1975 p. 66). Following the failure of compulsory pooling Goodfellow 
established a company called Amalgamated Dairies in 1927 to coordinate marketing in 
Britain . The company was perceived as an attempt to establish an alternative to the Board 
(now dominated by opponents of control) however its association with the NZCDC and 
Board opposition led to the abandonment of full industry marketing by amalgamated 
Dairies . 
14 7 Ward was later cleared however the enquiry revealed that the Bank's board had 
acted unwisely by granting shareholder's dividends while the Bank made record losses. 
The result was a majoring restructuring which resulted in government appointing six of 
the board's eight members and a government rescue of the bank under a capital 
restructuring programme . 
148 Hawke (1985), p 117 . 
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Conclusion. 
This thesis has developed four major themes. First, the role of the 
Commandeer and its impact on production and income variables during the 
First World War and post-war periods. Second, the role of Government and 
more specifically Massey in the formation of the producer statutory control 
organisations. Third, an evaluation of aspects of primary products marketing 
that may have required Government intervention. Fourth, the apparent 
'failure' of the boards architects to consider the wide range of issues 
'wrapped up in the single package'. 
Chapter 2 evaluated the general secondary source hypothesis that the 
Boards were formed to reproduce the benefits of income security and price 
stability of the Commandeer and to return to the boom conditions with which 
it had been associated before the 1921/22 slump. While nominal export prices 
in the pastoral industry increased by 48 percent between 1915 and 1918, 
output fell by 25 percent. Over the same period nominal prices for dairy 
products increased by 3 8 percent and output fell by 4.5 percent. Pastoral and 
Dairy production did not return to their 1915 levels until 1920. Real income 
series indicate that the Commandeer was not characterised by real gross 
income stability, but net real incomes were relatively stable, reflecting in 
many cases changing factor expenses which adjusted to changes in real 
gross income. 
There is little evidence to support the claim of a post-war boom in 
agriculture. Net real farm incomes increased from $24.6 million in 1918 to 
$27.4 million in 1919 before falling to $26.1 million in 1920. This was 
paralleled by falling profitability as agricultural terms of exchange (the 
difference between prices paid and prices received) deteriorated after 1918. 
The basis for 'prosperity' in agriculture during the post-war period was 
largely speculative, with land prices increasing dramatically through the 
Government's programme to settle returned servicemen on the land and the 
widespread availability of credit. 
The general enthusiasm for the Commandeer can be attributed to a 
number of factors. First, net real farm incomes during the Commandeer were 
higher than the 1921-1924 period. Second, while contract prices from 1915 to 
1920 were below those prevailing in the open market, the exportable surplus 
enjoyed a guaranteed market at fixed prices and favourable contractual 
conditions. Third, marketing costs associated with the pre-war and post 
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control marketing system were minimised during the Commandeer. Fourth, 
statutory monopoly was regarded by many producers as the most effective 
method of collectively managing risk and minimising transaction costs. 
While the case for a 'boom' has been over-stated for the farming 
sector, an agricultural slump after 1920 is apparent. Along with export prices 
net real farm incomes fell to $20.3 million in 1921 and $17 million in 1922. 
The impact of the slump was compounded by the interaction of three factors. 
First, there was the delayed output response to increasing prices during the 
Commandeer. Second, this output response coincided with the end of the 
Commandeer during 1920/21 and the de-stocking by Britain of commodities 
that had been accumulated during the contract period. Third, the 
international economy faced a strong down-turn with prices for most 
exports , including agricultural commodities falling . Thus deteriorating terms 
of exchange and the three factors above support the hypothesis that Boards 
were formed in response to the poor conditions that prevailed after the 
Commandeer, but question the imagery of 'boom' and 'slump ' cycles. 
Statutory control organisations developed in an environment where 
New Zealand producers believed that their weak position was being exploited 
by intermediaries and external interests . At the end of the Commandeer New 
Zealand was unable to persuade the British to dispose of surplus stocks in an 
orderly manner. There was also a widespread perception that producers were 
not being treated fairly in the British market. While some exporting nations 
traded openly after the war, the Commandeer led New Zealand to supply the 
British below prevailing market prices . Shipping in particular remained an 
export bottle-neck and shortages continued for some time after the war while 
freight charges on some in sulated cargoes increased. Although 'middlemen' 
were often attacked in contemporary debate , accusations of exploitation are 
often without substance. The operation of the 'American Meat Trust ' for 
example demonstrated that many of these concerns equated to a desire 
amongst some producers to exercise maximum control over their own 
industries and exclude foreign or non-producer interests . 
The second theme of the thesis relates to the role of Government and 
New Zealand ' s Prime Mini ster , W.F . Massey in the formation of statutory 
control organisations. A consi stent theme throughout New Zealand economic 
history has been the way in which Governments have used the machinery of 
intervention in a pragmatic and non-doctrinaire way . This approach may 
also be seen in the Government's handling of agricultural marketing issues 
during the Commandeer and the early 1920s. The Government actively 
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supported producers in their dealings with the British and publicly 
investigated issues of concern such as profiteering, meat trusts and shipping 
combines . Some accounts have portrayed the Government as reacting to 
political pressure from producers and factions within its own party. While 
there is an element of reactive policy making particularly to the threat of a 
'country party', the Government was an important protagonist in the Board 
movement. This role is demonstrated in the Government's initiatives to 
finance meat industry marketing as early as June 1920. Developments were 
also promised for wool, a 'super board', and later a meat marketing pool. The 
Government appears to have been driven by a belief that the prosperity of 
the New Zealand economy was dependent on the prosperity of producers. 
Massey's place in these developments is central. His advocacy in Parliament 
and dealings with all sectors of the agricultural industry gave the board 
proposals the impetus they required to become a reality. 
Third, the thesis has looked at aspects of primary product marketing 
that may have required Government intervention on producers' behalf. 
Three broad justifications for statutory intervention may be seen. First, 
'optim urn tariff' and economic rent arguments. Second, transactions cost 
minimising strategies. Third , technological economies of scale. 
The economic rent argument considers the extent of New Zealand's 
power to develop a price path that maximises foreign exchange and 
producers' income. Government intervention in the New Zealand economy 
has often been required to address bargaining power assymetries and ensure 
fair competiton . In the export economy the Government's role was to protect 
domestic producers against foreign interests, with intervention used to adjust 
imbalances in New Zealand's favour. Boards were regarded as a means of 
addressing inequity in existing producer-intermediary and producer-
exporter relationships through 'compulsory cooperation'. Voluntary 
cooperation of the type found in the dairy industry may have emerged in 
marketing given time but events noted above initiated the process of 
statutory intervention. Massey implicitly emphasised that boards were 
mechanisms to gain, rather than counter, monopoly power. New Zealand's 
share of the United Kingdom meat market for example suggests that 
producers had some ability to act as price makers rather than price takers; it 
also suggests that the optimum tariff argument may have applied. 
The transactions cost minimising strategy may be found in the 
provision of public goods and organisational economies of scale through 
single desk selling. Marketing functions that may have included a public 
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good element were research, market intelligence, Government lobbying, 
promotion and price stabilisation . Government intervention may be justified 
where public goods are under-provided by the market and 'free riding' is a 
problem. Intervention in these circumstances may increase the volume of 
public goods but it is unlikely to be optimal, leading to the possibility of 
'forced-riding'. 
The principal negative externality in marketing for producers since 
1922 has been the impact of poor quality products on New Zealand's generic 
brand image. While the benefits of grading and quality control have been 
questioned by some authors in the development economics literature, 
producers regard Government intervention in this area as essential to the 
long term prospects of commodity marketing. The economic development 
literature has been orientated to a different set of problems to those of 
primary interest for the New Zealand debate. That literature has focused on 
the relationship between commodity price instability and economic growth. 
The debate has largely failed to take account· of the existence of trading 
blocks, bargaining power assymetries, transactions costs and other key 
variables which have played an important role in explaining Government 
intervention in New Zealand agriculture. 
The third case for statutory intervention relates to the existence of 
natural monopolies in some aspects of public goods such as promotion and 
product branding. In other aspects of marketing particularly in shipping, 
documentation, insurance and storage, the advantages of single desk 
operations had been apparent since the Commandeer. The case for statutory 
intervention began with producers and Government pursuing the 
transactions cost and optimum tariff arguments. As potential gains in other 
areas became apparent (such as economies of scale) the concept of the 
Control Board widened to encompass these factors . The path to control m each 
industry depended on the internal and external , political, commercial and 
economic environments which acted to shape the distinct marketing systems 
in meat, wool and dairy . 
The fourth theme has been the wide range of organisational issues 
associated with the board structure. Recent analysis emerged out of a wider 
debate during the 1980s over the State's role in the economy and perceived 
problems in the structure of some Government and quasi-government 
organisations 
that boards 
Government. 
such as producer boards . Principal-agent analysis has shown 
are responsible to two separate principals, producers and the 
Problems emerge in this relationship where the objectives of 
109 
the two principals begin to diverge. While there is anecdotal evidence for 
conflict between the two principals, Government has effectively delegated its 
role as the primary principal. 
In terms of common theories of ideal organisational design three 
attributes are important. First, organisations must have clearly defined 
objectives that avoid conflict. Second, a defined set of sanctions and rewards 
must be in place. Third, the performance of the agent must be monitored. 
Provisions of the Board legislation made few concessions to these three 
attributes. It was difficult for boards to meet these organisational 
characteristics when there were few statutory requirements and no effective 
yard-stick by which Board performance could be monitored. While explicit 
legislative requirements were limited, there is strong evidence to support the 
view that informal and indirect channels provided important mechanisms of 
monitoring through annual reports and financial statements, the election 
process and Government appointment of members to the board. In these 
circumstances the adequacy of transparency depended on what producers 
determined was adequate and while the boards were confined to regulatory 
functions channels of monitoring and principal-agent conflicts appear to 
have been manageable. 
Informal networks of accountability are important for understanding 
the Government's willingness to sign a 'blank cheque'. The boards were 
delegated powers that the state would not have used itself and similarly it is 
unlikely that producers would have granted themselves these contingent 
powers under a voluntary based agreement. There was no devolution in a 
strict functional sense, but there was a delegation of contingent powers 
(such as compulsory pooling) from Government to producers . The board 
structure allowed producers to find solutions to their own problems without 
cost to the state. 
Recent analysis has argued that the boards lack clarity in their powers 
and do not represent a coherent philosophy. This analysis fails to consider 
that the board's powers were designed to be used in an experimental and 
tentative manner. Similarly while a 'coherent philosophy' may not be 
explicitly defined in the legislation (other than in the brief pre-amble to the 
Meat Export Control Act, 1921-22) chapters 3 and 4 have shown that the 
Government had clear objectives for introducing the respective statutory 
measures for wool, meat and dairy products . Two images have been used to 
characterise producers control boards . First, as part of a government 
responsible to an electorate. Second, as businesses with profit maximising 
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objectives. Neither of these images is accurate because Boards are multi-
functional, multi-goaled organisations . 
Conflicts of interest emerge as a consequence of the diverse range of 
powers and the overlap of responsibilities held by the various boards. 
Conflicts specifically occur on a number of levels. It is only recently that 
conflict has emerged between the statutory and commercial functions of the 
Boards; however the extent of the commercial role could not have been 
foreseen by the Board's architects . Indeed the commercial function 
emphasises that Boards are not subject to the same performance criteria as 
public companies which supposedly face the market disciplines of 
fluctuating share prices and the threat of takeover. Another form of conflict 
emerges where an agent's pursuit of their own interest rather than those of 
the principal can result in political rather then 'rational' economic decision 
making . Boards were by their nature inherently political organisations. 
Specific examples of conflicts of interest may be found in the allocation of 
political licenses in the meat industry and conflicts emerging out of dairy 
board members being directors of dairy companies . 
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Income Estimates in New Zealand Agriculture 1914/15 to 1924/25 
The basis for the following income and expenditure estimates for 
agriculture in New Zealand are drawn from the agricultural income and 
productivity studies of B.P Philpott et al published between 1958 and 1969149. 
Philpott attempted to compensate for the lack of official and unofficial 
estimates of net farm incomes during the inter-war period and also estimates of 
net farm productivity. Derived from a wider study of supply and demand 
functions for New Zealand agriculture, the Philpott data provided estimates of 
capital, output and income in New Zealand fanning. 
As far as this study is concerned levels of net income provide 
particularly useful evidence for testing two assertions. First, that producer 
boards were formed as a result of declining income levels by farmers in the 
early 1920s. Second, that the period of the Imperial Commandeer was 
characterised by sustained and rising income levels. While the Philpott data 
provide valuable insights into the later period, their starting point in the 
1921/22 June year leaves much of the period untouched. Utilising the Philpott 
methodology I have attempted to provide estimates for agricultural income and 
expenditure back to the 1914/15 season . The methodology was also applied to 
reconstruct the period 1921/22 to 1924/25 to ensure consistency and act as a 
control for the earlier estimates. 
Philpott explains that the component estimates of farm expenditure are 
constrained by the Government Statistician's estimates of Gross Farming 
Income. Gross Farming Income measures the total gross receipts at the "farm 
gate" . These estimates allow for inter-farm sales and make adjustments for 
changes in the value of livestock inventories. Furthermore the estimates are 
net of commissions, transport and other selling costs but include the value of 
production from primary processing industries. Processing industries were 
thus excluded from these estimates of gross fanning income with the official 
estimates converted by the factor of 79.4 percent, derived from the ratio of 
gross farming income to agricultural processing income during the period 
1928/29 to 1934/35. Data for gross fanning income has been calculated by the 
149 Philpott, B.P . and Stewart, J.D. "Capital, Income and Output In New Zealand 
Agriculture , 1922-1956", Economic Record , Volume 34, August 1958. 
Philpott, B.P . et a! , " Estimates of Farm Income and Productivity in New Zealand 
1921-65 ", Lincoln College. Agricultural Economics Research Unit Publication No. 30, 
(Lincoln College, 1967) 
Philpott, B.P. and Hussey, D.D. "Productivity and Income of New Zealand 
Agriculture, 1921-67, Lincoln College. Agricultural Economics Research Unit Publication 
No. 59, (Lincoln College, 1969) 
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statistics department to 1915/16 and from there to the 1910/11 census. For this 
reason the gross income figures for the 1914/15 season have been interpolated. 
In estimating levels of farm income and expenditure before 1921/22 
problems have been encountered that relate to the general lack of data. 
Difficulties were encountered when attempting to estimate levels of farm 
machinery; tractors and trucks where official data was limited or collected for 
only part of the period (from 1918/19 in the case of farm machinery). Similar 
difficulties were encountered in the shortcomings of census and inter-censual 
data. This was found to be the case when estimating Industrial production 
figures prior to 1918/19 in other than census years (requiring the arbitrary 
tool of interpolation) . While there was an absence of detailed farm 
wage/income distribution data prior to the 1926 census. The approach of this 
appendix will be to explain and follow the Philpott methodology, account for 
differences ·in results and explain the assumptions that have been made. 
Estimates for farm inputs are generally drawn from official data 
particularly from the Annual Production and also the Overseas Trade Statistics . 
Other data is drawn from Year books, local authority . and agricultural 
statistics . Trade statistics relate to the year ended December 31, production 
figures in contrast are calculated for the year ended March 31 . The approach 
adopted here , given that the Philpott figures relate to the year ended June 30 
has been to calculate trade data for the June year and add these to the 
production figures for the year ended March 31. The logical solution would 
have been to convert the production series for the year ended June 30, 
however this would have led to methodological and statistical inconsistencies 
with Philpott ' s data. The difference is effectively a three month period at the 
beginning and end of each production year to the June year applied to this 
study . This disparity should have a very limited impact on the accuracy of the 
final estimates . 
The general approach is clear. In later estimates (post 1924/25) Farmers' 
incomes and wage payments are calculated from the income distribution 
frequency data found in the 1926, 1936 and 1945 censuses. Data post- 1945 was 
particularly useful for Philpott given official estimates for net farm income. 
Nevertheless for inter-censual years and the period under consideration here, 
the approach was to derive independent estimates of component items of 
expenditure from official sources . Other sources have included studies of 
budgets and official farm sample data that analysed expenditures for a given 
year by stock unit or farm type . 
Budgetary studies were a particularly useful source of information 
where Department of Statistics data provided no dis-aggregated expenditures of 
VI(..!(.) lA UNIVI::.RSITY. ( . ! WLi... I 
114 
the agricultural or pastoral sectors. Philpott's method and that utilised here has 
been to use specially constructed price indices to convert known expenditures 
in 1949/50 prices to earlier periods where budgetary analyses and general data 
are scarce. The 'interdependence' of this money expenses and real inputs 
approach may also be seen where the price indices are used to convert data 
given in current prices to 1949/50 prices where the indices use this year as a 
base. This was used in the estimation of expenditures for rail and cartage, fuel 
and electricity and 'other expenses'. 
One cautionary note is the purpose for which this data was collected and 
the methodology developed. Philpott constructed these series to form a long-
run data base for National Income and capital accumulation studies. Hence 
deflation by individual indices is used to derive real figures in 1949/50 prices. 
While the "real data" is of interest to us for the purposes of this study we are 
more concerned with income forgone in the farming sector. In other words to 
test whether farmers were experiencing strong financial returns during the 
war period , followed by falling incomes post- 1920/21 current price data has 
been deflated by the consumer price index. While it may be questionable to 
assume that farmers and their families consume the same 'average' bundle of 
goods as the rest of the economy, the CPI does provide a source of information 
in evaluating a uniform deflation to obtain input and output prices. 
It is useful to draw from Philpott definitions of the terminology used in 
the following analyses that distinguishes primarily estimates as they occur in 
money and real terms. 
(a) Where components of these series refer to current prices the terms 
'incomes' and 'expenses' have been used. Where they refer to 'real' (ie: 
1949/50 prices) the terms are 'output' and 'input'. 
(b) Gross Farm Income as defined above; 'at the farm gate'. Gross Farm 
Output is Gross Farm Income in real prices. 
(c) Factor expenses are the amounts paid to the factors of production, for 
example wages to labour or interest to capital. It also includes payments of land 
tax and rates but excludes income taxes. 
(d) Non-Factor expenses are expenses paid by farmers other than those 
included above. 
(e) Net Farm Income equals gross farm income less the expense of (c) 
and (d) and represents income to farmers before income tax. 
(f) Factor Incomes = Factor Expenses + Net Farm Income 
= Gross farm Income - Non Factor Expenses 
(g) Net Output = Gross Farm Output - Non-Factor Inputs 
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Real values are expressed in terms of 1949/50 prices because, according 
to Philpott, this year represents one of post-war internal and external stability. 
1949/50 followed the 1948 currency appreciation and preceded the 
distortionary 1950/51 increase in wool prices. Finally the year marked an 
international census of agriculture in which New Zealand was a participant. 
Table 1: Gross Farm Income, Expenditure and Net Income (Current Prices) [$000) 
June Years 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 
1. Non-Factor Expenses 
Farm Requisites 1,823 1 ,913 2,014 2 ,162 2 ,548 3,097 3 ,164 2,590 2 ,611 2,808 2,931 
Fertiliser 1,146 1,391 1,402 1,446 1,433 2 ,017 2 ,485 761 973 1,271 1,822 
Lime 124 132 143 154 165 184 320 284 304 440 482 
Seeds 483 540 506 592 412 445 490 317 282 475 447 
Fuel, Oil & Grease 115 131 165 210 251 362 451 421 334 2 94 375 
Electric Power 316 340 392 450 502 608 777 875 895 905 917 
R&M Bldgs etc 2,608 2 ,745 2 ,755 2 ,72 2 2 ,903 2 ,649 3 ,160 3 ,492 3 ,387 3 ,248 3 ,618 
R&M Plant etc 483 560 637 737 843 821 1 ,117 1 ,241 1 ,362 1,436 1,690 
Rail and Cartage 1,338 1,394 1,365 1,444 1,829 2,293 2 ,309 2,780 2, 485 2, 223 2,254 
Depr. Bldgs etc 1,719 1 ,809 1,815 1,793 1,913 1,745 2,08 2 2 ,301 2,234 2, 140 2 ,324 
Depr Plant etc 157 166 181 219 272 339 480 6 06 6 9 0 7 50 912 
Other Expenses 10,201 11 ,125 12, 104 13 ,473 14 ,636 12 ,910 15,819 15 ,279 14 ,044 13 ,699 13,825 
Total Non-Factor Expenses 20,513 22 ,246 23 ,479 25 ,402 27 ,707 27 ,470 32 ,654 30 ,947 29 ,601 29 ,689 31 ,597 
13. Factor Expenses 
Wages 9 ,561 10,056 10,700 11 ,089 12,124 14 ,372 14 ,312 13,907 16,844 16 ,365 16,200 
Interest 7,651 8 ,267 8 ,756 9 ,211 9 ,770 11 ,405 13,572 14 ,709 15,503 16 ,108 16 ,802 
\0 Rent 6,003 5 ,918 5,851 5,813 5,586 5,818 5 ,486 5 ,682 5 ,590 5 ,646 5 ,534 
........ Rates 1,916 2 ,077 2,207 2 ,286 2 ,632 2 ,895 3,258 3 ,114 3 ,584 3 ,674 3 ,918 
........ Land Tax 480 629 428 831 908 935 1 ,013 982 9 2 5 856 801 
Total Factor Expenses 25 ,611 26 ,947 27 ,942 29 ,230 31 ,020 35 ,425 37 ,641 38 ,394 42 ,446 42 ,649 43 ,255 
20. Total Expenses 46 ,124 49 ,193 51 ,421 54 ,632 58,727 62 ,895 70 ,295 69 ,341 72 ,047 72, 338 74 ,852 
21 . Net Farm Income 27 ,676 30 ,507 28 ,679 31,068 37 ,173 38 ,805 32 ,005 26 ,059 30 ,753 30 ,66 2 49 ,148 
22. Gross Farm Income 73,800 79 ,700 80,100 85 ,700 95 ,900 101 ,700 102 ,300 9 5 ,400 102,800 103 ,000 124 ,000 
June Years 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 
Non-Factor Expenses 20,513 22 ,246 23 ,479 25 ,402 27,707 27 ,470 32 ,654 30 ,947 29, 601 29 ,689 3 1,597 
Factor Expenses 25 ,611 26 ,947 27 ,942 29,230 31 ,020 35 ,425 37,641 38 ,394 42 ,446 42 ,649 43 ,2 55 
Net Farm Income 27 ,676 30 ,507 28 ,679 31 ,068 37 ,173 38 ,805 32,005 26 ,059 30 ,753 30,662 49 ,148 
Table lla: Real Gross Output, Real Inputs and Real Net Output (1949/50 Prices) . [$000] 
June Years 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 
1. Non- Factor Inputs 
2. Farm Requisites 4501 4328 4213 4102 4439 5979 5006 4267 4597 5560 5234 
3. Fertiliser 1196 1329 1239 1157 1053 1641 1659 530 1015 1708 2260 
4. Lime 167 164 164 160 174 159 277 256 315 512 577 
5. Seeds 1671 1714 1483 1574 1005 1202 1086 732 616 1062 1853 
6. Fuel, Oil & Grease 174 196 213 227 248 309 345 369 387 411 545 
7. Electricity and Power 672 691 714 739 758 797 883 962 1042 1134 1178 
8. Repairs and Maintenance 
9. (i) Buildings etc 6180 5980 5543 4967 4863 4915 4810 5534 6284 6419 6869 
10. (ii) Plant and Machinery 1265 1345 1415 1482 1559 1682 1878 2170 2516 2694 3054 
11 . Rail and Cartage 2351 2274 2022 1837 2117 2224 2339 2817 2873 2940 3030 
12 Depreciation 
13. (i) Buildings etc 3934 3800 3524 3157 3090 3122 3057 3518 3730 3728 4047 
14. (ii) Plant and Machinery 823 874 923 1005 971 1030 1269 1526 1821 1980 2258 
15. Other Inputs 26427 27134 27385 28010 28200 24732 25310 28242 27164 277887 27485 
16. Total Non-Factor Inputs 49417 48548 48908 48479 48540 47862 47993 51028 52483 56011 58440 
17. Net Output 163283 162225 147392 1 41 521 146760 181738 141407 132772 135117 136489 139660 
18. Gross Output 212700 210800 196300 190000 195300 229600 189400 183800 187600 192500 198100 
r-
...... 
...... 
Table lib: Real Gross Output, Real Inputs and Real Net Output (1914/15 Prices) [$000] 
June years 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 
CPI 1949/50=1000 474 495 553 598 643 704 749 725 698 708 725 
Rebased 1915=1000 1000 1044 1167 1262 1357 1485 1580 1530 1473 1494 1530 
1. Non-Factor Inputs 
Farm Requisites 1,823 1,832 1,726 1 , 714 1,878 2,085 2 ,002 1 ,693 1,773 1,880 1,916 
Fertiliser 1,146 1,332 1 ,202 1,146 1 ,056 1,358 1,573 498 661 851 1,191 
Lime 124 126 123 122 122 124 203 186 206 295 315 
Seeds 483 517 434 469 304 300 310 207 192 318 292 
Fuel, Oil & Grease 115 125 141 166 185 244 285 275 227 197 245 
Electric Power 316 326 336 357 370 409 492 572 608 606 600 
R&M Bldgs etc 2 ,608 2,629 2,361 2,158 2 ,140 1,784 2,000 2 ,283 2 ,300 2 ,175 2 ,365 
R&M Plant etc 483 536 546 584 621 553 707 811 925 961 1, 105 
Rail and Cartage 1,338 1,335 1,170 1,145 1,348 1 ,544 1,461 1 ,818 1 ,688 1,488 1,474 
Depr. Bldgs etc 1,719 1,732 1 ,556 1 ,421 1 ,410 1 ,175 1 ,318 1 ,504 1,517 1,433 1,519 
Depr Plant etc 157 159 155 174 201 228 304 396 469 50 2 596 
Other Expenses 10 ,201 10,653 10,375 10,679 10 ,789 8 ,692 10 ,011 9,989 9, 537 9 , 171 9, 039 
Total Non-Factor Inputs 20 ,513 21,302 20 ,125 20 , 135 20 ,425 18 ,495 20 ,665 20 ,233 20,102 19 ,877 20 ,658 
00 13. Factor Inputs 
..-4 Wages 9,561 9 ,629 9 ,171 8,790 8 ,937 9, 677 9, 0 57 9, 092 11 ,4 38 10 .956 10,59 1 
..-4 Interest 7 ,651 7 ,916 7 ,505 7 ,301 7 ,202 7 ,679 8, 589 9 ,6 17 10 ,528 10,784 10 ,985 
Rent 6,003 5 ,667 5 ,015 4 ,608 4 ,118 3 ,917 3 ,472 3 ,7 15 3 ,796 3 ,780 3 ,618 
Rates 1 ,916 1 ,989 1 ,892 1,812 1,940 1 ,949 2 ,062 2 ,036 2 ,434 2 ,460 2, 562 
Land Tax 480 602 367 659 669 630 641 642 6 2 8 573 524 
Total Factor Inputs 25,611 25 ,804 23 ,950 23 , 169 22 ,867 23 ,851 23,821 25 , 102 28 ,824 28 ,553 28 ,280 
20. Total Inputs 46 ,124 4 7 ,106 44 ,075 43 ,304 43 ,292 42 ,347 44 ,486 45 ,335 48 ,926 48 ,430 48 ,938 
21 . Net Farm Output 27 ,676 29,213 24 ,582 24 ,626 27 ,403 26 ,127 20 ,254 17,037 20,884 20 ,528 32, 133 
22. Gross Farm Output 73 ,800 76 ,319 68 ,657 67 ,929 70 ,695 68 ,474 64 ,740 62 ,372 69 ,810 68 ,9 58 81 .070 
June Years 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 
Non-Factor Inputs 20 ,513 21 ,302 20 ,125 20 ,135 20 ,425 18 ,495 20 ,665 20 ,233 20 ,102 19, 877 20 ,658 
Factor Inputs 25,611 25 ,804 23 ,950 23 , 169 22 ,867 23 ,851 23 ,821 25 ,102 28 ,824 28 ,553 28 ,280 
Net Farm Outputs 27 ,676 29,213 24 ,582 24 ,626 27, 403 26 ,127 20 ,254 17 ,037 20 ,884 20 ,528 32, 133 
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Notes to Tables I and Ila and lib 
The following is a brief summary of the Philpott method, a more detailed 
explanation may be found in the original reference. Unless otherwise stated 
the following figures were drawn from overseas trade and industrial 
production statistics. 
Line 2: Farm Reguisites: composed of two main areas of expenditure 
(i) Sacks and wool packs, insecticides, dips, licks, weed killers, strainers, 
netting and saddlery . 
(ii) Miscellaneous dairy expenses - shed, veterinary and herd testing (in 
real terms the number of dairy cows at $1.20 per cow plus the number of cows 
tested at $1.00 per cow). 
Line 3: Fertilizer: From imports 25 percent of ammonia sulphate, 67 percent 
potash and all basic slag are excluded from imports as the basic components in 
the New Zealand fertilizer industry. Fertilizer represented imports plus manure 
works (less blood and bone production prior to 1921/22) plus blood and bone 
production after 1921/22. A Statistical reclassification took place in the 1922 
March year that drew a component of the fertiliser industry in 'Boiling Down 
and Manure Works' into 'Chemicals'. During and after this year 83 percent of 
the chemical industry was taken to be producing chemical fertilisers . 
Line 4: Lime: Agricultural lime was taken at 25 percent of all "Lime and Cement 
works" production. 
Line 6: Fuel Oil and Grease: calculated in real terms at $220.90 per farm tractor 
and $60 per farm truck. The department of Agriculture's annual farm 
machinery survey was established in 1918/19; before this time farm tractor 
imports are estimated at 24 percent of steam traction imports (representing the 
average ratio of tractor to steam traction imports 1919/20 to 1924/25). "Farm 
trucks" were not dis-aggregated from total truck registrations until the 
agricultural census of 1950. One third of all truck registrations are estimated by 
Philpott to be in the agricultural sector. Philpott underestimates the number of 
farm trucks prior to 1924/25, demonstrated by an inconsistent treatment when 
evaluating depreciation of plant machinery (see Table XI, column 3) with the 
official volume of truck imports prior. In under estimating the number of 
trucks , expenditure on fuel , oil and grease is also under valued. 
120 
Line 7: Electricity and Power: utilised by milking and shearing machines. 
Calculated in real terms as the number of sheep shorn by machine at 80 cents 
per 100 sheep and the number of cows in milk at $1.25 per cow. These 'real' 
figures then had to converted by a factor of 0.6855 to maintain consistency 
(1921/22 - 1925/26) with the Philpott estimates (Note; Sheep shorn and cows in 
milk data are drawn from official sources). 
Line 8: Repairs and Maintenance: 
(i) Buildings and Structures: composed of buildings at 40 percent and 
fences 30 percent of real farm improvements. R & M at the rate of 2 percent 
per annum for buildings and 3 percent per annum for fences as for Table XII. 
(ii) Plant and Machinery: trucks and tractors at 12.5 percent per annum, 
other plant at 7.5 percent per annum, these rates were applied to the real 
depreciated value of capital found in Table XI. 
Line 9: Rail and Cartage: In real terms a figure was derived for 1949/50 from 
farm sample data (see Philpott) and then adjusted by the index of farm 
production for real terms and an index of freight costs to derive current 
values. 
Line 10 : Depreciation : 
(i) Buildings and structures, in real terms at the rate of 2.5 percent m 
Table XII. 
(ii) Plant and machinery : as per Table XI 
Line 11: Other inputs: In census years other expenses were estimated as the 
difference between Gross Farm Income and Net Farm Income (less total 
expenses). For inter-censual years and the period under consideration the real 
figure was derived from regression analysis and the money figure from the 
deflation of the real figure by a specially constructed 'other inputs' price 
index. Other expenses is refer to the residual and includes items that cannot be 
dis-aggregated, these include; 
(i) Transport costs and distributive margins eg; in seed, fertiliser etc. 
(ii) Farm contractor payments . 
(iii) Insurance accounting and legal fees . 
(iv) General expenses150 . 
Lines 14.15 and 16: Wages, Interest and Rent: Refer to Tables IV, VI & VII. 
150 Economic Record , Volume 34, August 1958, p 234. 
1 2 1 
Line 17: Rates: Rates as levied by counties, road districts, catchment districts, 
land drainage districts and rabbit districts. 
Line 18: Land Tax: As officially reported, 30 percent of attributed to agriculture. 
122 
Table III : Prices Received and Prices Paid; June Years 
1949/50 = 1000 
Price Index of Price Index of Terms of 
Farm Farm Exchange 
Outputs Inputs 
1914/15 481 436 1103 
1915/16 537 462 1162 
1916/17 607 502 1209 
1917/18 713 552 1292 
1918/19 693 599 1157 
1919/20 676 602 1123 
1920/21 698 696 1003 
1921/22 519 639 812 
1922/23 547 570 960 
1923/24 535 533 1004 
1924/25 628 544 1154 
Notes to Table III: Prjces Recejyed and Prices Pajd 
(1) Price Index of Farm Outputs : derived from the ratio of the value of Gross 
Farm Income at current prices to the volume of production at 1949/50 prices. 
(2) Price Index of Farm Inputs: derived from the weighted index of farm input 
prices according to average expenditure in 1949/50. 
(3) Terms of Exchange: Price of all products sold in terms of all non factor 
expenses and paid wages . 
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Table IV Estimate of Wage Payments, June Years, 1925/26 =1000 
June 
Years 
1914/15 
1915/16 
1916/17 
1917/18 
1918/19 
1919/20 
1920/21 
1921/22 
1922/23 
1923/24 
1924/25 
1925/26 
(1) 
Index : Wage 
Rate 
793 
817 
874 
920 
976 
1032 
1038 
978 
999 
995 
998 
1000 
(2) 
Index of 
Earnings 
per Head 
793 
817 
874 
920 
976 
1032 
1038 
978 
999 
995 
998 
1000 
(3) (4) (5) 
Index of Index of Estimate of 
Estimated Total Wages Total Wages 
Number of Paid Paid 
Paid Farm ($000) 
Workers 
804 638 9561 
821 671 10056 
817 714 10700 
804 740 11089 
829 809 12124 
929 959 14372 
920 955 14312 
949 928 13907 
1125 1124 16844 
1097 1092 16365 
1083 1081 16200 
1000 1000 14986 
Notes to Table IV Estjmate of Wa2e Payments 
(1) The Index of Wage Rat!:<S : derived from the official index of Agricultural and 
pastoral wage rates . Base=1000 for the 1926 census. 
(2) Index of Earnings per Head : Philpott made the observation that earnings 
per head appeared to keep pace with wage rates between 1920/21 and 1925/26. 
This observation was applied to the earlier period 1914/15 . 
(3) Index of Estimated Number of Paid Farm Workers : It was found from Year 
book data that Philpott had over-estimated the number of paid farm workers 
before 1923 . Adjustments were made and the index taken back to 1914/15. 
(4) Index of Total Wages Paid : Is the product of the index of earnings per head 
and the index of the estimated number of paid farm workers. 
(5) Estimate of Total Wages Paid: is derived from applying the index of total 
wages paid in column (4) to the census estimate of total wages paid in 1926 
($14,986,000). 
Table V 
June 
Years 
1914/15 
1915/16 
1916/17 
1917/18 
1918/19 
1919/20 
1920/21 
1921/22 
1922/23 
1923/24 
1924/25 
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Estimates of Farm Labour Force, 1914/15 to 1924/25 
(1) 
Farmer 
Occupiers 
55.9 
55.8 
57.5 
59.2 
60.8 
62.5 
64.2 
63.8 
63.4 
63 .0 
62.6 
(2) 
All Farm 
Labour 
(000 Persons) 
116 
117 
119 
120 
123 
132 
132 
135 
146 
144 
143 
(3) 
Paid Farm 
Workers 
60.3 
61.6 
61.3 
60.3 
62 .2 
69.7 
69.0 
71.2 
82.6 
81.0 
80.4 
Notes to Table V : Estimates of Farm Labour Force 
(1) Farmer Occupiers: Farmers are recorded in the census as 'employers on own 
account but with employees' for census years (males only) were as given, 
inter-censual years required interpolation. 
(2) All Farm Labour. Males and Females : Drawn from census data in 1911, 1916, 
1921 and 1926. For inter-censual years data is drawn from The New Zealand 
Official Year book: 'Agricultural and Pastoral Production; Summary of Farm 
Employees ' . Note that for 1921/22 a difference is apparent between Philpott's 
figures and my own , in this instance I have used the Department of Statistics 
data. 
(3) Paid Farm Workers : Philpott calculated the number of paid farm workers by 
subtracting estimates of farmer occupiers drawn from the census data in the 
above years. Inter censual adjustments are made by interpolation . 
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Table VI Estimates of Interest Paid on Rural Debt 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimated Estimated Interest on Estimate of 
Mortgage Interest Bank & Stock Total Interest 
Debt on on Mortgages and Station Paid 
Rural Land Advances 
June 
Years $ mn $(000) $(000) $(000) 
1914/15 99 6435 1216 7651 
1915/16 107 6955 1312 8267 
1916/17 114 7410 1346 8756 
1917/18 120 7800 1411 9211 
1918/19 127 8255 1515 9770 
1919/20 149 9685 1720 11405 
1920/21 181 11765 1807 13572 
1921/22 196 12800 1909 14709 
1922/23 210 13650 1853 15503 
1923/24 220 14300 1808 16108 
1924/25 230 14950 1852 16802 
Notes to Table VI Estimates of Interest Paid 
(1 ) Estimated Mortgage Debt on Rural Land : The source of this data was The 
New Zealand Official Year book. The system of registration for mortgages and 
title was normally by Deed or Land Transfer with the latter representing 92 
percent of all registered mortgages in 1921. The Year book provides limited 
information relating to rural mortgages, however Rural Mortgages discharged 
and registered under the Land Transfer Act are recorded. Similar information 
is unavailable for Deed transfers in the Year book. Usin g Philpott's estimates as 
a guide the proportion of rural mortgages to total mortgages outstanding has 
been taken at 43 .2 percent (representing the mean proportion for the years 
1921/22 to 1925/26). In estimating the mortgage debt on rural land this 
proportion has been applied to the total mortgages outstanding for the years 
under consideration and cross-referenced by taking the net rural mortgages 
registered under the Land Transfer Act (after subtracting those discharged) 
and making adjustments for registrations under the Deed s Act. 
(2) Estimated Interest on Mortgages: For the period 1921/32 the rate of interest 
used in calculation by Philpott was 6.5 percent per annum. This rate has also 
been applied for the 1915/20 period inclusive. 
(3) Interest on Bank and Stock and Station Advances: Data for this category was 
not officially published until 1936 when it appeared in the Reserve Bank of 
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New Zealand Bulletin . For the period 1914/15 to 1924/25 the level of advances 
by these institutions was calculated by Philpott to exhibit the same relationship 
to total farm expenses (less "other expenses", depreciation and interest) as it 
did on average during the period 1936/37 to 1940/41. 
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Table VII Estimates of Rent Paid, 1914/15 to 1924/25 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Area of Estimated Estimated Rentals Total Rent 
Private Unimp/ved Rental on Paid on Paid 
Leasehold Value Private Crown 
Land Leasehold Land 
June 
Years ()()()a:.; $(000) $(000) $(000) $(000) 
1914/15 5707 68484 4451 1552 6003 
1915/16 5560 66720 4337 1581 5918 
1916/17 5395 64740 4208 1643 5851 
1917/18 5280 63361 4119 1694 5813 
1918/19 4940 59280 3853 1733 5586 
1919/20 4633 55596 3614 2204 5818 
1920/21 4340 52080 3385 2101 5486 
1921/22 4398 52776 3430 2252 5682 
1922/23 4261 51132 3324 2266 5590 
1923/24 4284 51408 3340 2306 5646 
1924/25 4220 50640 3292 2242 5534 
Notes to Table VII Estimates of Rent Paid 
Source of Data: New Zealand Official Year book 
(2) Estimated Unimproved Value: Estimated at a constant value of $12 per acre = 
Column (I) x $12 (Source: Official Government unimproved value per acre for 
all North Island rural land for most of the period to 1932). 
(3) Estimate of Rental on Private Leasehold Land: = Column(2) x 6.5 percent per 
annum. 
(4) Rentals Paid on Crown Land: Source: Crown Land Statistics 
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Table VIII: Gross Farm Income in New Zealand Agriculture 
1914/15 to 1924/25 (Current Prices $mn) 
(1) (2) (3) {4) 
Agricultural Pastoral Dairy Total Farm 
Produce Produce Produce Produce 
June 
Years $mn $mn $mn $mn 
1914/15 73.8 
1915/16 12.1 49.4 18.3 79 .8 
1916/17 10.0 49 .9 20.2 80 .1 
1917/18 11.6 52.2 21.9 85.7 
1918/19 12.7 59 .7 23.5 95.9 
1919/20 14.0 59.1 28.6 101.7 
1920/21 14.0 46.7 41.6 102.3 
1921/22 15.1 44.9 34.6 94.6 
1922/23 12 .9 48.3 40.0 101.2 
1923/24 11.3 51.9 39.1 102.3 
1924/25 12.9 68 .8 41.6 123.3 
Source: NZOYB ; 1920, 1938, 1950. 
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Table IX: Index Numbers of Volume of Farm Production. 
(1949/50 = 1000). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
June Agricultural Pastoral Dairy All Farm 
Years Produce Produce Produce Products 
1914/15 704 442 269 420 
1915/16 596 442 271 406 
1916!17 433 401 272 361 
1917/18 482 333 257 328 
1918!19 554 403 266 378 
1919/20 486 471 289 411 
1920/21 539 407 330 400 
1921/22 715 502 423 503 
1922/23 607 509 480 513 
1923/24 548 530 486 525 
1924/25 594 545 513 541 
Notes to Table IX: Index Numbers of Volume of Farm Production. 
Base 1949/50 = 1000 
(1) Agricultural Produce: Official figures of the value of agricultural 
production were deflated by the export price index for agricultural production 
and the index then spliced onto Philpott's figures for 1921/22. Index data for 
1921/22 to 1922/23 was then reproduced. 
(2) Pastoral Produce : An index was constructed based on the "value aggregates" 
at 1949/50 prices from the following items; 
Number of lambs slaughtered 
Number of sheep slaughtered 
Number of cattle slaughtered 
Quantity of wool produced 
Changes m livestock numbers. 
(3) Dairy Produce : calculated from the quantity of butter fat produced. 
(4) All Farm Products: Weighted index based on value weights of the respective 
sectors in the 1949/50 season . 
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Table X: Price of Farm Inputs; Indices, 1949/50 = 1000 
June Farm Fertiliser Lime Seeds Fuel 
Years Requisites 
1915 405 961 741 289 661 
1916 442 1047 807 315 670 
1917 478 1132 873 341 776 
1918 527 1250 963 376 924 
1919 574 1361 1049 410 1012 
1920 518 1229 947 370 1171 
1921 632 1498 1154 451 1306 
1922 607 1435 1109 433 1142 
1923 568 959 965 458 862 
1924 505 744 859 447 716 
1925 560 806 836 524 688 
June Power Buildings Fences PI ant Freight 
Years 
1915 470 437 407 3 83 569 
1916 492 476 444 417 613 
1917 549 515 480 451 675 
1918 610 568 530 498 786 
1919 662 619 577 542 864 
1920 762 559 521 489 996 
1921 880 681 635 596 1031 
1922 909 654 610 573 987 
1923 859 599 486 554 865 
1924 798 574 446 533 756 
1925 778 575 484 541 744 
June Machinery Wages Other Imp/ments Total 
Years 
1915 191 346 386 480 436 
1916 190 356 410 517 462 
1917 196 381 442 562 502 
1918 218 401 481 620 552 
1919 280 426 519 674 599 
1920 329 450 522 631 602 
1921 378 453 625 749 696 
1922 397 426 541 712 639 
1923 379 436 517 605 570 
1924 379 434 493 556 533 
1925 404 435 503 567 544 
1 3 1 
Notes to Table X: Price of Farm Inputs 
Philpott uses three separate price indices for the purposes of deflation each 
based in the 1949/50 season. 
(a) An 'All Inputs' price index, see Philpott p 54 for weightings. 
(b) An 'Other Inputs' price index. 
(c) An 'Improvements' index, weightings derived from budgetary surveys. 
For those items estimated in current prices, the Official Index of Farm 
Expendituresl51 (closely resembling the make-up of Philpott's 'All Inputs' 
price index) was spliced onto Philpott's figures for 1921/22 . Where however 
expenditures in current prices were established through deflating real 
expenditures in the 1949/50 season, the indices were reconstructed according 
to Philpott's methodology . The Philpott method has been applied to the items of 
fuel, power, freight, machinery, wages, other, improvements and 'All Inputs'. 
The last three items may have been distorted by the splicing process noted 
above. However this is of little significance to items of current expenditure. 
Since it is Table lib of current expenditure which is deflated by the CPI and not 
Table Ila of current expenditure deflated by individual indices that is of 
primary interest , then splicing by a general farm input cost index for our 
purposes is not a matter of concern. 
For the Methods of construction in individual indices, refer to Philpott (1968), 
'pp 52-54 
151 NZO Y B. 1932, pp 686-688. 
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Table XI: Real Value of Plant and Machinery at Depreciated 1949/50 
Prices. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Real Gross Real Real Dep Value Real Total Dep 
Annual Invest Dep Value of of Farm Value of 
in PI & Mach PI & Mach Trucks PI & Mach 
March 
Year $(000) $(000) $(000) $(000) 
1914/15 1228 14286 1543 15829 
1915/16 1254 15021 1725 16746 
1916/17 1299 15734 1871 17605 
1917/18 1484 16443 1978 18421 
1918/19 1948 17286 2074 19360 
1919/20 2972 18534 2253 20787 
1920/21 4611 20728 2493 23221 
1921/22 5546 24375 2645 27020 
1922/23 3620 28788 2761 31549 
1923/24 4786 31026 2825 33851 
1924/25 5960 34276 3029 37305 
Notes to Table XI: Value of Plant and Machinery at Depreciated 
1949/50 Prices. 
(1) Real Gross Investment in Plant and Machinery: Represents the sum of 
imports and the local production of farm plant, machinery and tractors. To the 
total of local production and imports the arbitrary margin of 33.33 percent has 
been added to cover the costs of distribution. Note that imports of machinery 
excluded parts . Imports consisted of items such as cultivators, ploughs, wool 
presses , dairy churns , cream separating machines, tractors etc. 
(2) Real Depreciated Value of Plant and Machinery: Philpott uses the 1950 
Census of Agriculture as a starting point for developing a formula to depreciate 
plant and machinery. It was noted that "all items of plant and machinery given 
in this census were valued at 1949/50 prices and two thirds of this total taken as 
the depreciated replacement value m 1950/51."152 Using this year as a starting 
point the following formula could be utilised: 
152Philpott et al, (1969) p 59. 
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Where; Ct = depreciated capital value of plant and machinery in year t. 
It = real gross investment in year t. 
dt = rate of depreciation in year t. 
The rate of depreciation for 1950 was calculated at 9 percent per annum 
reducing by 0.15 percent for years preceding 1950 to result in the rate of 4.5 
percent per annum by 1921/22 for depreciation of plant and machinery. 
(3) Real Depreciated Value of Farm Trucks: Refer to line 6 of Table I, the 
depreciated unit value of farm trucks in 1949/50 prices was estimated at $570 
per vehicle . 
(4) Total Real Depreciated Value of Plant and Machinery : Equal to the sum 
of columns (2) and (3), the total value is taken to represent the capital stock of 
plant and machinery available for use during that season. 
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Table XII: Real Value of Improvements. 
(1) (2) (3) 
Deflated Index of Value of 
Value of Cost of Improvements 
Improvements Improvements at Current 
Prices 
March 1949/50 1949/50= 
Years $(000) 1000 
1914/15 339223 480 162827 
1915!16 327394 517 169263 
1916/17 303864 562 170772 
1917/18 271745 620 168482 
1918!19 266677 674 179740 
1919/20 269566 631 170096 
1920/21 263477 749 197344 
1921/22 303202 712 215880 
1922/23 349260 605 211302 
1923/24 365285 556 203098 
1924/25 387925 567 219953 
Notes to Table XII: Real Value of Improvements. 
(1) Deflated Value of Improvements in 1949/50 Prices: Represents the capital 
stock in the form of improvements available. The valuation of counties was 
sourced from the Local Authorities section of the Department of Statistics 
Annual Report. The improved value of each county was then deflated by the 
wholesale price index to arrive at the real deflated value of improvements. The 
Auckland county of Waitemata and the Canterbury counties of Waimairi and 
Heathcote were excluded because they were largely urban . 
(2) Index of Cost of Improvements: refer to "Notes to Table X". 
(3) Value of Improvements at Current Prices: Calculated by deflating column 
(I) by column (2) . 
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WOOL INDUSTRY REGULATIONS. 
FoLLOWING is the text of the Wool Industry Regulations relating to the fixing of 
minimum prices for wool , control cf the wool industry, and prohibition of the 
export of wool except under prescribed conditioo.s. The regulations were gazetud 
on 23rd June, and came into force on the next day. 
REGULATIONS. 
I . These regulations may be cited as the Board cf Trade (Wool lndu:;try ) 
Regulations , 1921. 
2 In these regulations " Minister " means the :'dinister of Agriculture. 
3· The Minister may appoint a Committee, to be known as the :Sew Zealand 
Wool Committee {hereinafter referred to as " the Wool Committee "), consisting 
<.f two representatives of wool-brokers, two representatives of wool-grow!'rs, one 
Government representative {who shall be Chairman ), and such other perseus as 
he may from time to time decide to hold office during his vleasure. At any 
meeting of such Committee three shall form a quorum. All communications 
intended for this Committee shall be addressed to the Chairman, New Zealand 
Wool Committee, P.O. Box 374, \Ve!lington. 
4· The Board of Trade may, on the recomm!'ndation of the Wool Committee, 
and with the approval of the Minister, by resolution fix minimum prices for the 
various kinds and grades of wool ; and by n<ltice in the Gtatlle may, with the 
like recomm~ndation and approval. fix minimum average prices for all or any 
kinds or grades of wool : and may, on like recommendation and with like approval, 
in like manner as aforesaid , from time to time alter and amend such prices. 
5· It shall not be lawful for any person to sell , or agree or offer to sell, whnher 
by auction or otherwise, any wool at prices less than the relative minimum prices 
or average minimum orices fixed for the time'being in accordance with clause 4 
bereof. -
6. ~o per.!on snatl sell or agree to sell any wool otherwise than by public 
auction, unless he shall pri<lr to ,uch sale or agreement to sell have ascertained 
from the Wool Committee or a person ho!din~ a permit under claust' 9 hereof the 
minimum price fixed for the wool proposed to be sold, and all references in these 
regulations to minimum price shall with respect to that particular woe! be 
referen~s to the price so ascertained. 
i· No person shall purchase or agree to purchase other.<ise than by public 
auction any wool at prices less than the minimum prices ascertained in acccrd-
ance 'llrith clause 6 hereof for the particular wool proposed to be purchased. 
The production by the purt::haser t<l the Wool Committee of a statement in 
writing signed by the 3eller or his authorized agent that the prices proposed to 
he given and accepted are not less than the minimum pricP.s so fixeci shall relieve 
the purchast>r from any liability to penalties under these regulations. 
8. With the approval of the Minister the Wool Committee may from time 
t<l time detertnine the maximum aggregate quantities of wool that may be offered 
for ~ale by private treaty and c. r by pub!ic auction in any period, and may with 
respect to any specified sal~ by private treaty or by public auction fix the 
maximum quantity of wool that may be offered . Any pen.on offering by private 
treaty cr at any auction sale wool in exc~s <lf the maximum quantity so speci-
fi~d shall be guilty of an offence :~gaio.st these regulations, and shall be liable 
accordingly. 
9- It ~hall not be lawful for any person holding a license under the Auctloneers 
Act to offer wool for sale by poh!ic auction, nor for any person to sell wool on 
commission otherwise than by auction . except subject to the follov.;ng conditions. 
viz. : That he shall have obtained a pt'rmit issued by the WO<ll Committee on 
behalf of the Board of Trade , and shall have deposited with th~ Wo0l Committee 
an undertaking (in such form and subject to sur.h guarantee as the Woo! Com-
m ittee may require ) that he will fa ithfully adhere to ~uch ctirections as the Wool 
Committee mav give him in writi n~ from time to time as to the max:;mum 
qu~ntities of wool that he may offer at any specified au cticn sale or for sale by 
private treaty. 
10. It sh? ll not be lawful for any per~on to export wool from :Sew Zealand 
unless and until he shall have deposited with the Collector of Customs at the 
port of shipment (.1) a certifica te signed bv the Chairman of the Wocl Committee 
or by a person holding a permit under clause 9 hereof tb3t such wool has ~n 
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purchased at prices not Jess than the relative minimum prices fixed at the date 
ol such purchase in a c:cor?ance v.ith clause ~ hereof, or (!-:) e\idencc that be bas 
deposited v.itb the \\·0ol Committee an undertaking lin such form and ~uhject 
to 5ucb guarantee as thf' Wool Committee may require ) that he will n(·t ~~II any 
wool exporte<! by him , or offer 1t for sale, or permit it to be sold or offered for 
sale, in any country at prices ics~ :han the relative nunimum pri<'es fixed kr the 
time being in acccrdance with clau5r 4 hereof , v.itb the addition to such pri ces 
of the actual and reasonable amounr of frei~bt, insurance , and other C'-lSts 
incurred in placing wool at the point at which delivery in respec;t to such wool 
is given or is proposed to be given. 
I 1. Nothing in these rf'gula tions shall apply to any sale c{ woo! in :1\ew 
Zealand by private treat~· of a quantity not exceeding 8oo lb. in we1gbt , save 
that two or mort- sales made betwt>en the same partio~s at or substantiall y at the 
same time shall be deemed to be onf' sale for the purr'lse of th1~ clauS<' . 
The Board of Trade , on the recommendation of the :Sew Zeala nd 'Wool 
Committee and w;th the avproval of the Minister of Agriculture, has fixed the 
followmg m inimum average pnces for wool: For all wool grown ID ~cw Zealand 
of 56's quality and unde r, a ID.I.rumum average price of 5d. per pound; for 
over 56 ', quality, a m!Dim'um average price of 9(1 . per pound. 
The M.mister of Agriculture bas appointed the 1\ew Zealand Wool Committee 
as follows : Messrs . 0. J. Hawken , M.P., Hawera, and L. A. Rutherford , Wood -
grove (representative~ of wool-growers j ; W. S. Bennett and A. E . Mabin, Welling-
ton (representatives of woolbrokers ) ; and T . R. Lees , Controller. Department of 
Imperial Government Suppl:cs, Wellington (Government representative ). 
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MEAT-EXPORT CONTROL ACT. 
TEXT OF THE POOL MEASl'RE. 
THE Meat-export Control Act passed in the recently closed session of Parlia· 
mentis here placed on record for Jou'I'A41 readers, the full text being as follows :-
AN ACT TO MAKE PROVISION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A MEAT PNO-
DUCERS BOARD, WITH POWER TO CONTROL THE MEAT-EXPORT TRADE. 
WHEREAS the economic welfare of .Sew Zealand has lately been adversely affected 
by reason of a reduction in th~ net returns receivable by persons engaged in t.le 
business of the production of meat for export. such reduction being due in part to 
falling pnces and in part to the charges payable in respect of freight and other 
services : And whereas conferences have lately been held of representatives of the 
Government and of persons whose business is the production of meat for export, 
and it bas been resolved that the public economic welfare v•ill be promoted by 
the establishment of a Board of Control, with power to act as the agent of the 
producers in respect of the preparation, storage, and shipment of meat, and in 
respect of the disposal of such meat beyond l'ew Zealand : And whereas it ts 
desired to give effect to the resolutions aforesaid, and to provide by law 
accordingly : And whereas it is further deemed necessary and desirable that the 
expenditure of the Board of Control should be subject to audit as if it were 
public expenditure, and that the expenditure of the Board should be guarantel'd 
by the Government of New Zealand : 
Be it therefore enacted by the General Assembly of l'ew Zealand in Parha -
ment assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows :-
I. This Act may be cited as the Meat-export Control Act. 1921-22. 
1\'ew Zealand Meal Producers Borrrd. 
2 . (1. ) There is hereby established a Board to be known as the !\ew 
Zealand Meat Producers Board (hereinaher rderred to as the Board j. (2 . ) The 
Board shall consist of-(a .) Two persons to be appointed by the Governor-
General on the recommendation of the Minister of Agriculture as representatn·es 
of the l'ew Zealand Government. (b .) Five persons to be appointed by the 
Governor-General as representatives of the producers of meat for export, on 
election by such produ cers in such manner as may be prescribed . (J . ) lu 
addition to the members to be appointed pursuant to the last precedmg subsec· 
t.10n the Governor-General may from time to time appoint a member as a repre -
se.ntative of persons for the time being engaged in business as stock and station 
agents . Every such member shall be appointed for a term of two years, but 
may at any time be removed from office by the Governor-General on the recom -
mendation of the Board, or may from time to time be reappomted on the expiry 
of any term of his appointment. (-4 .) The members appointed as representa · 
tives of the Government shall bold office during the pleasure of the (jovernor· 
General. (5- ) With res~ct t o the first members appointed as representative~ of the 
producers of meat , the following provisions shall apply . (a .) Three of su ch members 
shall rettre on th e thirty-first day of August, nineteen hundred and twentv -three, 
and the remaimng two members shall retire on the thtrty-first day of :">ugust . 
nineteen hundred and twcntv -four. (b. ) The members so to retire on the th1rt , .. 
first day of August , nineteen hundred and twenty -ttuet . shall be determmed !),. 
agreement of the members, and . fa1hng agreement . shall be determined b~· lot. 
1c . ) Any member retirin g a~ aforesaid shall be eligible for reappointm<'Dt to th e 
Board . 16 .; Except as prov1d ed 10 the last preceding subsection , every perso n 
appointed as a repre>ent a tlve of the producers shall hold office fo r a penod of 
two years from the date of hts appointment. save that he may be reappomted m 
the manner presc ril>ed by paragr;,.ph lb) of subsection two hereof . or may at am· 
time be removed from o ffi ce bv the Governor-General on the recommendatwn 
of the Bo<'-rd . (i .) On the de.ath . resignation, or removal from office of anv 
member of the Board appomted a.< a representative of the producers as afu]"esaid 
the Governor -General shall . on the recommendation of the Board, appoint some 
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fit person to be a member of the Board for the residue of the term for which such 
first -mentioned person wa.' appointed . (8. ) The powers hereinafter conferred on 
the Board shall not be affec1ed by any vacancy in the membership thereof. 
3· The Board shall be a body corporate, with perpetual succession and a 
common seal. and shall be capable of holding real and personal property, and of 
doing and suffering all that bodies corporate may do and suffer . 
4· (1.) In any case in which the Governor-General is satisfied that any member 
of the Board is incapacitated by illness, absence. or other suffictent cause from 
performing the duties of hts office. the Governor-General, on the recommendation 
of the Mimster of Agriculture. if the member so incapaci tated is a Government 
representative, or on the recommendation of the Board in any other case, may 
appoint some fit person to be named by the ~inister or the Board. as the case may 
req uire. to be a deputy to act for that member during such incapacity ; anrl any 
d eputy shall , while he acts as such, have all the powers and authority of the 
member for whom he is so acti ng . ( 2 . ) :\o such appointment of a dt'puty and 
no acts done by him as such shal l in any procet'dmgs be questioned on the ground 
that tht' occasion for his appointment had not arisen or had ceast'd . 
5· [1. ) The first mePting of the Board shall be held on a day to be appointed 
in that behalf by the M.mister of Agriculture . (2. ) At the first meeting the Board 
shall appoint one of its members to be the Chatrman of the Board . (3.) On the 
second Wednesday in September, nineteen hundred and twenty -three , and on the 
same day in each succet'ding year , the Board shall hold a meeting for the purpose 
of appointing a Chairman for the ensuing twelve months . (4.) Any person 
appointed as the Chairman of the Board shall hold office until the appointment 
of his successor in accordance wtth this section , and shall be eligible for reappoint -
ment. 
6 . (1. ) Except as provided in the last preceding section, meetings of the 
Board shall be held at su rh times and places as the Board shall from time to time 
appoint (2 .) The Chairman of the Board . or any four members thereof , may at 
any time call a special meeting of the Board . (3.) At all meetings of the Board 
four members, of whom at least one shall be a representative of the Government , 
shall form a quorum . (4.) The Chairman shall preside at all meetings of the 
Board at which he is present. (5.) In the event of the absence of the Chairman 
from any meeting of the Board the members present at such meeting shall appoint 
one of their number to be the Chairman of the meeting . (6 .1 At any meeting of 
the Board the Chairman shall have a deliberative vote , and in the case of an 
equality of votes shall also have a casting-vote, and a decision of the majority of the 
members present shall be the decision of the Board . 
i · (1.) The Board may appoint such officers as it deems necessary for the 
efficient carrying-out of its functions under this Act . (2 . ) Any person in the 
service of the Crown may be appointed as an officer of the Board : Provided 
that no such person shall atcept such appointment and be entitlt'd to retain his 
position as a servant of the Crown except-(a ) In the case of a person subject 
to the Public Service Act , 1912 , w-ith the consent of the Public Service C<>mmis-
sioner ; and (b) in any other case with the consent of the Minister to whose 
control he is subject . 
Lcmd011 AgNtcy of Board . 
8. (!.) There is hereby also constituted an agency of the Board in London 
(hereinafter called the London Agency ) which shall consist of such number of 
persons as the Board may decide from time to time . of whom one shall be appointed 
by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the :".-finister of Agriculture. 
and shall hold office during his pleasure . (2 .) ThP other members of the London 
Agenc~· shall be appointed by the Board. and shall hold office during the pleasure 
of the Board (3.) It shall be the duty of the London Agency to keep the Board 
advised as to current prices of meat and as to other matters relati,·e to the dl'-
posal of New Zealand meat in England or elsewhere , and generally to act as the 
agent of the Board in accordance with the directions of the Board . 
:'of eat not to be trpcrrted save in tuccrrdanu with Dttrrminotian of Board. 
9 . ( 1. ) For the purpose of enabling the &ard efff'ctive ly t o control the export, 
sale . and di stribution of :\ew Zealand meat the lzOvcrn or-General may , a"cting 
und er the powers conferred on him by the Customs Act , 1913. and its amendments, 
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prohibit the export from New Zealand of any meat save in accordance v.ith the 
determination in that behalf of the Board . (2.) It may be a condition of a license 
issued under section twenty-five of the Slaughtering and Inspection Act , 1908, or 
of a meat-export license issued under the Slaughtering and Inspection Amendment 
Act, 1918, that the export of meat under the authority of that license shall be 
subject to such condi~ions and restrictions as may be imposed b·y the Board or 
otherwise pursuant to this Act. 
Boa~d may assume Ccmtrol of MeaJ i11leftded for Esporl. 
10. (1.) The Board is hereby empowered to determine from time to time the 
extent to which it is necessary , for the effective operation of this Act and the 
fulfilment of its purposes, that the Board should exercise control over the export 
of meat from New Zealand, and may assume control of any such meat accord-
ingly . (2.) In any such case the control of the Board shall operate as from a 
time to be specified in that behalf by the Board by notice given in conformity with 
this Act. (3.) Notice by the Board of its intention to assume control of any meat 
may be given either by service on the owner of any meat or on any person ha~ing 
possession thereof, or by publication in any newspaper or newspapers in accord-
ance with such conditions as may be prescribed . Every such notice shall, subject 
to the provisions of this Act, have effect according to its tenor. (-4 .) The control 
to be exercised by the Board over any meat may, as the Board in any case deter-
mines, be absolute or limited . (5 .) All meat of which the Board has assumed 
absolute control shall be graded and shipped as the Board directs, and shall be 
sold and disposed of only by the Board, or by direction of the Board , at such times 
and in such manner and on such terms as the Board in its discretion determines . 
(6.) V.'bere the Board has assumed limited control the extent of its control shall 
be defined by notice as aforesaid, or by agreement between the Board and the 
owners of the meat or other persons having authority to enter into an agreement 
with the Board with respect to such meat . (7 .) Notwithstanding anything to the 
contrary in the foregoing provisions of this section the Board shall not exercise 
its powers under this section with respect to the sale of any meat if the Board is 
satisfied-fa) That there is subsisting a contract for the purchase and sale of that 
meat made before the commencement of this Act, or (b) that there is subsisting a 
contract for the purchase and salt> of that meat made after the commencement 
of this Act but before the Board has givt>n notice of its intention to assume control 
of that meat ; and that the meat to which any such contract as aforesaid relates 
is to be exported from New Zealand not later than the thirty -first day of October, 
nineteen hundred and twenty-two. 
Boa~d may makt A~~angem..nts as to Slaughteri11g of Stock . 
1 1 . In addition to the powers conferred on the Board by the last preceding 
section the Board may, as the agent of the owners of any stock from which the 
meat or any portion of the meat is intended for export, make such arrange-
ments as may be necessary for the purpose of ensuring the eflective operation of 
this Act or in the interests of producers with respect to the slaughtering of that 
stock . 
A s to Co,.tracls f~ Shipment of Meat . 
12 . (1. ) After the constitution of the Board, or after such later date as tbe 
Board may by public notice appomt, no contract for the carriage by st-a of any 
meat to be exported from :1\ t>w Zealand shall be made save by the Board , acting 
as the agent of the owners of that meat or of other persons ha,;ng authority to 
export that meat , or in conformity v.;th conditions to be approved by the Board. 
(2 . ) E~·t'T)' contract for the camage of mt>at by sea made otherw1Se than in con-
formity with this section shall be void . (3.) Every person other than the Board 
who. after the passmg of thts Act , or after such later date as aforesaid , exports 
any meat from ~ew Zealand shall , on making entry therefor und er the Customs 
Acts, and before such entrY h a~ bt>en passed , produce to tht> U>Uector or otht>r 
officer of Customs suffi cient e'·1d ence to satisfv the Collector or otht>r officer as 
aforesaid that the contract for the shipmt>nt o{ that meat has been approved b~· 
the Board . ' 4·1 Thr foregomg prov1sions of tht> section shall apply , with the 
necessarv modificat iOns. t o contract > made before the commencement of th1s Act . 
save that the appro,·al of th t Board shall not be require.d for any such contract 
if the meat to wh1ch it relat e> I!' expurted from ~ew Zealand not later than the 
th1rty-first day of October , mneteen hundred and twenty-two. 
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Let•y 001 .\1 eat exported. 
13. (I.) There shall be paid by way of levy on all meat exported from ~ew 
Zealand after a date to be fixed in that behalf by the Governor-General in Council, 
whether such meat is subject to the control of the Board or not . such charges as may 
from time to time be fixed by the Board, not exceeding the maximum charges 
that may be prescribed in that behalf by regulations under this :\ct. (2 .) All 
moneys payable under this section in respect of any meat shall be paid to the 
Collector of Customs on or bf>fore the entry of that meat for export , and shall be 
paid into the Consolidated Fund . (3.1 The net amounts paid into the Consolidated 
Fund as aforesaid, after deducting such proportion as may be prescribed in respect 
of the sen;ces of the Collectors and other officers of Customs, shall from time to 
time be paid to the Board without further appropriation than this section, and 
shall form part of the funds of the Board. 
Parlictdar Poa:ers of Board. 
1~ . ( I. ) Withou t limiting any authority specifically conferred on the Board 
with respect to any meat . the Board shall have full authority to make such arrange-
ments and gwe such directions as it thinks proper for the following matters : 
ta l For the grading , handling, pooling . and storage of meat ; (b) for the shipment 
of such meat on such terms and in such quantities as it thinks fit ; (c) for the sale 
and disposal of meat on such terms as it thinks advisable ; (d) for the insurance 
against loss of any such meat either in New Zealand or in transit from l'ew Zealand, 
and until disposed of ; and (e) generally for all such matters as are necessary for 
the due discharge of its functions in handling, d istributing, and disposing of New 
Zealand meat. (2.) For the purpose of securing any advances that may be made 
to the Board or to the owners of any meat at the request of the Board, the Boar<~ 
shall , by virtue of this Act and without further authority, have full power on 
behalf of the owners to give security over such meat and to execute all mortgages 
and other instruments of assurance in the same manner in all respects as if the 
Board were the legal owners of such meat. 
Applicaticft by Board of Mcmey s received by it, 
15. All moneys received by the Board in respect of the sale of meat or other-
wise howsoever shall be paid by the Board into a separate account at a bank to be 
approved by the Minister of Finance, and shall be applied by the Board as follows : 
(a ) In payment of the expenses, commission, and other charges incurred by the 
Board or for which the Board may become liable in the course of its business ; 
(b ) in payment of the salaries and wages of officers and servants of the Board ; . 
(c) in payment of travelling-allowances, fees, or other remuneration to members 
of the Board or of the London Agency (not being persons permanently employed 
in the service of the Government) ; (d) in payment of advances made by the Board 
to the owners of any meat on account of the price of that meat ; (e) in payment of 
interest and other charges, and in repayment of principal, in respect of moneys 
advanced to the Board by the Minister of Finance; (f) in payment into a Reserve 
Fund, from time to time as the Board in its. discretion determines, of such amounts 
as the Board may consider necessary to enable it to carry on its operations under 
this Act ; (C) in payment of the balance to the owners of meat controlled by the 
Board in proportions to be fixed by the Board by reference to the quantity and 
grade of the meat handled by the Board in respect of the several producers or 
other owners of meat. 
16. The accounts of the Board shall be subject to audit in the same manner 
i n all respects as if the moneys of the Board were public moneys within the meaning 
of the Public Revenues Act, 1910. 
Mi11ister of Fina11u may g1iara7tlee Advances ma<U lc or at ReqtUsl of Board. 
17. (1. ) Where any bank or other person carrying on business in l'ew Zea· 
land has. with the approval of and subject to conditions impo~ed by the Minister 
of Fmance, advanced moneys to the Board on t he security of any meat controlled 
by the Board for the purpose of enahling the Board to make advances to the ownerS 
of that meat, or ha.~ advanced moneys t o su ch owners at the request of the Board, 
the Minister of Finance is hereby authorized to guarantee to the bank or other 
person as aforesaid the repayment of such advances anrl of the int erest and other 
charges in respect thereof. ( l. J In the event of default being made by the Roa.rd 
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or by any other person in the repayment of any such advances, or of the interest 
or other charges thereon, or of any portion thereof, the Minister of Finance may , 
without further appropriation than this secti0n, pay out of the Consolidated Fund 
such amount as may be payable by him pursuant to the terms of the contract of 
guarantee. (J.) In lieu of or in addition to exercising the authority to guarant~ 
advances as aforesaid , the Minister of Finance may from time to time borrow on 
the security of Treasury bills , or other..ise on the security of the public revenues 
of New Zealand, any moneys that may be required by the Roard to enable it to 
carry on its operations under this Act, and may pay the same into the Board 's 
account . (4 .) All moneys so advanced to the Board shall be charged .on the 
revenues and other property of the Board. and shall bear interest at such rate as 
may from time to time be fixed by the Minister of Finance. (5.) The limit imposed 
on the iss De of Treasury bills by section thirty-nine of the Public Revenues Act . 
1910, shall not apply to the issue of Treasury bills under this section ; but, save 
as aforesaid , the pro,;sions of that section. including the provisions relating to 
renewal, shall extend and apply to all such Treasury bills . 
Liability of Boa•d fo• its Acts Of' Omissio,.s . 
t8 . (1.) The Board in its corporate capacity shall in all its operations under 
this Act be deemed to be the agent of the owners of all meat of which the Board 
has assumed control, and the mutual rights, obligations, and liabilities of the Board 
and the several owners shall accordingly be determined in accordance v.ith the law 
governing the relations between principals and agents, save that nothing herein 
shall be construed to limit the power of the Board to exerci.~e. without the authority 
of the owner of any meat. any power with respect to such meat that may expressly 
or by implication be conferred on the Board by or by virtue of this Act . (2.) The 
members of the Board shall not be personally liable for any act or default of the 
Board done or omitted to be done in good faith in the course of the operations of 
the Board . 
RegulaJiOJts. 
19. For the purpose of enabling the Board to carry out its functions under 
this Act tht Governor-General may make regulations prescribing the maximum 
charges to be paid by way of levy in respect of meat exported from New Zealand, 
and all such other regulations as he thinks necessary for the purpose of enabling 
this Act to be carried into effect . 
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DAIRY. PRODUCE EXPORT CONTROL ACT, 1923. 
THE full text of this mea..;ure , as passed in the recent session of Parliament, is 
as follows:-
1. This :\ct may be cited as the Dairy-produce Export Control Act, 1923. 
Act to ~ brought tnlo Opnation bj· Pr.•clamalion. 
2. 1 1 .) Thi~ :\ct shall come into operation on a date to be specified in that 
behalf by the GoHrnor-General. by Proclamation approved in Executive Council . 
(" .) .\ PTocla ·nation shall not issue under this section unless and until a 
majority 10 number of the producers , within the meaning of this Act. have, at 
a poll to be taken for the purpose as herein providE-d , voted in favour of a 
proposal that th1s .\ct should be brought into operation . 
13.) At the poll to be taken as aforesaid proposals shall be submitted in the 
following form :-
1. I vote that the .\ct be brought into operation . 
~ . I vote that the Act be ~OT brought into operation. 
(4.) Every voter at the poll on the proposals submitted under this section 
shall be entitled to one vote only, and shall record his vote by striking out the 
proposal for whlch hE' does not wish to vote . 
() .J A proposal under this section shall be deemed to be carried if a majority 
of the valid votes recorded at the poll is in favour thereof. but not otherwise. 
(6 .) For the purposes of a poll under this section an officer of the Public 
Sprvice shall be appointed as Returning Officer, and the Returning Officer shall 
mal\e all necessary arrangements for the conduct of the poll. 
( ;. ) The poll to be taken under this section shall be taken on a day or 
days to be appointed in that behalf by the Minister of Agriculture, being not 
later than the first day of ~ovember, nineteen hundred and twenty-three, and 
may be taken by post . 
(8 .) On the completion of thE' poll the Returning Officer shall make a 
declaration as to the rt'Sult . and shall forward the same to the !'ttinister of 
.\griculture , who shall cause notice of the same to be published in the Gaze!le . 
(g .) The notice published in the Gaze/It shall be conclusive evidence of the 
result of the poll. 
I nterpretal ion . 
S. In this .\ct. unless the context otherwise requires, "dairy-prod uce " 
means butter and cheese : " producers " means persons carrying on business as 
suppliers of milk or cream to factories manufacturing dairy-produce for export . 
Stw Zealand Dairy-produu Control Board. 
4. ( !. ) There is hereby E'Stablished a Board to be known as the .Sew Zealand 
Dairy-produce Control Board (heremafter referred to as the Board). 
( 2. J The Board shall consist of-(a .) Two persons (herein referred to as 
Government representativE'S , to be appointed by the Governor-General , on the 
recommendation of the ~1mister of Agriculture. as reprt'Scntatives of the .Sew 
ZE-aland Governme nt ; the Governor-General shall not appoint any person 
rejected by a vote of the producers as hereinafter provided . lb.) .Sine persons 
(herein referred to as producers' representatives) to be appointed by the Governor-
General as representativE'S of producers on election in manner hereinafter providE-d . 
(3 .1 In addition to th~ members to be appointed pursuant to the last 
precedmg subsection, the Governor-General may appoint one member as repre-
sentative of persons for the time being engaged in business as manufacturers of 
dairy-produce, or as sellers of such produce out of :!'\ew Zealand , whether as 
agents or on their own account . Such member shaH be appomted for a term 
of three . vears . but rna\' at anv time be removed from office bv the Governor-
Ge neral , on the recommendatl<JO of the Board, or may from time to time tx, 
reappomtt>d on the exp•T)· oi any term of appointment. 
(4 .. 1 Of the producer;' representatives si:x shall be elected in the preScribed 
manner by dlTect vote o! the producers cafr!,ng on business in the ;\orth. 
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Island, and three shall be similarly elected by producers carrying on business 
in the South Island . 
(5.) Every person appointed as a Government representative under this 
section shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor-General . 
(6.) With respect to the first members appointed as producers' representa-
tives the follov.ing provisions shall apply : (a.) Three of such member.; shall retire 
on the thirtieth day of June in each of the years nineteen hundred and twenty-
five, nineteen hundrt>d and twenty-six , and nineteen hundred and twenty-seven . 
(b .) The members so to retire in any year shall be determined by lot, save that 
in each of the said yean. two representatives from the ~orth Island and one 
representative from the South Island shall retrre . (C . I Any member retiring as 
aforesaid shall be eligible for reappointment to the Board . 
(;.) Except as provided in the last preceding subsection, every person 
appointed as a producers " repn:sentative shall hold office for a period of three 
vears from the date of his appointment , save that he may be reappointed in 
the manner prescribed by paragraph (b J of subsection two hereof, or may at any 
time be removed from office bv the Governor-General , on the recommendation 
of the Board . · 
(8. j On the death , resignation, or removal from office of any member of 
.the Board appointed as a producer.;' representative the Governor-General shall , 
on the recommendation of the Board, appoint some fit person to be a member 
af the Board for the residue of the term for which such first-mentioned person 
was appointed. 
(9. ) The powers hereinafter conferred on the Board shall not be affected by 
any vacancy in the membership thereof . 
6. The Board shall be a body corporate. with perpetual succession and a 
common seal , and shall be capable of holding real and personal property, and 
of doing and suffering all that bodies corporate may do and suffer. 
6. (1. ) Any contract which, if made between private persons, must be by 
deed shall, if made by the Board , be in writing under the seal of the Board . 
(2.) Any contract wluch, if made between private persons, must be in 
·writing signed by the parties to be charged therewith shall , if made by the 
Board , be either under the seal of the Board or signed by two member~ of the 
Board on behalf of and by direction of the Board . 
(3.) Any contract which , if made between private persons, may be made 
verbally without writing may be similarly made by or on behalf of the Board by 
any two member.; acting by direction of the Board, but no verbal contract shall 
be made for any sum exceeding twenty pounds . 
7. (!. ) In any case in which the Governor-General is satisfied that any 
member of the Board is incapacitated by illness, absence, or other sufficient 
<:ause trom performing the dutie> of his office, the Governor-General , on the 
recommendation of the :O.finister of Agriculture ii the member so incapacitated 
i~ a Government representative, or on the recommendation of the Board in any 
other case, may appoint some fit per>on to be named bv the Minister or the 
Board , as the case may require , to be a deputy to act for that member during 
such incapacity ; and any deputy shall . while he acts as such , han all the powers 
and authonty of the member for whom he is so acting . 
(2 . \ l'o such appointment of a deputy and no acts done by him as such shal l 
in an~· proceedings be questiOned on the ground that the occasion for his appoint · 
ment had not arisen or had ceased . 
8. (!. ) The first meeting of the Board shall be held on a day to be appointed 
in that behalf by the !>!.mister of Agriculture. 
(2 .) .~t the first meeting the Board shall appoint one of its members to bt 
the Chairman of the Board. 
(3.) On the second Wednesday in July, nineteen hundred and twenty-four, 
and on the sa.ne day in each succeedmg year , the Board shall hold a meeting for 
the purpose of appointing a Chauman for the ensuing twelve months . 
(4. ) Any person appomted as the Chairman of the Board shall bold office 
until the appointment of hts successor in accordance with this section, and shall 
be ehgible for reappointmetH . 
9. ( 1. \ Except as pronded io the last preceding section . meetings of the Board 
shall be held at such times and place!> as the Board shall from ~ime to · ti.::ne 
appoint. 
144 
SEPT . 20, 1913. ~ . Z . JOl"R~AL OF AGRICt"LTl"RE. 
(1. ) The Chairman of the Board , or any four members thereof, may at any 
time call a special meeting of the Board. 
(J. ) At all meetings of the Board five members (of whom at least one shall 
be a Government representative) shall form a quorum . 
(4 .) Tb~ Chairman shall preside at all meetings of the Board at v;bich he i5 
present. 
(_; .) In the event of the absence of the Chairman from any meeting of the 
Board the members prt'sent at such meeting shall appoint one of their number 
to be the chairman of the meeting. 
(6 .) At any meeting of the Board the Chairman shall have a deliberative vote, 
and in the case of an equality of votes shall also have a castmg-vote, and a decision 
of the majonty of the members present shall be the decision of the Board. 
tO. The Board may appoint such officers as lt deem~ necessary for the 
efficient carrymg-out of its functions under this Act . 
Landon Agn~cy o; B oard . 
11. (1. ) There is hereby also constituted an agency of the Board in London 
(hereinafter called the London Agency). which shall consist of such number of 
persons as the Board may decide from time to time, one of whom shall be 
appointed by the Governor-General, on the recommendation of the Minister of 
Agriculture . and shall hold office during his pleasure . 
(2. ) The other members of the London Agency shall be appointed hy the 
Board, and shall bold office during the pleasure of the Board. 
(3-' It shall be the duty of the London Agency to lu•ep the Board advised 
as to current pnces of dairy-produce, and as to other matters relative to the 
dtsposal of ~ew Zealand dairy-produce in England or elsewhere , and generally 
t o act as the agent of the Board in accordance with t he directions of the Board. 
Dairy-produce n ot to h~ exported strUe in occordanu u:ith DelerrninaJian of 
Board. 
12. For the purpose of enabling the Board eflect1vely to control the export. 
sale . and distribution of ~ew Zealand dairy- produc~ the Governor-General may, 
acting under the powers conferred on him by the Customs Act , 1913, and its 
amendments. prohibit the export from ~ew Zealand of any dairy-produce save in 
accordance .,.,-ith a license to be issued by the :>imister of Agriculture. subject to 
such conditions and restrictton5 as may be approved by the Board . 
Board rna1 · as sur.u Control of Dairy -producr trrtn.ded for Export . 
13. I !. ) The Board is hereby empowered to determme from time to time the 
extent to wluch it is nect'ssary. for the eflective ope~ation of this Act and the 
fulfilment of its purposes, that the Board should exercise control over the export 
of dairy-produce from ~ew Zealand , and may assume control of any such dairy -
produce accordingly . 
(1 .1 !n any such case the control of the Board shall operatt' as from a time 
to be specified in that behalf by the Board by nouce given in conformity .,.,ith 
this Act . 
13.! ~otice by the Board of its intention to a ssum e control of any dairy· 
produce may be given eltht'r by service on the owner of any dairv-produce or on 
any person havmg possession thereof. or by pubhcation in any newspaper or 
newspapers . in accordance .,.,ith such conditions as may be prescribed . E very 
such notice shall , subject to the provisions of thi~ .-\ct . have eflect according to 
its tenor . 
l 4.l The rontrol t o be exercised by the Board over any dairy-produce may , 
as the Board m any case determines. be absolute or hrnited . 
(j . l Ali dairy-produ ct- of which the Board has a>sumed absolute control shall 
be sh1pped as the Board directs . and shall be sold and disposed of only by tht-
Board , or bv directiOn of the Board, at such times and in such manner and on such 
terms a > tti C> Board in lt> discretion determines . 
!6. / \\''here the Buard has assumed hmited control the extent of its contro l 
sha ll be defined bv nou ce "-S aforesaid . or by agre~m ent between the Board and 
the owner; of the da1rv-produce or other persons having authority to enter into 
a n agreem t· nt w1th the Board with respect to ;uch datry-produce. 
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(;.) :\"otwithstanding an:y""thing to the contrary in the foregoing provision; 
of this section, the Board shall not exercise its power;: under this section with 
Tf'spect to the sale of any dairy-produce if the Board is satisfied-la) That there 
is subsisting a contract for the purchase and sale of that dairy-produce made 
before the commencement of this Act, or !b) that thert is subsisting a contract 
for the purchase and sale of that dairy-produce made after the commence:nent 
of this .'-ct but before the Board has given notice of Its intention to assume 
control of that dairy · produ ce. and that the dairy· produ ce to which any such 
contract as aforesaid relates is to be exporte-d from :\"ew Zealand not later than the 
thiny-first day of August . nineteen hundre-d and twenr,·-four . 
(8 .) :!\otw;thst.anding an~""thing to the contrarv in the foregoing pro,·islOn s 
of this section , the Board shall not exerci'e its power, under this sect10n w·ith 
respect to the sale of any dairy-produce so as preJudiciallY to aflect the operation 
of any contract of agencv in respect of the sal~ of dairY-produce out of ::\ ew 
Zealand if such contract has been entered into in writing on or before the fir .; t 
day of July , nineteen hundre-d and twenty-three . 
C 011lracts for Shipmntl oi [)a in -prod 11 cr . 
14. (1. ) After the constitution of the Board . or after such later date as the 
Board may by public notice appomt . no contract for the carriage by sea of anY 
dairy-produce to be exported from ~ew Zealand shall bt- made save by the Board 
acting as the agent of the owners of that dairy-produce or of other person; ha,·mg 
authority to export the same, or m conformity with conditiOn!> to be approvt-d by 
the Board : Provided that if the Board established under the ~eat-export Control 
Act. 1911-12. by resolution notified to the Board under this Act , determin~ not 
to enter into any contract for the sea carriage of meat save m accordance 
..,.;th an arrangement between that Board and the Board under this Act . the 
Board under this Act shall not , while such resolution rema.in s in force , have 
authority to enter into any contract for the sea carriage of dairy-produce saYe 
in accordance witt an arrangement to be made with the :ll cat -producers Board . 
(1.) Every contract for the carriage of dairv-produce bv sea made otherwise 
than in conformity w;th this section shall be void . 
{3.) Every person other than the Board who, after the constitution of the 
Board . or after such later date as aforesaid . exports anY dairy-produce from :\"ew 
Zealand shall . on making entry therefor under the Custom s :\ ct; and before suc h 
entry has been passed . produce to the Collector or other offiCer of Customs suffiCient 
evidence to satisfy him that the contract for the shipment of that dairy-produce 
has been approved by the Board . 
(4 .l The foregoing provisions of this sect ion ~hall apph· . with the necessa rY 
modifi cations . to contracts made before the constitution of the Board (whe ther 
before or after the commencement of this :\ct}. save that the approval of the 
Board shall not be requin'<l for any such contract if the dairy-produce to which it 
relates is exported from ~ew Zealand not later than the thirty-first day of .\ugust , 
nmeteen hundre-d and twenty · four . 
Lrt".\ 011 Dair_1-produ cc uportrd f r om .\"c 1 ZuriO>Id . 
15. ( I. ) There shall be paid by way of le\)" on all dain ·- produce exported 
from ~ew Zealand after a date to be fixed in that behalf bY the Governor-General 
in Council. whether such dairv-pr,>duce Is subject to the control of the Board or 
nut , such charges a> may from ume to time be fixed lJ, · the Bo<.rd , not exce<-ding 
the maximum charg e> that m a y be prescri)x,d in th at b<'half hy ref!ula tiom under 
thL• :\ct lbemg not more m am· case than on<··eighth of a p<-nny In rc,p..-n of eat h 
poun<l of butter and one·SIX tt"enth of a penn~ 10 r~'>pen of r·ach poum! of ch<',·se 
exported a.< aforesaid ). 
(1 .) .-\11 money; payable under this section in rt"spec: of anv dairy-pmdu ce 
shal l be paid to the Collt'ctor of Cu-; tom> on or heh>n th<· entry of tha t <lain·· 
produce for export . and shall be paid into the C<msohdated Fund 
(3 .) The net amounts paid mto the Con;;ohr\at .. d Fund a; afore.aid . after 
deoducung such propornoo a; mav he !Jr~s.:rit>""(l m rt"spert nf tb t> sen·Ice- of th e 
Col!.-ctors and other offi .:ers of C u stom~ . shall from tlmt· t<• time lx- p:ud ro th t-
Board without furthe r appropnation than thi ; SPCt lon , and shall form part "of tht: 
fund s of the Board . 
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Paf'licular Pou•ers oj Board . 
16. ( I . 1 Without limiting any authority specificallY conferred on tht> Board 
with rt>spect to any dairy-product>. tht> Board sh::tll have full authority to make 
such arrangements and gl\·e such directions a• 1t thmks proper for the following 
mattt>rs · ta ) For tht> handlin~ . pooling . and storage of dairy-product> ; (b) for 
tht> shipmt>nt of such dairy-product> on such terms and in such quantities ru; it 
thmks fit : tc : for tht> salt> and Jisposal of dairy -produce on such t!'rms as it 
thinks ad,·isable : tdl for the insuranct> agaimt lo's of any such dairy-produ ct> 
e1tht>r in ~t>W Zealand or in transit from :Sew Zealand anrl until disposed of, and 
(tl generally for all such matters as Jif necessary for the rlut> discharge of its 
functions in handhng. distributing , and disposing of :Sew Zealand dau-y-produce . 
(z. ) For the purpose of ;ecuring any ad,·ances that may be made to the 
Board or to the owners of any dairy-produce at the request of the Board tht> 
Board shall . b\· , -inue of th1s .\ct and wnhout funher authority, have full power 
on behalf of the owners to gi,·e st>curity over such dairy-produce and to execute 
all mortgages and other instruments of as>urance 10 tht> same manner in all 
respects as ii the Board were the legal ownt>rs of such dairy-produce . 
. 4pplicaltOn by Board oi .\!oruys recti;·fd by il. 
17 . . -\11 mont>\"S rece1ved hv the Board bv wa\· of levY under section fifteen 
herrof or in rt>spect of tht> sale of dairy -prCxluct>. or otherwise howsoever shall 
be paid by tht Board into a St>parate account at a bank to be approved by 
the :'.linister of Finance . .-. ~. J shall be applied by the Board as follows : (a ) In 
payment of tb t> expenses. commission, and other charges incurred by the Board 
or for which the Board .nav become liable in tht> course of its business ; 
(b• in payment of th<' salanes and wages of officers and servants of the 
Board ; (c l in payment of travelling-allowances, fees. or otht>r remuneration to 
m t>mbers of tht> Board or of the London .\gency (not being persons permanently 
employed in tht> service of tht> Govemmt>nt ) ; (d) in payment of advances made 
by the Board to the owners of any dairy-produce on account of the prict> of that 
rlairy-produce ; (el in payment into a rt'sen·e fund , from time to timt> as the 
Board in its d iscretion determines, of such amounts, not exceeding in any year 
the max1mum amount levied for that vear under section fiftl"en hereof, as tht> Board 
may consider necessary to enable it· to carry on its operatwns under this Act ; 
t/ ) in payment of the balance to the owners of dairv-produce controlled by the 
Board JD proponwns to be fixed by tht> Board by reference to the quantity and 
gyade of the dauy: -produce handled by the Board in respect of the several 
producers or other owners of dairy-produce. 
Audit of A ccozmts . 
18. The accounts of the Board shall be subjt>ct t o audit in the same manner 
in all respect s as if the money~ of the Board were public moneys .,.;thin the 
meaning of the Public .Revenues .-\ct. 1910. 
Lwb•i•ll· O! B oard ior its t1 cis or Omissions . 
19. ( I. ) The:' Board in its corporate capacity shall in all its operations under 
thi s .-\ct be deemed to be the agent of tht> own~rs of all dairy-produce of which 
the Board ha> assumed control ; and the mutual rights. obligations, and liabilities 
of the Board and the several owners shall accordingly be dt>termined in accordance 
with the law go,·erning the relations between principals and agents, save that nothing 
hert>in shall be construed to limit the f>ower of the Board to exerci;;e, without the 
authority of the owner of any dairy-produce, anv power .,.; th respect to such 
da1ry-produce that may expressly or bv implica tion be conferred on the Board 
by or by v1rt ue of th1s :\ct . 
(: .; The members of the Board shall not be personally liable for any act or 
dt-fault of the Board done or omitted to be done m good fa1th in the course of the 
operations of tht> Board. 
Regulations. 
20. For the purpose of t'nabling the Roard to carry out its functions undt>r 
t h1s .-\ct th t> Govt>rnor-General may mak t> regu lations prescribmg the maximum 
chargc;>s to bt- pa 1d by way of lt>,·y m re;pect of da 1rv-pruduc" exported fro~ :\ew 
Zealand . and all sulh uther regu la tions a> h~ thmk> n<'cessary for the purpose of 
enabling this :\ ct to be cam f'd mto effec~ . 
147 
Bibliography 
Primary Sources 
Annual Report: New Zealand Dairy Produce Control Board (Annual, 
Wellington, 1925 No: 1). 
Annual Report and Statement of Accounts: New Zealand Meat Producers Board 
(Annual, Wellington, 1922/23 No:1). 
Department of Agriculture Papers (New Zealand National Archives, Agr 40, 
Series 1) 
Ag 1422 
Ag 1428 
Ag 1429 
Ag 1571 
Ag 2332 
Ag 2328 
Ag 2333 
Ag 2398 
Ag 2408 
Ag 2836 
Ag 3097 
Dairy Board Act 1922-26 
Marketing N.Z. Dairy Produce in the U.K 1922-28 
Overseas Shipping Charges on Dairy Produce 1921-3 3 
N .Z Producers Board Conferences 1930!16D 
Meat Export Control Act 1922-51 
Meat and Other Trusts affecting Marketing of 
New Zealand Produce 1917-57 
Export of Meat in General (Part 4) 1922-36 
N.Z. Dairy Board Annual Reports 1926-57 
N.Z Meat Producers Board and N.Z. Dairy Board 
Merger Proposal 1927-31 
Dairy Industry Statistics 1922-25 
Wool Industry Promotion Act 1921-27 
Farmers Union Advocate (N.Z Farmers Union to July 1922, Monthly, 
Wellington, 1905 No: 1). 
Farmers Weekly (New Zealand Farmers Union , Wellington, 1924, No: 1). 
Meat and Wool: New Zealand Stock and Stud Review (Monthly, Wellington, 
1921, No : 1) 
New Zealand Appendix to the Journal of the House of Representatives 
(Government Printer, Series). 
H-29 (1916- Department of Agriculture, Report of the Minister. 
H-29A (1917- Board of Agriculture. 
H-38 (1917-1922) Department of Imperial Government Supplies. 
H-38A (1918/22) Butter: Telegrams Exchanged with London in 
Connection with the Disposal of the Butter Output during the 1917/18, 
1921/22 Seasons. 
148 
H-38A (1919) Correspondence between the Prime Minister of New 
Zealand and British Ministers Respecting Shortage of Shipping. 
H-38B (1922) Imperial Purchase of New Zealand Wool Clips 1916-17, 
1917-18, 1918-19, 1919-20. 
I -1 OA (1920) Report of Inquiry by the Agricultural and Pastoral 
Indutries Stock and Commerce Committee into (1) Proposed Statement 
by N.Z. Overseas Shipowners' Committee in Reference to the Increase 
in Ship Charges; (2) Memorandum from the Prime Minister that an 
Inquiry be made. 
I 10/lOA (1923) Report and Evidence of the Select Committee on the 
Dairy Produce Control Bill, 1923. 
New Zealand Dairyman, (Monthly, Wellington, 1896 No: 1). 
New Zealand External Trade, 1969-70, Report and Analysis , (Department of 
Statistics, 1972). 
New Zealand Farmer , (Monthly, Auckland, 1882 No: 1). 
New Zealand Farmers Advocate, (N.Z. Farmers Union, August 1922-1924, 
Monthly, Wellington) 
New Zealand Journal of Agriculture , (Government Printer, Series). 
New Zealand Official Yearbook , (Annual). 
New Zealand Parliamentary Debates , (Government Printer, Series). 
New Zealand Prices, Wages and Labour, 1977 (Department of Statistics, 1977). 
Prime Minister's Papers (New Zealand National Archives, Series 1) 
PM 14/l 03 "Fighting the Meat Trust: An Empire Problem, Practical 
Measures in Defence of British Interests" 1917 
Treasury Papers (New Zealand National Archives, Series 1) 
T 27/2/6, Re: Meat 1920 
T 27/5, Dept of Imperial Government Supplies 1915-1917 
T 27/6, Re: Butter 1916-1921 
T 27/6/l, Butter Equalisation Fund 1919-1929 
T 27/14, Dept of Imperial Government Supplies 1917-1919 
T 27/15, Re: Butter and Cheese 1917-1919 
Treasury Papers (Released under the Official Information Act) 
1416 The Future of Statutory Producer Boards 14/ 9/87 
1416 The Role of Statutory Producer Boards (Background paper) 
149 
2719 Review of Producer Boards: Progress Report 17/ 3/88 
4108 Review of Statutory Producer Boards 16/ 6/88 
6188 Review of Statutory Producer Boards 21/11/88 
6678 Treasury I MAF Review of Stat Producer Bds 22/12/88 
Secondary Sources 
Bauer, P.T., The Economics of Underdeveloped Countries (Cambridge 
University Press, 1957) 
Bauer, P.T. and Yamey, B.S., Markets, Market Control and Marketing Reform 
(Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1968) 
Belshaw, H., et a!, Agricultural Organisation in New Zealand: A Survey of 
Land Utilisation , Farm Organisation, Finance and Marketing 
(Melbourne University Press, 1936). 
Benathan, E. and Walters, A.A., The Economics of Ocean Freight Rates 
(Praeger, 1969) . 
Bloomfield, G.T. , New Zealand: A Handbook of Historical Statistics (G.K.Hall 
and Co, 1984). 
Brooking, T., "Economic Tranformation" in Oliver, W.H. (ed), The Oxford 
History of New Zealand (Oxford University Press, 1981) 
Bushnell, P. and Scott, G., "An Economic Perspective" in; Martin, J. and 
Harper, J.,(ed), Devolution and Accountability (Government Printer, 
1988) . 
Carroll, A. and Evans, L. "Towards a Theory of the Firm: The Principal Agent 
Approach" (Victoria University of Wellington, 1991, Chapter pending 
publication) 
Condliffe, J.B., New Zealand in the Making ( George Allen and Unwin, 1930). 
Coopers & Lybrand and Associates, Report on Kiwifruit Marketing : Final 
Report ( N.Z Kiwifuit Marketing Authority, 1988) 
Cramer, G.L. and Jensen, C.W., Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness : An 
Introduction (John Wiley and Sons, 1979). 
Drummond , I.M ., British Economic Policy and the Empire, 1919-1939 (Allen 
and Unwin , 1972). 
Drummond, I.M., "Marketing Boards in the White Dominions with Special 
Reference to Australia and Canada" in Platt, D.C.M. (ed) Argentina, 
Australia and Canada, Studies in Comparative Development, 1870-1965 
(MacMillan, 1985). 
Evans , B.L ., A History of Agricultural Marketing and Production in New 
Zealand (Keeling and Mundy , 1969). 
150 
Fairburn, M., "The Farmers Take Over (1912-1930)" in Sinclair, K. (ed) The 
Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand (Oxford University Press, 
1990). 
Gardner, W.J., "The Farmer Politician in New Zealand History" Massey 
University Occasional Publications No 3 (Massey University, 1970). 
Glezakos, C., "Export Instability and Economic Growth: A Statistical 
Verfication" Economic Development and Cultural Change, Volume 21, 
July 1973. 
Gorringe, P., "Some Recent Developments in the Economics of Property 
Rights and Transaction Costs" (Unpublished Paper, Wellington, 1990). 
Graham, B.D., "The Country Party Idea in New Zealand Politics, 1901-1935" in 
Chapman, R. and Sinclair, K. (ed) Studies of a Small Democracy: Essays 
in Honour of Willis Airey (Halstead Press, 1963). 
Greensmith, E.L. and Philpott, B.P., The New Zealand Wool Commission (N.Z. 
Wool Marketing Corporation, 1976). 
Hawke, G.R., The Making of New Zealand: An Economic History (Cambridge 
University Press, 1985). 
Hayward , D., Golden Jubilee: The Story of Fifty Years of the New Zealand Meat 
Producers Board, 1922-1972 (Universal Printers, 1972). · 
Hereford, P.S.E., The New Zealand Frozen Meat Trade (New Zealand Publishing 
Co, 1932). 
Hill, B.E. and Ingersent, K.A., An Economic Analysis of Agriculture 
(Heinemann, 1982) . 
Institute of Policy Studies and The Economic Development Commission, The 
Producer Board Seminar Papers (July, 1988) 
Institute of Policy Studies, State Owned Enterprises : Privatisation and 
Regulation - Options and Issues (IPS, 1988) 
Kindleberger, C.P., International Economics (Irwin, 1973) 
Lloyd Pritchard, M.F., An Economic History of New Zealand to 1939 (Collins, 
1970) . 
MacBean, A.I., Export Instability and Economic Development (Allen and 
Unwin, 1966) 
Maizels , A., "A Book Review of 'Export Instability and Economic 
Development', A.I. MacBean", Economic Development and Cultural 
Change , July 1973. 
Martin, J., A Profession of Statecraft?: Three Essays on Some Current Issues in 
the New Zealand Public Service (Institute of Policy Studies, 1988). 
Martin, S.K., "An Integrated Framework for analysing Agricultural 
Marketing Issues" Lincoln College, Agricultural Economics Research 
Unit, Research Report No 179 (Lincoln College, 1986). 
1 5 1 
Martin , S.K. and Zwart, A.C. "A Contractual Framework for Evaluating 
Agricultural and Horticultural Marketing Channels" Lincoln College, 
Agricultural Economics Research Unit, Research Report No 178 
(Lincoln College, 1986). 
Mascarenhas, R.C .... Public Enterprise in New Zealand (New Zealand Institute 
of Public Administration, 1982). 
McKinlay, P., Corporatisation: The Solution for State Owned Enterprise? 
(Institute of Policy Studies, 1987). 
McKinlay, P.,"Going International: The Role of Producer Boards" Agricultural 
Policy Proceedings; No 10 (Centre for Agricultural Policy Studies, 
Massey University, 1988). 
Moriarty, M.J . (ed), New Zealand Farm Production and Marketing (Oxford 
University Press, 1963). 
Maughan, C.W. and Schroder, W.R., "A Marketing System for the New Zealand 
Meat Industry" Centre for Agricultural Policy Studies, Massey 
University , Agricultural Policy Discussion Paper, No 4 . (Massey 
University, 1983). 
Murray , D., "Export Earnings Instability: Price, Quantity, Supply, Demand ?" 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, October 1978. 
Newbury, D.M.G. & Stiglitz, J.E., Theory of Commodity Stabilisation: A Study in 
the Economics of Risk (Clarendon Press, 1981). 
New Zealand Marketing Development Board, Directions in Foreign Exchange 
Earnings : Export Marketing Systems for Primary Produce (July, 1988). 
Nicholson, W ., Microeconomics Theory : Basic Principles and Extensions (Holt 
Saunders, 1985). 
O'Connor, P.S., "Mr Massey and the American Meat Trust" Massey University 
Occassiona/ Publications No 4 (Massey University, 1972). 
Oliver, W.H . (ed), The Oxford History of New Zealand (Oxford University Press, 
1981). 
Philpott, B.P. and Stewart, J.D ., "Capital Income and Output in New Zealand 
Agriculture , 1922-1956", Economic Record , Volume 34, August, 1958. 
Philpott, B.P. et a/ "Estimates of Farm Income and Productivity in New 
Zealand, 1921-65" Lincoln College, Agricultural Economics Research 
Unit , Research Report No 30 (Lincoln College, 1967). 
Philpott, B.P. and Hussey, D.D., "Productivity and Income in New Zealand 
Agriculture , 1921-69" Lincoln College , Agricultural Economics 
Research Unit , Research Report No 56 (Lincoln College, 1969). 
Philpott, B.P., "A 'Price-Less' Agriculture in a 'Cost Plus' Economy" Project on 
Economic Planning, Discussion Paper No 4 (Victoria University of 
Wellington , 1975). 
Philpott, H.G., A History of the New Zealand Dairy Industry (Government 
Printer, 1937). 
152 
Quigley, N.C., Private Superannuation in the Banking Industry: A Centennial 
History of the Bank of New Zealand Officers' Provident Association 
(BNZ Officers Provident Association, 1988). 
Rae, A.N., "The Role and Performance of Statutory Marketing Organisations" 
Massey University, Department of Agricultural Economics and Farm 
Management, Discussion Paper No 56 (Massey University, Nov 1980). 
Rae, A.N., "Frameworks, Theories and Methods for Analysis of Marketing 
Channels: A Marketing Literature Review" Agricultural Policy 
Discussion Paper, No 7 (Centre for Agricultural Policy Studies, Massey 
University, 1986). 
Rhodes, J.V., The Agricultural Marketing System (Wiley, 1983) 
Simkin, C.F.G ., The Instability of a Dependent Economy (Oxford University 
Press, 1951). 
Sinclair, K., A History of New Zealand (Penguin, 1984). 
Sinclair, K . (ed) The Oxford Illustrated History of New Zealand (Oxford 
University Press, 1990). 
Smith, W.M., The Marketing of Australian and New Zealand Primary Products. 
(Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons, 1936). 
Stein, L.,"Export Instability and Development: A Review of Some Recent 
Findings" Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, Quarterly, September 1977, No 
122, pp 279-290. 
Stephens, F.B., "Cooperation in New Zealand" (pp 745-764) in Belshaw, H., et 
al, Agricultural Organisation in New Zealand: A Survey of Land 
Utilisation, Farm Organisation, Finance and Marketing (Melbourne 
University Press, 1936). 
Sutch, W.B., Colony or Nation: Economic Crises in New Zealand from the 1860s 
to the 1960s (Sydney University Press, 1966). 
Teece, D.J., "Towards an Economic Theory of the Multiproduct Firm" Journal 
of Economic Behaviour and Organisation 3 (1982) pp. 39-63 
Tsokhas, K., "W.M.Hughes, The Imperial Wool Purchase and the Pastoral 
Lobby, 1914-1920" The Australian National University, Working Papers 
in Economic History No 106 (Australian National University, 1988). 
Wallace, L.T. and Lattimore, R. (ed), Rural New Zealand - What Next? 
(Agribusiness and Economics Reasearch Unit, Lincoln College, 1987). 
Ward, A.H., A Command of Co-operatives (New Zealand Dairy Board, 1975). 
Williamson, O.E., "The Modem Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes" 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol XIX (December 1981), pp. 1537-
1568. 
Williamson, O.E., The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (MacMillan, 1985). 
Woods, R., The Role of the Producer Boards (Economic Development 
Commission, 1988). 
153 
Yotopoulos, P.A. & Nugent, J.B., Economics of Development: Empirical 
Investigations (Harper & Row, 1976). 
